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PREFACE 
t is my pleasure to introduce this ambitious and forward-looking report of 
the  CEPS-ECMI  Task  Force  on  Supporting  Long-Term  Investing  and 
Retirement  Savings.  The  report  emphasises  the  potential  of  mobilising 
financial wealth for long-term investing to the benefit of both the citizens of 
Europe and the European economy. 
When the words “long-term” are used, they may sound as if the matter 
were  not  urgent.  Nothing,  however,  could  be  further  from  the  truth,  for 
Europe  is  facing  a  double  challenge:  a  significant  need  for  long-term 
investments – crucial levers for job creation, competitiveness and sustainable 
growth – and a growing pension gap, both of which call for resolute action. 
A more prudent regulation in Europe following the 2008 economic and 
financial crisis has meant less availability of capital with the profile of being 
long-term  and  willing  to  accept  risk.  Capital  markets  are  called  to  play  an 
increasingly important role to channel savings into the productive economy. 
Long-term capital is needed to fuel the competitive position of Europe in 
today’s  globalised  world  and  protect  the  welfare  of  its  citizens.  It  is  of 
paramount  importance  that  available  patient  capital  can  find  its  way  into 
investment  opportunities  that  push  Europe’s  competiveness  forward  – 
whether fully private or in the form of public-private partnerships. 
In parallel, the pension gap is widening and thus threatening the well-
being  of  younger  generations.  In  parts  of  Europe,  a  sustainable  pension 
structure does  either  not  exist  or  it  is underfunded.  Moreover,  in countries 
where  a  pension  structure  does  exist,  many  of  the  schemes  are  based  on 
guaranteed  structures  or  defined  benefits.  The  low  interest  rates  are 
challenging these models, dating back to periods with much higher interest 
rates and a more relaxed mechanism regarding mutual reallocation of wealth 
between beneficiaries. When combined with the demographic changes, we can 
expect a clash between generations where the future workforce will have to 
pay a substantial part of their income to support future pensioners. Apart from 
the moral aspect, it will dramatically dampen growth and lead to brain drain 
both at national and European level. Equally scary, and just as unacceptable, is 
the increasing risk of creating an impoverished class of the elderly in Europe. 
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Europe has not succeeded so far in building a single market for private 
pensions, where savings and related services can move freely across borders. 
Some  member  states  have fairly solid  systems,  frequently  occupational.  But 
others lack even a basic framework. A well-articulated single market, however, 
could benefit both by delivering significant efficiencies. Lower costs, due to 
scale, are probably the most straightforward benefit, but a single market could 
also be made to deliver eased access and transferability.  
In  reforming  the  prudential  rules for  insurers  and  pension  funds,  via 
Solvency  II  and  IORP  II,  respectively,  it  is  possible  to  combine  prudent 
governance with a higher traction for real assets. Governments do not deliver 
real  returns.  Only  companies  and  businesses  can  do  that.  No  sustainable 
retirement plans can be based primarily on investments in government bonds. 
By  its  very  nature  this  would  be  degenerating  for  Europe.  The  increased 
prudency in the new regulation is needed, but with a few amendments the risk 
models  could  better  reflect  the  long-term  nature  of  pension  and  insurance 
plans. 
This Task Force has focused on producing concrete proposals to address 
these  challenges.  The  current  and  projected  economic  situation  in  Europe 
renders  action  urgent.  It  is  unrealistic  to  wait  for  occupational  pensions  to 
develop  in  countries,  industries  or  areas  where  no  schemes  exist  today. 
Instead,  our  efforts  should  concentrate  on  personal  pensions,  in  which 
employers may choose to contribute, and in gearing such pension solutions 
towards the long-term. 
It  has  been  a  pleasure  chairing  this  CEPS-ECMI  Task  Force,  which 
brought together nearly 45 participants from industry, academia and policy-
making. Despite the diverse interests around the table, I feel we managed to 
keep the focus on Europe and its citizens throughout the discussions. I would 
like to thank all contributors for their dedicated work.  
I am also grateful to CEPS and ECMI for proposing and developing this 
Task Force. Hard work and enthusiasm were shown by Karel Lannoo, CEO of 
CEPS, and Mirzha de Manuel, author of the report. I would like to express my 
deepest respect to them for their work and commitment to this project. 
Allan Polack 
Chairman of the Task Force 
CEO, Nordea Asset Management 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
ostering long-term investing practices in funded pension plans, as well as 
retail access to these and other long-term investing solutions, probably 
constitutes the most significant opportunity to increase the availability of 
long-term financing in the European economy, while raising income adequacy 
at retirement. Europe faces a dual challenge: delivering strong and sustainable 
economic growth while bridging the widening pension gap, bringing strain on 
living standards and public finances. To realise these goals, the development of 
more inclusive, efficient and resilient retail investment markets plays a central 
role. Against this background, and based on the key conclusions summarised 
below,  the  members  of  this  CEPS  ECMI  Task  Force  present  the  following 
recommendations to policy-makers and regulators.1 
* * * * * 
1. Place households, as end investors and beneficiaries, at the heart of the 
debate on long-term investing. 
► Households are direct owners or indirect beneficiaries of 60% of financial 
assets in Europe. And they face a growing need to save more, and more 
efficiently, for retirement and other future consumption needs, implying 
long-term investment horizons, amidst growing longevity. 
► At the macroeconomic level, long-term investing drives the productive 
capacity of an economy. But from a microeconomic perspective, it hangs 
on mobilising available long-term savings through investment solutions 
devised to maximise returns over the long-term, removing market and 
regulatory barriers.  
Long-term investing by, or on behalf of, households.   Whether market or other 
risks  are  internalised  by  the  intermediary  –  providing  an  insurance  or  a 
guarantee  –  or  are  borne  directly  by  the  beneficiaries,  both  solutions  are 
compatible with long-term investing. By offering a guarantee the provider 
                                                        
1 A full list of members (and observers) is presented in Annex 2. Please note the disclaimer 
featured in the copyright page of this report.  
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has  a  controlling  incentive  to  realise  long-term  investing  practices,  albeit 
skewing asset allocation towards less-risky assets (bonds). In the absence of 
guarantees, more freedom in asset allocation represents a higher long-term 
investing potential but demands careful alignment of incentives and solution 
design. Pure long-term investing needs full illiquidity towards end investors 
during  its  life-cycle,  eliminating  the  possibility  of  early  redemptions.  Yet, 
liquidity facilitates investor entry, competition and portability in fragmented 
markets.  
Read more in Chapter 1 (Sections 2 and 3) 
2. Enable and foster the access to long-term investing solutions for retail 
clients, including for retirement planning purposes. 
► Retail investors and beneficiaries need easily accessible, high-quality and 
cost-efficient  long-term  savings  and  investment  solutions.  While  such 
solutions exist in some member states, they are lacking or sub-standard 
in others. 
► Standardisation of «default» solutions would help retail access by raising 
visibility, mitigating complexity and the burden of choice, and focusing 
competition on quality and costs. Such regulated solutions could hence 
be sold on an execution-only basis (see below).  
► Any  reform  efforts  should  be  mindful  that  financial  exclusion  in  the 
markets  for  long-term  savings/investments  is  widespread  and  only 
partially explained by disposable income. Broadly accessible solutions 
are needed, including for the most vulnerable. 
Less-liquid investment funds for retail investors. EU product rules for retail 
balanced funds, with an asset allocation geared towards the long-term and 
limited redemption opportunities, would broaden access by retail investors 
to  less-liquid  assets.  Such  long-term  balanced  funds  would  complete  the 
retail market, in addition to UCITS and the closed-end ELTIFs. Task Force 
members believe that the proposed closed-end ELTIFs would only be suitable 
for a minority of retail investors – given the high allocations to less-liquid 
assets  –  whilst  long-term  balanced  funds  could  contribute  significantly  to 
financial inclusion. This Report weighs the merits of such balanced funds and 
explores an accompanying market structure.  
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3. Set a regulatory and supervisory framework strengthening the quality 
of long-term investment and retirement solutions – in a competitive market 
setting, delivering value primarily to investors. 
► Investors in some markets perceive that funded pensions fail to deliver 
value. While volatile underlying market returns over the last years are 
primarily to blame, poor solution design and poorly organised markets 
for funded pensions also sometimes explain poor net performance. 
► In addition to solution design, policy-makers should consider measures 
addressing market structure. The single market potential should be fully 
exploited in this respect – overcoming barriers such as the fragmentation 
of processing and inconsistent taxation principles.  
Pan-European personal pensions. The provision of pensions is moving from 
traditional defined benefit to hybrid and defined contribution arrangements. 
Europe needs to equip itself better for this transition. An EU framework for 
personal pensions is needed to raise the quality of these solutions, notably by 
aligning incentives with long-term investing and retirement objectives while 
requiring appropriate risk management. An EU framework is also needed to 
address sub-optimal market structure and industrial organisation, including 
by widening accessibility and exploiting the potential of market integration. 
This Report considers key trade-offs in the design and delivery of personal 
pensions and suggests a blueprint for pan-European solutions, composed of 
six building blocks, with a clear retirement and long-term investing focus.  
Read more in Chapter 3 and Table 10 
4. Strengthen the framework for investor protection, while optimising it 
to promote long-term investing.  
► When investing long-term, agency conflicts are magnified, as well as the 
cumulative impact of costs, given compounding. Investors may also be 
unfamiliar with long-term investment practices or limits on redemptions. 
Information and sale requirements should be attentive to these respects. 
► While financial advice can help individuals make well-informed choices, 
the embedded costs ultimately reduce net returns and act as a barrier for 
small investors to enter the market. Actions to both moderate complexity 
and guide choices are needed to facilitate access to long-term investment 
and retirement solutions. 
«Default solutions», advice and sale process. For retirement solutions, given 
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impact of costs on end benefits, any assessment of suitability should be based 
on broad market coverage and take full account of charges and costs. In a 
related vein,   the large share of individuals who can hardly afford investment 
advice should be given the option to access cost-effective and high-quality 
«default solutions» on an execution-only basis. The words «default solutions» 
refer here to standardised solutions subject to product rules and available for 
purchase on an execution-only basis or within a pension plan, as described in 
this Report.  
Read more in Chapter 2 (Section 3) and Chapter 3 (Section 4) 
5. Continue to modernise the prudential rules and supervisory framework 
for the provision of guarantees. 
► Task Force members recognise the merits of the Solvency II process and 
its role in driving greater sophistication in investment practices and risk 
management. Solvency II is also an important tool to safeguard financial 
stability and competition dynamics.  
► It is crucial, however, that Solvency II reflects the risks effectively born in 
life insurance, including the mitigation effects derived from asset liability 
management (ALM). The ‘matching adjustment’ is central in this respect 
but the effects of ALM should also be recognised in capital charges. 
► Task Force members support the approximation of qualitative aspects in 
national IORP legislation. As for quantitative aspects, more research is 
needed, given the diversity of the sector in Europe, including in terms of 
security and adjustment mechanisms. Yet, arbitrage between insurer and 
pension fund operations, where comparable, should be avoided. 
Long-term investing within Solvency II. Reflecting the fundamentals of asset 
liability management is important for capturing the risks to which insurers 
and beneficiaries are actually exposed. It is essential to support best practices 
in the operation of life insurance and accurate reporting to stakeholders. In 
addition, extending the eligibility for the ‘matching adjustment’ to securities 
with an expected cash-flow profile similar to bonds could facilitate long-term 
investing, including in infrastructure and others. Moreover,  capital  charges 
for  sovereign  debt  should  be  reconciled  with  economic  reality  to  avoid 
distorting  asset  allocation  to  the  detriment  of  long-term  investing.  This 
Report  considers  long-term  investing  when  guarantees  are  offered  and 
necessitate prudential requirements. 
Read more in Chapter 1 (Section 3) 
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The reform of the IORP directive. The  diversity  of  occupational  pensions  in 
Europe calls for caution on the approximation of prudential rules. The reform 
of the IORP directive should distinguish between dealing with legacy issues 
versus prospectively devising a framework for the future workplace pensions 
in Europe. Quantitative requirements should fully reflect the characteristics 
of pension contracts and the distribution of risks among participants, sponsor 
and any other stakeholder. Ultimately, given the magnitude of pension funds 
as operators in financial markets and the need to preserve financial stability, 
quantitative requirements should be approximated – taking due account of 
the diversity of pension funds and national pension systems. Approximation 
should not be undertaken in haste and member states should retain flexibility 
to deal with instances of underfunding. 
Read more in Chapter 2 (Section 2) 
* * * * * 
In sum, the Task Force members believe the recommendations above would 
contribute to the development of more inclusive, efficient and resilient retail 
investment markets, which are better equipped and more committed to deliver 
value over the long-term for beneficiaries. In so doing, they believe long-term 
investing could be significantly increased, to the benefit of both investors and 
the economy. In addition to high quality intermediated solutions for long-term 
investing, Task Force members also encourage the development of accessible 
markets for retail direct investments in equities and, specially, bonds – as an 
additional way to foster long-term investing and capital markets in Europe. 
Collective investment schemes offer however better diversification than direct 
access by retail investors. 
* * * * * 6  
1.  SETTING THE SCENE: 
LONG-TERM INVESTING AND 
RETIREMENT SAVINGS IN EUROPE 
his first  chapter  provides  an  overview  of  the multifaceted concept  of 
long-term investing and a stylised picture of both retail and institutional 
investing today, setting the scene for the remaining two chapters of the 
report. It explains the focus of the Task Force in enabling and promoting long-
term investing in the interest of beneficiaries. 
Beyond the precise definition of long-term investing from a macroeconomic 
perspective,  this  chapter  argues  that  in  practical  terms  what  matters  is  the 
implementation  of  long-term  investing  through  product  mix  and  business 
model  innovation,  as  well  as  market  settings  and  structures,  in  order  to 
stimulate supply and satisfy unmet demand for long-term investing among 
investors and beneficiaries. 
1.1  What is long-term investing?  
Long-term investing is a multi-faceted concept... 
In defining long-term investing, the focus can be placed on different elements: 
investors  themselves,  investment  strategies  and  behaviour,  asset  classes  or 
even the ultimate non-financial underlying. It is also possible to follow a macro 
or a micro approach to the definition of long-term investing. Definitions can be 
based on objective factors (for instance investment horizons) or more subjective 
considerations, such as social usefulness. 
  The identification of long-term investors 
Long-term investing has been frequently defined with reference to the role of 
institutional investors as providers of patient, engaged and productive capital 
(OECD, 2013a). This includes notably defined benefit pension funds and life 
insurers  –  with  an  average  duration  of  their  liabilities  of  7  to  15  years  and 
assets under management in excess of $22 trillion globally – but also family 
offices,  endowments  and  foundations,  and  sovereign  wealth  funds  –  with 
longer  liability  profiles  but  global  assets  below  $6  trillion (World  Economic 
Forum & Oliver Wyman, 2011).  
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A long-term investor depends chiefly on its liability profile and its ability to 
ride out short-term volatility while taking advantage of low prices and illiquid 
investment opportunities. A long-term investor therefore has no specific short-
term liabilities or liquidity demands, or otherwise these are small in proportion 
to its total portfolio (Ang & Kjaer, 2011).  
Institutional investors are widely recognised as “the natural providers of long-
term finance in the financial system” (FSB, 2013) to the extent that the duration 
of  their  liabilities  is  suited  to  fund  assets  with  long  lifecycles.2  Hence,  the 
question is not whether institutional investors can perform long-term investing 
but the extent to which they do and whether any market or regulatory barriers 
distort their behaviour.3  
Other institutions also perform a role as long-term investors despite having a 
liability  profile  that  may  be  shorter-term  or  more  uncertain  than  the  ones 
above.  Banks  are  the  most  important  long-term  investors  by  size  in  many 
jurisdictions. In Europe, they provide over 50% of long-term investing, and in 
China over 70% while in the US less than 20% (G30, 2013, p. 29). More than half 
of the long-term lending by banks are mortgages, however, which frequently 
finance the consumption of housing rather than “the expansion of productive 
capacity in the economy”(G30, 2013, p. 30). 
The future contribution of banks to long-term investing is uncertain, as they 
undergo a process of deleveraging and adjustment following the 2008 financial 
crisis and the introduction of new regulations under Basel III. From a financial 
stability  perspective,  reduced  incentives  for  banks  to  fund  long-term 
investments on short-term liabilities are welcomed (FSB, 2013, p. 14), but they 
open  a  transition  period  where  it  is  crucial  to  i)  maximise  the  long-term 
potential of institutional investors and ii) promote the development of market-
based finance, particularly in Europe. 
The role of banks, capital markets and institutional investors should not be 
considered  in  isolation, however.  Structured  finance can  help  channel  long-
term funding towards long-term investment opportunities via capital markets, 
allowing  institutional  investors  and  beneficiaries  to  profit  from  the 
underwriting expertise of local bank branches. High-quality securitisation can 
                                                        
2 Only fixed and long-term liabilities allow institutional investors to access less-liquid asset 
classes, without jeopardising financial stability derived from potential liquidity shortfalls or 
maturity mismatches. 
3 Such is the focus of the OECD project on ‘institutional investors and long-term investing’, 
in  addition  to  the  promotion  of  responsible  share  ownership  (OECD,  2013).  A  private 
initiative,  the  Long-term  Investors  Club,  also  aims  at  clarifying  the  status  of  long-term 
investors,  with  respect  to  accounting  and  prudential  rules,  and  promoting  long-term 
investing. Section 1.4 considers institutional long-term investment today. 8 | SETTING THE SCENE: LONG-TERM INVESTING AND RETIREMENT SAVINGS IN EUROPE 
indeed be useful in this respect. The challenge is to control some of the risks 
inherent in the process, such as complexity, transparency and volume-based 
incentives, which led to the 2008 sub-prime crisis.4 
Investment funds also play a useful role in long-term investing, depending on 
their investment objectives and redemption profile. Retail funds are considered 
institutional investors (OECD, 2013a). Traditional retail funds, such as UCITS 
(undertakings  for  collective  investment  in  transferable  securities)  or  mutual 
funds,  offer  high  liquidity  to  investors,  in  terms  of  redemptions.  Yet,  their 
investment  objectives  may  project  over  the  long-term  and  their  volume  of 
assets under management may remain stable over time. Examples are ‘buy and 
hold’ strategies and some target-date funds. Other retail funds invest primarily 
or  partially  in  less-liquid  assets  under  redemption  policies  that  incorporate 
restrictions, e.g. limited windows, advanced notice requirements and lock-in 
periods. 
While  identifying  the  long-term  investors  currently  operating  in  the 
marketplace is certainly useful in order to promote their role, it should not 
obscure the potential for innovation in the business model and product mix, 
nor the fiduciary role of institutional investors.  
  Asset classes that are compatible or require long-term investing 
Most asset classes are not short-term or long-term per se but can be part of 
long-term investing depending both on the strategy of the investor and the 
ultimate non-financial underlying. As a general rule, asset classes that are less-
liquid or have maturities that extend beyond the business cycle require long-
term investing (FSB, 2013). The illiquidity elicits the commitment to the assets, 
which the investor is unlikely to be able to sell at short notice at fair value. It 
increases not only the likelihood of large costs in case of early exit but also 
results  in  very  certain  and  palpable  entry  costs  –  including  discovery, 
appraisal, valuation and legal costs – given the lack of public markets. 
Asset classes compatible with long-term investing include fixed-income under 
long maturities (at least 10 years or in line with business cycle), listed equity, 
non-listed equity and infrastructure (WEF-OW, 2011). But a number of factors 
determine the extent to which the use of these instruments is longer-term: 
◦ Equity  vs. fixed-income  risk.  The  payoff  and  risk characteristics  of  long-
term investments are more akin to equity than to debt. This is very much 
                                                        
4 An industry initiative, Prime Collateralised Securities (PCS, 2013), was launched in 2012 to 
help revive the securitisation market in Europe, badly hit following the 2008 financial crisis. 
The initiative is aimed at promoting securitisation by issuing standards and awarding the 
PCS label based on criteria of quality, transparency, simplicity and standardisation. SAVING FOR RETIREMENT AND INVESTING FOR GROWTH | 9 
the case in ‘project finance’ where the return on investment depends on the 
project cash flow rather than the financial strength of a counterparty (see 
below). In this context however, structured finance provides solutions to 
identify and disaggregate risks, allocating them to different investors in line 
with their position, capabilities and risk appetite (Yescombe, 2002). 
◦ Listed  vs.  non-listed  equity.  While  all  equity  instruments  confer  similar 
rights onto shareholders, equities listed in public markets offer liquidity to 
investors. Non-listed equities therefore require a longer-term commitment 
from investors. At the same time, perceived pressure on quarterly earnings 
in public markets is inducing some healthy and mature listed companies to 
consider going private, as they feel public markets would not support any 
conversion producing results over the long-term rather than in the next few 
quarters.5 
◦ Tradable vs. held to maturity. Fixed-income assets purchased to be held to 
maturity provide a stable funding basis for issuers, helping to balance the 
pressure on short-term performance from public markets. From the point of 
view  of  the  investor,  holding  a  debt  instrument  to  maturity  results  in  a 
mutation of relevant risks; spread risk – the risk of losses given short-term 
market fluctuations in the valuation of an instrument – gives way to default 
risk – the risk that the issuer may default during the life of the instrument.  
◦ Direct vs. intermediated access. Additional intermediation or outsourcing 
allows institutional investors – asset owners in this context – to i) access 
expertise outside mainstream asset classes and ii) pool their capital with 
similar  investors,  where  required  by  the  sheer  size  of  the  investment  or 
prudent to benefit from diversification. It does result however in agency 
conflicts  and  costs,  given  the  difficulty  in  aligning  the  interests  of 
intermediaries and asset owners.6 Direct access is not always feasible but 
has the potential to optimise strategy and maximise returns net of fees. The 
extent to which institutional investors can perform direct access depends 
not only on the size of their balance sheet but also on their willingness to 
generate  internal  expertise  and  capabilities.  Market  size  explains  the 
average size of institutional investors and depends, in the EU context, on 
the level of integration of the single market.  
                                                        
5 The European Commission proposed in 2011 to forego the regulatory requirement for 
quarterly reporting [COM (2011) 683 final].  
6 So far policy action to align interests has focused on remuneration and has affected more 
directly managers of investment funds (while for institutional investors, remuneration rules 
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◦ Strategic  vs.  satellite  investing.  For  equity  instruments,  the  difference  is 
usually made between major stakes held for strategic purposes and other 
‘satellite’ investments that help achieve diversification.7 Strategic holdings 
are more likely to be held over the long-term and to command the interest 
of asset owners for active engagement. In effect, the benefits from active 
share ownership and engagement relate positively to the amount of capital 
committed and the investment horizon.  
The figure below, adapted from the report of the World Economic Forum and 
Oliver Wyman (2011) on long-term investing, presents an overview of asset 
classes and their compatibility with long-term investing.  
Figure 1. Liquidity, life-cycle and compatibility with long-term 
investing for selected asset classes 
 
Source: Adapted from WEF-OW (2011, p. 14). 
  The ultimate non-financial underlying of long-term investing 
The Group of Thirty (2013), the European Commission (2013a) and the FSB 
(2013)  all  propose  similar  definitions  of  long-term  investment  based  on  the 
concept  of  gross  fixed-capital  formation  in  national  accounting.  Long-term 
investing would therefore include investment in infrastructure, new real estate 
development, equipment and software – tangibles – as well as in education, 
                                                        
7 Even when asset allocation remains stable, however, an asset owner may change funds or 
mandates at short intervals, based on short-term performance, which is an issue of concern 
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research and development – intangibles. It would exclude both financial capital 
formation  (financing  for  consumption  smoothing,  financial  institutions  and 
liquidity or payments) and consumption, including consumer durables. The 
focus  is  hence  on  productive  investment  that  can  extend  the  frontiers  of 
productivity, competitiveness and growth in an economy.  
The European Commission further specifies the ultimate underlying of long-
term  investing  in  line  with  the  priorities  of  its  broader  growth  strategy8:  i) 
energy, transport and communication infrastructures, ii) industrial and service 
facilities, iii) housing and iv) climate change and eco-innovation technologies.9 
The challenge of delimiting the scope of these different underlyings should not 
be  underestimated,  as  highlighted  for  instance  by  the  OECD  (2011)  with 
respect to infrastructure (Della Croce, 2011).  
It is worth noting in addition that, given the underlyings identified, the notion 
of long-term investing appears closely connected to ‘project finance’, meaning 
the financing of projects where investors bear (and frequently manage to some 
extent) technical, environmental, economic and political risks specific to the 
project, and the return on their investment depends chiefly on the cash flow 
generated by the project rather than the financial standing of any counterparty 
(Yescombe, 2002). The pursuit of long-term investing practices should also be 
stimulated, however, in the field of traditional equities and bonds.  
  Long-term investment behaviour and incentives 
Long-term investing is also defined from a behavioural perspective, focusing 
on the intent of a qualified investor to hold an asset over an indefinite period of 
time (WEF-OW, 2011). The intent, expertise, expectations and ultimately the 
behaviour and incentives of the investor are indeed as important as its liability 
horizon. 
Behaviour  and  incentives  are  discussed  in  this  context  both  to  explain  the 
apparent short-term bias of some agents and prescribe solutions that would 
promote long-term investing. Within the asset management value chain, most 
stakeholders identify performance and risk measurement as the main hurdle 
for long-term investing:  
                                                        
8 The Europe 2020 strategy (ec.europa.eu/europe2020) and the development of its ‘flagship’ 
initiatives, including in terms of industrial policy (EC, 2012), innovation policy (EC, 2010) 
and integrated European infrastructures (EC, 2011). 
9 These priorities also inform the request from the Commission (2012a) to EIOPA to calibrate 
capital  charges for  long-term  investing  within  Solvency  II.  In  addition,  the financing of 
small-  and  medium-sized  enterprises  (SMEs),  social  business  financing  and  socially 
responsible investments – as presented in EC (2011b) and EC (2013b) respectively – are also 
regarded as elements of long-term investing (EC, 2013a, p. 1 and p. 15).  12 | SETTING THE SCENE: LONG-TERM INVESTING AND RETIREMENT SAVINGS IN EUROPE 
◦ Performance measurement in investment mandates is frequently based on a 
market benchmark, which the manager is called to outperform. The impact 
of benchmarks extends not only to the selection and appraisal of investment 
opportunities  but  also  the  remuneration  of  managers.  Benchmarks  that 
account  for  long-term  investment horizons  or  the  life-cycle  of  less-liquid 
asset classes are not readily available. Fundamental benchmarks, based on 
sector and macroeconomic conditions rather than market performance, can 
also play a role in disentangling individual from peer performance.  
◦ Typical  risk measurement  methodologies  are  based  on  past  performance 
and  short-term  horizons,  which  result  in  short-term  volatility  weighing 
excessively in investment decisions. The impact of these methodologies on 
asset allocation and risk management is magnified by its use for compliance 
and regulatory purposes.10 The perceived over-reliance on methodologies 
such as value-at-risk (VaR)11 is controversial not only from the perspective 
of  long-term  investing  but  also  due  to  the  widespread  belief  that  it 
contributed deeply to the irrational exuberance that led to the 2008 financial 
crisis (Turner, 2009; De Larosière et al., 2009). 
From the perspective of behaviour and incentives, long-term investing can be 
defined as an investment process that takes due account of the potential and 
characteristics of longer-term holding periods and less-liquid asset classes. It 
involves notably the use of aligned performance and risk measurement tools. 
Examples are: i) establishing absolute return targets over relative performance, 
ii) considering cash-flows and underlying economic drivers over market prices, 
iii) monitoring indications of potential short-term bias, such as high turnover, 
iv)  evaluating  managers  over  extended  periods  of  time  and  market 
circumstances and most importantly v) framing risk metrics within broader 
                                                        
10 For instance, the SCR (solvency capital requirement) under Solvency II is base on a VaR 
measure calibrated to a 99.5% confidence level over a one-year time horizon (Art. 101) – 
which corresponds to the worst loss one could expect in any single year in the next 200 
years, assuming normally distributed returns and based on historical market data. In CRD 
IV (Credit Requirements Directive) VaR is used for the purpose of calculating own funds 
(Art. 186). In UCITS, so-called ‘global exposure’ is limited with reference to VaR (ESMA 
guidelines, CESR/10-788). 
11 Value at risk (VaR) is an estimation of the maximum potential decrease in the market 
value of a portfolio based on historical market data and assuming a given distribution of 
returns (typically, the normal distribution) with a given confidence level. For instance, a 
VaR (20 days, 99%) of €5 million means that, under normally distributed returns in the 
marketplace, there is a 99% probability that a portfolio will not lose more than €5 million in 
value in 20 trading days. VaR does not provide information about potential loss outside the 
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analytical and operational frameworks, shifting the focus from measurement to 
management (WEF-OW, 2011; de Manuel & Lannoo, 2012, p. 77).  
Active ownership (engagement) and the consideration of environmental, social 
and governance (ESG) factors are also an integral part of long-term investing, 
as they drive incentives in a direction that promotes voice over exit, longer 
holding periods and comprehensive risk management (Hirschman, 1970; IISD, 
2012; IRI, 2006). 
  In sum... 
The concept of long-term investing is multi-faceted (Table 1 below summarises 
the definitions of long-term investing by key institutions). A long-term investor 
is defined chiefly by its liability profile and investment philosophy, while long-
term assets are defined by their duration or life cycle, in practice linked to their 
non-financial underlying and its potential externalities. The goals pursued by 
policy action refer both to financial stability – setting the right incentives for 
long-term investments to be funded by long-term liabilities – and sustained 
economic growth – by removing artificial deterrents and promoting investment 
in infrastructure, equipment, education and research and development, while 
encouraging the consideration of ESG criteria and active ownership. The key 
question remains how to bring these goals forward in practice.  
Table 1. Definitions of long-term investing provided by key institutions 
Group of 
Thirty 
(2013) 
“Long-term financing refers to the provision of long-dated funds to pay for capital-
intensive undertakings that have multi-year payback periods. Long-term investment is 
spending on the tangible and intangible assets that can expand the productive 
capacity of an economy.” 
European 
Commission 
(2013) 
“Long-term investment is the formation of long-lived capital, covering tangible assets 
and intangible assets that boost innovation and competitiveness.” 
OECD 
(2011) 
“Responsible and longer-term investment among institutional investors shares the 
following features: more patient capital that acts in a counter-cyclical manner; 
ongoing and direct engagement as shareholders and consideration of environmental 
and other longer-term risks; and an active role in the financing of long-term, 
productive activities that support sustainable growth.” 
WEF - OW 
(2011) 
“Long-term investing can be usefully defined as investing with the expectation of 
holding an asset for an indefinite period of time by an investor with the capability to 
do so.” 
Kay (2012)  Portrays a broad distinction between investing, focused on the activities of the 
company (business, strategy, profits) and trading, focused on the market for shares of 
a company (order flow, short-term correlations, arbitrage opportunities). 
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1.2  What is the focus of this report?  
Beneficiaries should be brought to the discussion... 
The section above explored the definition of long-term investing from various 
perspectives – referring to investors, asset classes, underlyings and behaviour – 
and  presented  the  main  approaches  and  policy  priorities  identified  by  the 
OECD,  the  Financial  Stability  Board  (FSB)  and  the  European  Commission. 
Policy-makers have identified two key macro-goals: long-term financing and 
productive investments. To realise these goals however, our attention should 
focus on micro-questions and beneficiaries. 
Households account directly for approximately 43% ($23 trillion) of financial 
assets  owned  by  residents  in  Western  Europe  (McKinsey  Global  Institute, 
2011).  And  they  are  the  beneficiaries  of  a  further  $10  trillion  held  by 
institutional investors in pension funds, individual retirement accounts and life 
insurance, that is, an additional 18% to 20% of assets. The remainder is held by 
non-life insurers (10% or $5 trillion) and banks (22% or $12 trillion). In total 
therefore, households are the direct owners or indirect beneficiaries of at least 
60% of financial assets in Europe (Figure 2). Section 1.3 and chapter 3 consider 
household wealth in more detail. 
Figure 2. Financial assets owned by residents in Western Europe, 2010 
Note:  Western  Europe  refers  to  EU-15,  Switzerland  and  Norway.  Institutional  investors  include 
pension  funds,  individual  retirement  accounts  (IRAs),  insurance  undertakings,  endowments  and 
foundations.  Other  institutions  refer  to  non-financial  corporations,  central  banks  and  sovereign 
wealth funds. Equity includes listed equity shares and equities held via mutual funds.  
Source: McKinsey Global Institute (2011). 
Beyond the widespread acknowledgement that institutional investors are “the 
most  natural  providers  of  long-term  finance  in  the  financial  system”  (FSB, 
2013), the debate on long-term investing would probably benefit from further 
Institutional investors
$15 trillion (28%)
Banks
$12 trillion (22%)
Others institutions
$4 trillion (7%)
Equity, $6.7 trillion (29%)
Fixed income, $3.2 trillion (14%)
Cash and equivalents, $12 trillion 
(52%)
Other financial assets, $1 trillion 
(4%)
Households
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reflection on the mobilisation of household wealth and the product offerings 
and business models of both insurance and asset management undertakings. 
The relevance of households to long-term investing arises therefore both from 
i) being the largest owner and beneficiary of financial assets in Western Europe 
and globally, and ii) the long-term horizon inherent in saving and investing for 
major  future  consumption  needs,  including  notably  retirement.  Current 
macroeconomic  conditions,  which  project  into  the  future,  such  as  fiscal 
sustainability, low interest rates and ageing, are determining factors. 
To date, the promotion of financial stability and sustainable economic growth 
have driven the debate on long-term investing. By contrast, the members of the 
CEPS-ECMI Task Force on Long-term Investing and Retirement Savings aimed 
to focus on the microeconomic level by bringing the interests of beneficiaries 
forward and discussing potential solutions for the share of their savings that 
could benefit from long-term investing. 
Our focus is on retail investment products... 
The potential of mobilising household financial wealth for long-term investing 
is elicited both by its size and the long-term horizons involved in investing for 
retirement. Against this background, the Task Force focused on the interest of 
beneficiaries to access long-term retail investment products. 
Retail investment products allow individuals to accumulate savings and gain 
market exposure (investment funds), a guaranteed return (insurance policies) 
or  a  combination  of  both.  Investment  funds  tend  to  offer  investors  high 
liquidity – the possibility to redeem daily – whereas insurance policies tend to 
incorporate limits to redemptions. 
The redemption policy towards investors determines the level of certainty and 
extension of the liability profile of the originator, although total assets under 
management may remain stable within certain thresholds even in the presence 
of  high  liquidity  for  investors,  particularly  for  funds  offering  competitive 
pricing and standardised diversification. 
Products offering high liquidity can be utilised by retail investors for long-term 
investing purposes, for instance to invest in a diversified equity basket with the 
intent of holding that basket over an indefinite period of time. Under such an 
investment horizon, an investor may however also wish to invest in less-liquid 
assets, such as unlisted equity, real estate or infrastructure. 
The liquidity of the underlying (the ability to sell it in the marketplace at short 
notice and fair value) and of the product units (the ability to redeem equally at 
short notice and fair value) are linked in several respects: 
◦ From a financial stability perspective, the liquidity of units and underlying 
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meet redemptions (de Manuel & Lannoo, 2012, p. 33). This principle holds 
whether market risks fall entirely on the investor or only partially – when a 
guarantee is given as to principal or return, the provider should in addition 
be duly capitalised. 
◦ From a retail investor perspective, the liquidity of product units is relevant 
in three respects: i) higher liquidity facilitates investor entry, since it lowers 
commitment and increases perceived empowerment; ii) enables competition 
for existing pools of savings, as well as portability in fragmented markets; 
but iii) may result in foregone returns, given the illiquidity premium, and 
lower diversification, as it inhibits access to less-liquid asset classes.12  
◦ From a long-term investing perspective, asset classes with longer maturities 
or  less-liquidity  are  better  funded  by  sources  with  similar  features  for 
investors. Similarly, longer liability profiles generally increase the incentives 
for responsible engagement. 
Retail investment products offering lower liquidity therefore have the potential 
to offer higher returns and diversification to investors who are able to commit 
their  capital  over  the  long-term  and  willing  to  accept  some  limits  to 
redemptions. However, since lower liquidity limits competition to administer 
existing pools of savings, the optimal level of liquidity towards investors also 
depends on market circumstances. For instance, in the European context, given 
incomplete integration of national markets, low liquidity could further limit 
cross-border  flows  and  increase  fragmentation.  Similarly,  lack  of  investor 
familiarity  with  illiquid  products  could  lead  to  sub-optimal  allocation. 
Liquidity,  however,  is  a  continuum  that  allows  for  intermediate  solutions. 
Moreover, actions could also be undertaken to remove the ancillary barriers 
above  –  consolidating  the  single  market,  improving  investor  education  or 
offering incentives to invest in less-liquid products. 
In view of the former, the Task Force and this report focus on less-liquid retail 
investment products, defined by their i) purpose – serving retail investors to 
accumulate savings and gain market exposure in order to maintain or increase 
the inflation-adjusted value of those savings; ii) investment horizon – in excess of 
10 years; iii) packaging – incorporating limits to redemptions that result in a 
certain liability profile for the originator and iv) underlying – which includes 
assets with long-term maturities and life cycles. 
Section 1.3 considers long-term retail investing today in more detail, including 
the liquidity profile of available retail investment products. 
                                                        
12  For  a  review  of  the  academic  literature  referring  to  the illiquidity  premium,  refer  to 
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Including personal retirement schemes... 
The accumulation and investment of retirement savings, undertaken from an 
early age, throughout working life and even during retirement, is probably the 
best example of the potential for long-term investing by individuals. 
The provision of retirement income takes different forms across countries and 
even professions. Most pension systems are based on three tiers: i) government 
or social security benefits, ii) occupational schemes and iii) individual savings. 
The term ‘personal pensions’ is used to refer to private pension solutions to 
which the employer may or may not make contributions, and hence can be part 
of the last two tiers (chapter 3). 
The importance of personal retirement schemes is elicited by demographic and 
economic trends. Longer life expectancies mean larger pools of capital will be 
needed to support income adequacy upon retirement.13 While the inversion of 
the age pyramid – more people receiving benefits than financing them – puts a 
strain on government and social security benefits to meet the challenge on their 
own.14  Personal  pensions  are  therefore  called  upon  to  supplement  income 
adequacy.  
Supporting the development of personal pensions in order to foster adequacy 
is indeed among the priorities identified by the European Commission (2012c) 
in its agenda for adequate, safe and sustainable pensions. 
The balance between safety and adequacy is hard to strike, however, notably in 
an environment of persistently low interest rates and dismal growth. Pension 
safety refers to the provision of guarantees, mostly supported by fixed-income 
strategies, devised to match assets and liabilities. But under low interest rates, 
providers are forced to re-orient their product offerings towards more limited, 
lower and conditional guarantees (lower adequacy and/or safety). Where no 
guarantees are offered, different investment strategies are possible, holding the 
potential for higher returns (potentially higher adequacy) but also higher risks 
(lower safety). 
Long-term investing is in line with the interest of beneficiaries in both product 
categories. A long-term liability profile allows product providers to hold assets 
to maturity, riding-out short-term volatility and concentrating on the economic 
fundamentals of the underlying. It also allows them to invest in equity markets 
with a long-term focus, which they can steer through engagement. And finally, 
                                                        
13 By 2060, life expectancy at birth is expected to raise by 7.9 years for men and 6.5 for 
women, compared to 2010 (European Commission, 2012b). 
14 By 2060, there will be two people of working age for every person over 65 – in 2010 there 
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they are able to invest in less-liquid assets and access the premia linked to their 
illiquidity. 
To maximise long-term investing in personal pensions, there are nevertheless a 
number of barriers to overcome, including: i) the difficulty in separating short-
term volatility from default risk, where assets are held to maturity; ii) cognitive 
limitations and behavioural biases, including myopic risk aversion, leading to 
sub-optimal  decisions  among  retail  investors;  and  iii)  the  structure  of  the 
market for personal pensions which may limit its ability to deliver full value to 
investors. Section 1.4 considers the first barrier, including the role of prudential 
rules, while chapters 2 and 3 consider the other two, with regard to investor 
protection and the markets for long-term investment solutions and pensions.  
1.3  Retail long-term investing today 
The previous section narrowed the focus of this report to the interest of retail 
investors and beneficiaries in accessing long-term investments, notably for the 
purpose of retirement provision. As noted above, households are direct owners 
or indirect beneficiaries of over 60% of financial assets in Europe and have high 
potential as long-term investors, given the horizons linked to saving for major 
future consumption needs, including retirement.  
This section considers retail long-term investment, by referring to the diversity, 
degree of liquidity and intermediation of retail investments in Europe, and the 
related institutional setting. 
A diverse picture in Europe… 
The distribution of household financial wealth across financial instruments and 
solutions is not homogenous within the EU.15 As shown in Figure 3, allocations 
to pension schemes and life insurance policies in some member states are large, 
both in absolute and relative terms, whereas in others, households allocate 20% 
or  less  of  their  financial  wealth  to  retirement  solutions.  Among  major 
economies, the Netherlands, UK and France are the best positioned, while Italy 
and Spain lag far behind. 
This diversity is attributable to multiple reasons, such as: i) total wealth and 
the balance between consumption and savings; ii) the institutional setting for 
retirement  provision  and  the  strength  of  first-pillar  pensions;  iii)  prevailing 
perceptions  about  retirement,  the  role  of  the  state  and  expectations  about 
                                                        
15 There is no homogeneity either in the weight of non-financial wealth (land and dwellings) 
in total wealth or its distribution. For instance, according to OECD statistics for 2010, land 
accounted  for  21%  of  total  household  wealth  in  the  Netherlands,  compared  to  43%  in 
France, and dwellings for 22% and 37%, respectively. SAVING FOR RETIREMENT AND INVESTING FOR GROWTH | 19 
future income; iv) lay perceptions about financial instruments, risk aversion 
and  investment  horizons,  v)  the  relative  weight  of  non-financial  assets  and 
attitudes versus real estate,16 vi) financial shrewdness and cost awareness and 
vii) taxation and other exogenous incentives. 
Yet, despite this diversity, Europeans from all origins face a growing need to 
save  more  for  retirement,  which  should  increase  allocations  to  targeted 
investment and insurance solutions, promoting convergence. Supporting the 
development of long-term savings is important, not only to enhance retirement 
incomes,  but  also  to  promote  long-term  investing  and  macroeconomic 
convergence within Europe (European Commission, 2013a, 2012c, 2012d).17 
Figure 3. Distribution of European household financial holdings, end 2011 (€ billion) 
 
Note: Total Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. Insurance includes life and composite undertakings.  
Source: Boston Consulting Group. 
                                                        
16 Many Europeans save primarily by investing in real estate, including their own dwelling. 
Other Europeans prefer to rent their residence. The return on one’s dwelling depends on the 
mix of purchase versus rent prices, financing conditions, taxation and the evolution of real 
estate prices.  
17  The  development  and  promotion  of  complementary  retirement  savings  is  one  of  the 
recommendations  issued  by  the  European  Commission  to  member  states  through  the 
‘Annual  Growth  Surveys’.  These  surveys  are  one  of  the  mechanisms  to  strengthen 
macroeconomic policy coordination in the EU (the ‘European Semester’ framework). 
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Intermediated over direct access… 
About 45% of household financial assets in Europe are not held directly but via 
intermediaries. An additional 35% is held in cash or deposits, while only 20% is 
estimated  to  correspond  to  direct  bond  and  equity  holdings  (Figure  4). 
Diversity is also present in this respect, with Italy boasting twice the European 
average in direct holdings, thanks to a competitive and accessible bond market 
for retail investors. 
Intermediation allows investors to benefit from professional management and 
diversification. Within retirement solutions, intermediation is indispensable to 
arbitrate insurance, repartition and solidarity mechanisms. These advantages 
make intermediation central to long-term investing by households – although 
not  all  forms  of  intermediation  are  conducive  to  long-term  investing  as 
discussed in section 1.1. 
Intermediation does however entail agency conflicts between the parties to the 
contractual relationship – household and provider – as their interests diverge. 
It also entails charges and costs, which depending on competition dynamics, 
can  be  sizeable  and  severely  dampen  net  returns  (EC,  2009).  Investor 
protection  and  competition  policies  are  hence  important  to  ensure 
intermediation delivers value primarily to beneficiaries rather than providers. 
When investing long-term, agency conflicts and the effects of charges and costs 
(given compounding) are magnified. While the interest of beneficiaries would 
be to maximise long-term performance, intermediaries may pay more attention 
to shorter-term results – given for instance reporting and valuation practices, 
market pressures or staff remuneration and tenures. Preserving the interest of 
beneficiaries may therefore warrant further public intervention in the markets 
for long-term and retirement savings (section 2.3, chapter 3 and Box 5). 
Beyond intermediation, long-term investing by households may also take place 
via direct holdings of equity and bonds and other simple instruments. In fact, 
direct holdings by households may provide more patient capital (with lower 
turnover) than some forms of intermediation. Direct access by retail investors 
to some market segments, however, in particular for corporate and sovereign 
bonds, is limited in most member states, both with regard to national and EU 
issuance (see section 2.4). SAVING FOR RETIREMENT AND INVESTING FOR GROWTH | 21 
Figure 4. Intermediation in European household financial holdings, end 2011 (€ trillion) 
 
Note: Total Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. Insurance includes life and composite undertakings.  
Source: Boston Consulting Group. 
Liquid over illiquid products… 
Over 90% of intermediated financial holdings by households are estimated to 
be moderately to fully illiquid, meaning they incorporate important restrictions 
on early redemptions or may only be redeemed upon maturity (typically upon 
retirement). This is the 40% of household financial wealth held in pensions and 
life insurance solutions.18 A similar percentage is held in cash or bank deposits 
and money market funds (the most liquid end of the spectrum) while 22% is 
invested in bonds, equities and investment funds – mostly UCITS whose units 
or shares can be redeemed daily (Figure 5). 
Illiquidity is linked to long-term investing to the extent that less-liquid asset 
classes typically require long-term funding. And long-term investing practices 
can only be safely pursued by intermediaries (on behalf of investors) if their 
liability profile is stable and can be anticipated with sufficient certainty – which 
involves restrictions on redemptions, either explicit or implicit in the event of 
market distress leading to mass redemptions. Life insurance and pension funds 
are positioned at the less-liquid end of the spectrum. 
                                                        
18 Some pension solutions and life insurance policies are redeemable before retirement but 
entail fees or penalties (endogenous barriers). In addition, taxation arrangements also tend 
to deter early redemptions (exogenous barriers). 
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Diversity in the liquidity of holdings is observable not only at the macro but 
also at micro level. In absolute terms, the individual weight of deposits and 
pension funds/life insurance is similar in Europe (Figure 5). However, ECB 
(2013) data reveal that deposits are the most prevalent financial asset, owned 
by 96% of households, recording a median value (conditional on ownership) of 
€6,100. By way of contrast, voluntary private pensions and whole life insurance 
are held by only 33% of households at an average value of €11,900. It follows 
therefore  that,  despite  similar  weight  in  absolute  terms,  the  distribution  of 
deposits  versus  pension  funds/life  insurance  is  very  unequal  at  the  micro-
level.  
The question that is the most pertinent but probably also the most difficult to 
answer is the share of holdings in cash and deposits that are long-term and 
might find better returns by being placed in less-liquid investment solutions. 
The  evidence  suggests  that  the  interest  of  households  in  deposits  is  driven 
more by perceived security and tax treatment than by immediate consumption 
needs, leading to account balances that are fairly stable over time (BME, 2007; 
OER, 2011).  
Alternatives to bank deposits exist but households may be deterred by several 
factors that are both subjective – lack of familiarity – and objective – diversity 
and relative complexity (section 2.1). Long-term investment solutions for retail 
investors  are  sometimes  scarcely  available  or  are  inappropriately  labelled. 
Moreover, following the 2008 crisis, the tightening of prudential requirements 
is pushing banks to focus sale efforts on deposits (EFAMA, 2011). 
Figure 5. Liquidity of European household financial holdings, end 2011 (€ trillion) 
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Notes: Total Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. Insurance includes life and composite undertakings.  
Source: Boston Consulting Group. 
Decreasing allocations to equity… 
Equity holdings by households decreased by almost 19% in Europe and 14% in 
the US from 2000 to 2010 (Figure 6). Lower allocations to listed equities can be 
attributed to a combination of factors, including weaker-than-expected returns, 
higher volatility and the occurrence of market bubbles (McKinsey, 2011). Retail 
investors have lost confidence in both stock markets and the asset management 
value chain (Kay, 2012).19 Similarly, among institutional investors, awareness 
of the risks embedded in the provision of guarantees has grown, leading to the 
generalisation of asset liability management, based primarily on fixed-income 
rather than equity investments (see EDHEC, 2011). 
Perceptions of risks and risk-pricing are also affected by exogenous elements, 
which shape preferences towards some asset classes to the detriment of others. 
For instance, taxation in some countries favours investments and financing in 
debt rather than equity (EC, 2013b). Similarly, explicit and implicit government 
guarantees favour some instruments, such as retail bank deposits, over others. 
Prudential rules that are not based on evidence, such as preferential capital 
charges  for  sovereign  debt,  also  distort  asset  allocation  (section  1.4).20 
Inducements paid by product originators to distributors can also distort asset 
allocation. 
Lower allocations to risky assets, including equity, by households may increase 
the likelihood of principal preservation but also entail a lower return potential. 
In the context of long-term and retirement investing, principal preservation by 
investing in fixed-income instruments increases pension security but its lower 
return potential reduces the scope for higher pension adequacy based on yield 
rather than additional contributions.  
                                                        
19 In the US, a December 2012 survey by the Chicago Booth – Kellogg School ‘Financial Trust 
Index’ found that 58% of US citizens saw a fall of more than 30% in equity prices as likely in 
the following 12 months (http://financialtrustindex.org/). According to this Index, public 
equity markets are less trusted than banks, mutual funds and large corporations, being in 
effect the least trusted institution surveyed. 
20 It is also unclear, notably within the Solvency II framework, the extent to which risk 
charges for less-liquid asset classes reflect risks accurately, as the methodologies typically 
applied  to calculate risk-weights  rely  on  historical market  prices,  which  tend  to  be  less 
available or informative for these assets, due to their relative illiquidity. On this point see 
EIOPA (2013e) and EVCA (2012). 24 | SETTING THE SCENE: LONG-TERM INVESTING AND RETIREMENT SAVINGS IN EUROPE 
Figure 6. Evolution of household financial holdings, 2000-2010 
 
Note: Data from national accounts. Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, 
Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Norway and Switzerland. See also Table A.1 in the annex. 
Source: OECD (2013b). 
 
Poor understanding and risk aversion… 
Retail investors and beneficiaries are challenged by the growing diversity and 
complexity of financial instruments and investment products (IOSCO, 2012), in 
addition to their own biases and risk aversion (Figure 7). Most individuals are 
not capable of indentifying the most adequate and cost-effective investment 
solutions without the assistance of professional and impartial advice.21 But the 
cost of such advice is onerous, as it can reduce net returns significantly and act 
as a barrier for smaller investors to enter the market. Action to address choice 
and complexity, in addition to disclosure and advice, is hence necessary in the 
markets for long-term investing and retirement solutions (chapters 2 and 3). 
                                                        
21 Difficulties in choosing are also due to the limited progress achieved on pre-contractual 
disclosure, beyond the KIID (Key Investor Information Document) for UCITS funds. The 
proposal to introduce a KID (Key Information Document) for other packaged investment 
products, including retirement solutions, and potentially also for plain vanilla securities and 
bonds, aims to introduce a common standard across the board [COM (2012) 352 final]. 
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Figure 7. Risk aversion among retail investors in selected countries 
 
Source: Boston Consulting Group. Data for 2012. See also Figure 12. 
Within an incomplete single market...  
The markets for retail long-term investment solutions remain mostly national 
in Europe, in particular for life insurance, pension funds and less-liquid retail 
investment funds – in contrast with the progress achieved in the cross-border 
distribution of UCITS. For instance, in 2012 only 84 pension funds operated 
cross-border in Europe (EIOPA, 2012a), while no EU regulatory framework or 
marketing passport exists for less-liquid retail investment funds (chapter 2). 
A monitoring exercise carried out in 2007 by BME Consulting for the European 
Commission attributed the low level of integration to: i) the insufficient degree 
of harmonisation of applicable legislation, ii) the fragmentation of distribution 
and processing architecture, iii) distortions linked to cross-border taxation, iv) 
insufficient information and advice regarding product choice and v) limits to 
the transferability of investments from one product or provider to another.  
Of the obstacles to integration above, some have been addressed while others 
remain largely unaddressed: 
◦ Since the 2008 financial crisis and following the G20 consensus on financial 
regulation, policy action has focused on building a level playing field across 
intermediaries in all member states, raising the level of harmonisation in 
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regulation and convergence in supervision. More attention has been paid to 
the fundamentals of business models, over the traditional categorisation of 
intermediaries, in an effort to apply consistent rules to equivalent economic 
functions, reducing the opportunity for arbitrage. Landmarks include the 
ongoing revision of the rules applicable to insurance companies (Solvency 
II), occupational pension funds (IORP II) and traditional investment funds 
(UCITS V/VI), and the introduction of common rules for most other asset 
management  activities  (AIFMD).22  Despite  this  progress,  inconsistencies 
remain, as well as key gaps, including the absence of an EU framework for 
personal pensions, which would be central to facilitating retail long-term 
investing (chapter 3). 
◦ When it comes to cross-border distribution and investor protection, action 
has focused on extending disclosure and sale-process requirements across 
product categories (under the PRIPs initiative).23 Yet, insufficient ambition 
in  the  harmonisation  of  sale-process  requirements  is  increasing  market 
fragmentation (MiFID II and IMD II).24 Retail investor protection remains 
primarily a competence for member states, under the current EU Treaties, 
which makes the achievement of a single market very difficult.25 
◦ The fragmentation of processing architecture has not been addressed so far, 
despite its practical importance. In the absence of pan-European processing, 
subscriptions and redemptions are processed nationally, restricting choice 
and competition for investors, leading to higher costs and inefficient scale, 
including  for  long-term  investing  purposes.  Given  path-dependency  and 
coordination  costs,  the  industry  is  unlikely  to  find  a  solution  without 
guidance from regulators. Limits to transferability are closely linked to the 
absence of standardisation, particularly for less-liquid solutions, in addition 
to tax obstacles, which also remain largely untackled.26  
                                                        
22 Directive 2009/138/EC on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and 
Reinsurance (Solvency II). Directive 2009/65/EC on undertakings for collective investment 
in transferable securities (UCITS). Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2009/65/EC 
as regards depositary functions, remuneration policies and sanctions [COM (2012) 350 final]. 
Directive 2011/61/EU on Alternative Investment Fund Managers. 
23 Proposal for a Regulation on key information documents for investment products [COM 
(2012) 352 final]. 
24 Proposal for a Directive on markets in financial instruments (MiFID II) [COM (2011) 656 
final]. Proposal for a Directive on insurance mediation (IMD II) [COM (2012) 360/2]. 
25 Arts 4.2.b and 21.3, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
26  Amended  proposal  for  a  Directive  on  minimum  requirements  for  enhancing  worker 
mobility by improving the acquisition and preservation of supplementary pension rights 
(Pension Portability Directive) [COM/2007/603 final]. SAVING FOR RETIREMENT AND INVESTING FOR GROWTH | 27 
For reference, Table 2 presents an overview of the regulatory framework for 
savings solutions in the EU. 
Table 2. Overview of the EU regulatory framework for savings solutions 
  Selling practices 
Pre-contractual 
disclosure 
Asset allocation 
Prudential 
requirements 
Deposits (sovereign 
guarantee) 
Local rules  Local rules  Unregulated  CRD IV 
Non-guaranteed 
deposits (< €100k?) 
Local rules  Local rules  Unregulated  CRD IV 
UCITS  Local rules + MiFID  UCITS KIID  UCITS Directive  UCITS Directive 
Other retail 
investment funds 
Local rules + MiFID  (P)RIPs KID  Local rules + AIFMD  Local rules + AIFMD 
Life insurance 
policies/wrappers 
Local rules + IMD II  (P)RIPs KID  Solvency II  Solvency II 
Personal pensions  Local rules + MiFID  (P)RIPs KID  Local rules  Local rules 
Occupational 
pensions 
Local rules (social 
and labour law) 
Local rules 
[(P)RIPs KID?] 
Local rules 
(IORP I minimum 
harmonisation) 
Local rules 
(IORP I minimum 
harmonisation) 
Listed securities  Local rules + MiFID 
Prospectus Directive 
[(P)RIPs KID?] 
Non-applicable  Non-applicable 
Structured products 
(including deposits) 
Local rules + MiFID 
(new to MiFID II) 
(P)RIPs KID  Unregulated 
CRD IV (for bank 
origination) 
Source: Author. 
1.4  Institutional long-term investing today 
Institutional investors are prime long-term investors, but their power to behave 
as such springs from the long-term horizons of beneficiaries, where they invest 
for retirement or other consumption needs far off in the future. Life insurers 
and pension funds are situated therefore at the core of long-term investing. 
This section discusses institutional long-term investing today, focusing on the 
provision of guarantees, the interest of beneficiaries and the impact of changes 
in macroeconomic conditions and business models. It also considers the role of 
regulation and the ongoing reform of the prudential framework for insurers 
and pension funds in Europe. 
Linked to the provision of guarantees... 
The business of life insurers and pension funds has been traditionally linked to 
the provision of guarantees, that is, the protection of the capital invested and 
the promise of a given return or income stream, whereby the provider (on its 
own or with a sponsor) assumes market and other risks (such as longevity risk) 28 | SETTING THE SCENE: LONG-TERM INVESTING AND RETIREMENT SAVINGS IN EUROPE 
on its balance sheet. It is estimated that nearly 65% of assets held by European 
life insurers are backing policies that offer some form of guarantee (€3 trillion) 
– the remaining 35% being invested for the benefit of policyholders who bear 
market risk in full (€1.7 trillion) (EIOPA, 2012, Table 6).27 Similarly, pension 
funds have been traditionally linked to the provision of guarantees. In 2011, 
80%  of assets under management  by  autonomous  pension  funds  in  Europe 
were  deemed  to  belong  to  defined  benefit  (DB)  schemes  (€3  trillion).28 
However,  even  DB  funds  increasingly  incorporate  risk  pass-through 
mechanisms (EIOPA, 2012c). 
Non-guaranteed insurance policies and pension schemes are pure investment 
management products, where the full market risk falls on the investor, similar 
to  the  retail  investment  funds  which  frequently  serve  as  the  underlying. 
Hybrid schemes share the market or other risks between the provider and the 
beneficiary. Figures 8 and 9 present the business composition of life insurance 
and pension funds in Europe.  
Figure 8. Composition of the business of life insurers in EU-27, 2003-11 (€ trillion) 
 
Source: EIOPA (2012a).  
                                                        
27 Approximately a further €0.2 trillion is invested for the benefit of policyholders who bear 
market  risk  in  full  by  ‘composite’  undertakings  (insurers  combining  life  and  non-life 
business).  The  share  of  life  versus  non-life  insurance  within  composite  undertakings  is 
however  not  apparent  in  the  available  statistics.  Supposing  both  business  lines  weigh 
equally, an additional €0.7 trillion would be invested by European insurers in connection to 
traditional life insurance offering some form of guarantee. 
28 Author’s own elaboration based on Towers Watson, BCG and OECD data. The remaining 
assets were managed by defined contribution (DC) (16% or €0.6 trillion) and hybrid schemes 
(4% or €0.15 trillion). Additional €2.2 trillion were held in book reserves by non-autonomous 
pensions funds (mostly defined benefit). 
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Figure 9. Composition of the business of occupational pension funds in selected 
European countries, 2011 
 
Source: Data compiled by EIOPA (2012b) on a best-effort basis an approximate view of the financial 
position of occupational pension funds during 2011.  
Guarantees provide a useful social function as they increase pension safety and 
help mitigate income inequality at retirement. Investors are given assurances 
as to the level of benefits and are protected against untimely drops in asset 
prices. The relevance of guarantees within personal pensions is framed by the 
overall  pension  and  social  security  system  in  each  country  –  automatic 
stabilisers and public anti-poverty schemes are alternatives to guarantees in 
private pensions (OECD, 2012). 
The guarantees linked to different life insurance policies and pension contracts 
are not homogeneous but depend, first and foremost, on the risks covered and, 
for similar risk coverage, on the level of return promised. Product choice varies 
across member states depending on market development and regulation.29 The 
differences ultimately relate to two respects: i) whether the provider assumes 
only market risk – protecting initial capital and delivering a fixed return – or 
also longevity risk – delivering an income until death, potentially exceeding 
the capital accumulated (as in annuities and defined benefit pension schemes); 
and ii) whether the risks are assumed by the provider in full or the insurance 
policy/pension contract foresees any risk pass-through mechanisms, whereby 
certain risks are shared with the beneficiaries or a sponsor.30 
                                                        
29 For instance, in some member states occupational pension funds are obliged to be defined 
benefit.  
30 Guarantees can also be classified with respect to whether they are: i) set on nominal or real 
terms, ii) set as fixed or minimum return, iii) provided for a definite or indefinite period of 
time and iv) final or resettable during the application period (OECD, 2012, p. 135). 
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But widely heterogeneous guarantees... 
As just noted, the guarantees offered in the marketplace are heterogeneous, not 
only as to their level but also with respect to their supporting features. The 
presence of a sponsor (typically the employer) is a salient supporting feature, 
which typically differentiates life insurance and defined benefit pension funds. 
Where a sponsor is present, market and other risks are not borne solely by the 
pension fund but also by the employer, in accordance with national law and 
the contract with beneficiaries. The pension promise is therefore supported not 
only by the financial strength of the fund but also by that of the sponsor.31  
Similarly, under compulsory participation, pension funds usually also have the 
ability to raise contributions. In a collective scheme, if redistribution of risk and 
funding among generations is allowed, additional contributions from current 
employees may be used to fund ongoing benefits (to current retirees), which 
may operate as an additional support to the guarantee provided.32  
In addition to their supporting features, guarantees are also characterised by 
their level of strictness. Both pension funds and insurance policies increasingly 
incorporate risk pass-through mechanisms allowing for benefit cuts, chiefly in 
case of underfunding. Where contracts incorporate risk pass-through clauses in 
the  exceptional  circumstances  (such  as  high  risk  of  bankruptcy  of  the 
undertaking), they may still be considered to provide a guarantee. However, if 
the  guarantee  is  framed  or  made  contingent  on  market  indicators  (such  as 
market interest rates or stock indices) the contract should rather be considered 
as a ‘hybrid’.  
Demanding distinct investment practices... 
The provision of guarantees requires the implementation of specific investment 
practices  (asset-liability management) and  prudential  safeguards (regulatory 
capital  and  supervision),  which  become  more  relevant,  the  stricter  the 
guarantee. Asset-liability management (ALM) and liability-driven investment 
(LDI) try to match asset allocation with the expected profile of liability cash-
flows in order to generate returns that are similar to those liabilities in volume 
and timing. It requires the estimation of the profile of future liabilities, which 
                                                        
31 Similar to the support provided by a sponsor, mutual insurers may call for supplementary 
contributions from their members. 
32  The  guarantee offered  by current  employees  to  current retirees  needs  to  be  balanced 
against the need to fund the future pensions of current employees, which depends both on 
their  own  contributions  and  those  of  future  employees.  So-called  ‘intergenerational 
solidarity’ in collective schemes may be welfare enhancing but is affected by constraints, 
given the uncertainty surrounding future contributions and returns, in later generations. See 
Beetsma et al. (2011), Hollanders (2010) and Gollier (2008). SAVING FOR RETIREMENT AND INVESTING FOR GROWTH | 31 
may be subject to uncertainty, for instance where benefits are inflation-indexed 
or the provider bears the longevity risk. It leads to an asset allocation with a 
similar pattern of returns and life-cycle to the liabilities it backs.  
Where long-term guarantees are provided, ALM is typically based on either 
cash-flow or duration matching.33 Fixed-income assets are used because of the 
characteristics they share with the liabilities arising from the provision of long-
term guarantees, in terms of surety, predictability of cash-flows and sensitivity 
to interest rates. Where assets are held to maturity and offer an income stream 
in line with the liabilities they back, the likelihood of meeting these liabilities is 
high (except if the issuer defaults) and spread risk will be mitigated or, in case 
of perfect matching, eliminated.34  
ALM strategies under long-term investment horizons are inherently conducive 
to long-term investing as assets with long life-cycles (in particular fixed-income 
instruments) are held over long periods of time or to maturity, providing long-
term and stable funding to issuers. Limits to cash flow and duration matching 
arise, however, from the difficult modelling of some liabilities, limited supply 
of assets with long enough maturities and rebalancing of portfolios as the yield 
curve moves. Regular rebalancing is needed as the yield curve does not usually 
move in parallel but becomes flatter or steeper, leading to maturity mismatches 
(Morgan Stanley, 2013). 
Where a sponsor backs the guarantee afforded to members (partly or fully, as 
per the sponsorship arrangement or the law) or risk pass-through mechanisms 
are present in the pension contract with current and future beneficiaries, an 
ALM framework remains best practice. But the backstops provided allow this 
framework to depart from the strict matching of assets and liabilities based on 
fixed-income instruments and to assume additional equity and equity-like risk, 
with potentially higher returns (Amenc et al., 2009). 
And prudential safeguards... 
The provision of guarantees also necessitates prudential safeguards, namely 
regulatory capital requirements and close supervision of the business practices 
(promised returns for new contracts) and funding position of the provider with 
                                                        
33  Cash-flow matching  involves  investing  in  fixed-income  instruments  whose pattern  of 
returns (coupons) matches a given liability stream. Duration matching involves investing in 
fixed-income instruments whose interest-rate sensitivity (the sensitivity to a parallel shift in 
the yield curve) is equivalent to that of the liabilities matched.  
34 Perfect matching is rarely possible in practice given the practical limitations explained 
later in this report. 32 | SETTING THE SCENE: LONG-TERM INVESTING AND RETIREMENT SAVINGS IN EUROPE 
respect to the liabilities in its balance sheet.35 The function of regulatory capital 
is to cover the likely losses in tail events to which the provider of the guarantee 
is exposed – for instance, issuer default in case of assets held to maturity or a 
deep drop in market values, when liabilities become due, for equity holdings. 
Capital also reflects the risks linked to the modelling of liabilities – for instance, 
longer than modelled life expectancies if longevity risk rests with the provider. 
Regulatory capital increases the likelihood of meeting liabilities, including in 
adverse market conditions, but constrains investment practices and carries an 
economic cost.36 Guarantees do, however, play a useful function in increasing 
the security of retirement income and facilitating voluntary participation by 
risk-adverse investors in retirement-savings vehicles. 
Investment practices and prudential safeguards are inter-linked in two ways: i) 
since regulatory capital should reflect the risks that the provider is effectively 
exposed to, capital requirements need to factor in investment practices, to the 
extent  that  they  shape  those  risks;  and  ii)  investment  restrictions  can  be 
foregone as long as appropriate capitalisation is provided (see below).37  
Conversely, in the absence of any guarantee, where market and other risks are 
borne by the investor, no capital requirements should apply (except to cover 
operational risks). Such is the instance of unit-linked insurance policies38 and 
defined contribution pension schemes. In the absence of guarantees and capital 
burdens, these products are able to maximise the share of principal invested 
and have the freedom to invest in more-risky assets, potentially offering higher 
                                                        
35 Supervision is geared to ensure that providers do not offer new guarantees to consumers 
who  are  unlikely  to  be  fulfilled  under  projected  market  yields  (in  particular  long-term 
interest rates). It is also directed at monitoring the funding of liabilities in the balance sheet 
and, in the event of underfunding, triggering remedial action. 
36 The cost of a guarantee is the risk margin which, on top of the best estimate, is equal to the 
present value of the costs, for the undertaking, of holding regulatory capital in relation to it.  
37  The  introduction  of  Solvency  II  and  other  risk-based  prudential  and  supervisory 
frameworks aims at drawing the link between regulatory capital and investment practices, 
lifting previously generalised investment restrictions. Solvency II allows insurers to invest in 
any asset class, including equities and less-liquid assets, as far as sufficient capital is set 
aside. It may not, however, fully reflect the effect that ALM practices have in shaping the 
risks borne by the insurer. 
38 Unit-linked products (insurance policies) are packaged retail investment products (PRIPs, 
as defined by European Commission, 2009) which are distributed and/or created by an 
insurance  undertaking  but  offer  no  insurance  guarantee  and  have  units  or  shares  of  a 
collective investment undertaking as underlying. Pure unit-linked products, where the full 
market risk is borne by the policy-holder and no ancillary insurance cover is provided, are 
exempt  from  capital  requirements  for  market  risk  under  Solvency  II  but  are  subject  to 
requirements for operational risk and expense risk (Art. 105). SAVING FOR RETIREMENT AND INVESTING FOR GROWTH | 33 
returns.  Nevertheless,  if  the  objective  is  to  build  retirement  income,  the 
potential for a higher return should be balanced against the need to mitigate 
risks. Risk mitigation in the context of retirement savings, even in the absence 
of a guarantee, calls for the implementation of an ALM framework. 
A customised and hybrid approach, both in terms of investment practices and 
prudential framework, is better adapted to the provision of limited guarantees 
(under risk pass-through exceptions), which are based on market indicators 
(interest rates or equity indices) or endorsed by a sponsor. As for investment 
practices, these products may also invite investments in asset classes that are 
different from fixed-income, with a long-term life cycle but a higher potential 
return. And capital requirements should account for any limits introduced to 
the  guarantee  and/or  any  sponsoring  arrangement,  as  well  as  the  financial 
soundness of the sponsor. 
Adapting to low interest rates... 
Unconventional monetary policies in developed economies following the 2008 
financial  crisis  and  the  ongoing  economic  downturn  have  brought  interest 
rates to historical lows. Interest rates have been close to zero in nominal terms 
and negative in real terms since 2009. As the processes of bank and public-
sector  deleveraging  continue  in  most  developed  economies,  and  economic 
growth and job creation remain elusive, unconventional monetary policies are 
expected to continue in the future (EIOPA, 2013; ECB, 2013). 
The provision of long-term guarantees is directly affected by interest rates, as it 
is mostly supported by fixed-income investments. The impact of a prolonged 
period of low interest rates on the provision of guarantees is better described 
by  distinguishing  between  legacy  and  new  liabilities.  Existing  or  legacy 
liabilities, priced on the estimated term structure of interest rates39 at issuance, 
need to be fulfilled, even if the yield curve would later on be radically altered 
(as far as no risk pass-through exceptions are foreseen). By way of illustration, 
a traditional life insurance policy sold in 2004 offered a guarantee based on an 
interest  rate  for  long  maturities  nearing  5%,  while  in  2013,  the  yield  curve 
exhibits  long-term  rates  below  3%,  in spite  of which  the  original  guarantee 
would need to be fulfilled (Figure 10). 
                                                        
39 The term structure of interest rates (also known as yield curve) represents the relationship 
between interest rates (market remuneration or asset pricing) and the remaining time to 
maturity of debt securities. The forward yield curve presents the short-term interest rate for 
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Figure 10. Euro-area yield curve (illustrative spread 2004-13) 
 
Note: The graph plots spot and instantaneous forward yield curves for AAA-rated euro-area central 
government bonds, drawing on earliest and latest dates for which the yield curves were available at 
the time of drafting. 
Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse (2013). 
Providers, however, are not fully exposed to the risk above. In particular, asset-
liability management (ALM) allows the provision of long-term guarantees, by 
mitigating interest-rate risk via cash flow and maturity matching. Albeit, since 
perfect matching is not possible – especially for longer-term liabilities given the 
limited supply of corresponding assets – providers are partially exposed to a 
decline in interest rates, notably through reinvestment risk. This exposure to 
interest-rate  risk  varies  greatly  across  intermediaries  but  may  not  be  fully 
apparent, depending on accounting and reporting practices (EIOPA, 2013a). 
On average in 2012, European insurers were estimated to maintain reasonable 
margins between the guarantees on their balance sheets and the average return 
on the assets backing them (Figure 11). Bonds purchased when interest rates 
were higher than today have probably not matured yet but the pressure on 
margins  (and  ultimately  on  capital)  may  later  materialise  depending  on 
duration gaps and the persistence of low rates. 
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Figure 11. Average and new yields vs. guarantees in life insurance 
 
Source: Morgan Stanley (2013), based on company data for 2012. 
To service legacy liabilities in a prolonged low interest-rate environment, it is 
possible that insurers and pension funds will moderately re-risk, in the search 
for yield, increasing their allocations to equity and less-liquid asset classes, in 
spite of the comparatively higher capital charges applicable under forthcoming 
regulations,  such  as  Solvency  II  (BlackRock,  2012).  There  is  evidence  that 
insurers run higher risks in some jurisdictions, notably the US (Box 1). In sum, 
low interest rates present challenges to the servicing of legacy liabilities. 
When it comes to new business, insurers and pensions funds are framing their 
guarantees in line with (lower) projected rates of return and introducing risk 
pass-through  mechanisms.  These  institutional  investors  realise  that  market 
conditions may change in unforeseeable ways, particularly over the long-term 
horizons that are typical of the provision of guarantees in retirement-savings 
products.  In  effect,  product  offerings  and  business  models  are  evolving 
towards  the  provision  of  more  limited  guarantees.  The  next  subsection 
considers this transition. 
 
Box 1. Impact of low interest rates on solvency and financial stability 
The potential impact of a prolonged period of low interest rates on the solvency position 
of life insurers and some defined-benefit pension funds is of great concern to supervisors 
(EIOPA, 2012c). This concern is generally more acute for insurers, given the absence of 
sponsoring entities (i.e. employers), which are typically present in occupational pension 
schemes. This condition also exposes funds less directly to competition from alternative 
providers of retirement-savings solutions. The case of Japan, where seven life insurers 
failed at the end of the 1990s, is frequently cited as an example of the risks posed by low 
interest rates to financial stability. We consider these respects in more detail below. 
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Persistently low interest rates may impact the (future) solvency position of insurers and 
pension funds where assets are not fully matched to liabilities, resulting in heightened 
reinvestment risk, that is, the risk that future interest rates would be below the rate of 
return promised to policy-holders: When the duration of existing liabilities exceeds that 
of the assets backing them, insurers and funds have to reinvest upon maturity (or earlier). 
Persistently low interest rates make it unlikely that new investments offer a rate of return 
above  the  one  guaranteed  to  beneficiaries,  putting  pressure  on  the  profitability  of 
insurers (and pension funds) and ultimately on their solvency position. 
Depending on the reporting and accounting methodology employed by the life insurer or 
pension fund, the impact of low rates may not be immediately apparent. Under mark-to-
market prospective accounting, low interest rates would increase the present value of 
liabilities, resulting in an instantaneous deterioration of the (reported) solvency position. 
Yet,  this  deterioration  may  be  artificial  if  it  fails  to  take  into  account  the  extent  of 
interest-rate risk  immunisation  obtained  through  asset-liability  management  practices 
(discussed in more detail in section 1.4). 
Moreover, as life insurers (and pension funds) move towards lower or limited guarantees, 
they will be more exposed to competition from pure asset managers (investment funds), 
banks (deposits, structured products) and direct holdings (bonds, shares). The change in 
business model may result in further pressure on profitability; although non-guaranteed 
products  are  today  more  profitable  than  guaranteed  ones,  the  situation  is  likely  to 
change as competition toughens. In sum, the traditional value proposition of insurers 
may suffer, resulting in downward pressures on sales and profits, with potentially adverse 
consequences for the servicing of legacy liabilities (EIOPA, 2013a). 
EIOPA (2013) advises market participants and national supervisors to look at a wide range 
of risk metrics, based both on market value and historical cost accounting, as well as cash 
flow and its evolution. It encourages supervisors to demand increased provisioning for 
existing  business  and  to  monitor  new  product  offerings,  in  order  to  ensure  that 
guarantees are not set at levels that are unlikely to be met, challenging business models 
where appropriate. 
Persistently low interest rates may also drive insurers and pension funds to increase the 
risk in their portfolios. The effect of moderate re-risking should not be detrimental per se 
to policy-holders or financial stability, as long as appropriate capitalisation is provided, in 
line with the risks of the assets held. In this respect, EIOPA has urged the introduction of 
the risk-based capital charges and prudential controls in Solvency II (Bernardino, 2012). It 
has also put forward a plan to introduce the principles of risk-based supervision before 
the formal adoption of the legislation (EIOPA, 2012d). The IMF (2013) has warned of 
substantial re-risking and even ‘gambling for resurrection’ among defined benefit pension 
funds and life insurers in the US, which European providers seem to have eschewed so 
far. In Europe, the discussion is focused on whether the precise capital charges envisaged 
under Solvency II accurately reflect the relevant risks. 
When considering financial stability, banks attract the most attention but the likelihood 
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be underestimated. A prolonged period of low interest rates caused the failure of seven 
life  insurers  in  Japan  between  1997  and  2001  and  forced  the  adoption  of legislation 
allowing defaults on guarantees (EIOPA, 2013a). The Japanese crisis, however, was not 
only  caused  by  persistently  low  interest  rates  but  also  by  the  continuation  of 
unsustainable business models – offering disproportionate guarantees for new policies, in 
an environment of intense competition among intermediaries and inactive supervision – 
inadequate investment practices and a very sharp decline in stock market prices – down 
by 60% in Tokyo (CGFS, 2011). 
In transition to limited guarantees... 
Our  focus  in  2012  was  on  developing  and  rolling  out  our  defined  contribution 
product range, including a new mutual fund range with a transparent and low cost 
structure,  while  continuing  to  cut  costs  and  look  for  efficiencies  across  our 
operations.  We  remain  cautious  of  defined  benefit  products,  which  we  view  as 
unsustainable for both employers and insurers, and continued to withdraw from 
guaranteed  products  where  customers  were  not  prepared  to  pay  the  increased 
market consistent costs of guarantees. […] We also launched a new product that 
provides  customers  with  a  guaranteed  return  linked  to  the  market  interest  rate, 
rather than a fixed percentage guarantee.  
Excerpt from the 2012 Annual Report of Achmea,  
a major insurer from the Netherlands (p. 42). 
As  reflected  in  the  excerpt  above,  a  prolonged  period  of  low  interest  rates 
could accelerate the transition in product and business models towards limited 
and  no  guarantees.  Non-guaranteed  and  hybrid  life  insurance  policies  and 
pension schemes are growing in volume and market share, a trend supported 
by  both  regulation  and  consumer  preferences  (EIOPA,  2012c).  This  move, 
however, is not only explained by low interest rates but also by a number of 
diverse reasons, in a manner similar to the transition from defined benefit to 
defined  contribution  pension  schemes,  which  has  been  well  documented 
(OECD, 2012):  
◦ Potentially higher returns for investors, as there is more flexibility to allocate 
investments  to  equities  and  less-liquid  asset  classes  –  a  potential  that 
becomes more likely in the context of low interest rates. 
◦ Simpler regulatory framework and easier administration, given the absence of 
the prudential requirements typically linked to the provision of guarantees. 
◦ Higher profitability for intermediaries, measured as return on equity (Morgan 
Stanley, 2013), given both lower capital intensity and competition dynamics 
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◦ Higher certainty for employers (plan sponsors) as to the timing and volume of 
their commitments and liabilities.  
◦ Sometimes  easier  transferability  for  employees  (ease  of  changing  providers), 
better  adapted  to  growing  career  and  geographical  mobility  in  labour 
markets. 
◦ Higher perceived transparency and sense of immediacy, given easier access to the 
value of accumulated savings and returns. 
Guarantees are beneficial for pension safety (see above) but also entail costs, 
depending on their level and characteristics. The OECD (2012) estimates that a 
guarantee covering the principal invested (nominal at retirement) has a yearly 
cost of 1.24% of contributions or 0.06% of accumulated net asset value.40 This 
estimation  is  inherently  sensitive  to  the  contribution  period,  investment 
strategy and capital-market conditions. For instance, a parallel shift in the yield 
curve  (see  above)  of  -1%  would  increase  the  cost  cited  above  to  4.2%  of 
contributions.  A  higher  allocation  to  equities,  instead  of  bonds,  would  also 
increase the cost. Moreover, these are estimations of the nominal cost (similar 
to  a  premium),  which  do  not  comprise  the  compound  loss  on  foregone 
contributions, since the premium paid is not accumulated in the scheme and 
does not generate returns.  
Higher guarantees carry higher nominal costs, as shown in Table 3. The table 
also provides an overview of the benefits of guarantees for beneficiaries: the 
probability that the final lump sum received by the investor at 65 is higher, 
having  selected  an  option  with  guarantee,  rather  than  the  lump  sum  s/he 
would  have  received  if  a  non-guaranteed  option  had  been  selected.  This 
probability  may  also  be  seen  as  a  proxy  for  the  trade-off  between  pension 
security and adequacy.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
40 The estimations provided by the OECD (2012) are for guarantees offered (as an option) 
within  defined  contribution  pension  schemes.  Within  defined  benefit  pension  and 
traditional life insurance, (risk-based) capital requirements similarly account for the nominal 
cost of the guarantees provided. SAVING FOR RETIREMENT AND INVESTING FOR GROWTH | 39 
Table 3. Mean nominal costs and benefits of guarantees 
  Fees paid as 
% of lump 
sum at 65  
Loss as % in 
lump sum at 
65 
Probability 
guarantee is 
exercised 
Probability 
higher lump 
sum  
Capital guarantee (at retirement)  00.86  01.28  00.49  00.48 
Inflation-indexed capital guarantee  03.67  05.49  06.48  05.22 
Ongoing capital guarantee  06.08  07.14  83.45  18.20 
Floating guarantee (1-year interest rate)  15.96  23.81  40.33  21.72 
4% guarantee (with annual fees)  12.20  18.30  35.32  21.26 
Source: OECD (2012, pp. 129-151). 
The  development  of  retirement  solutions  offering limited  or  no  guarantees, 
however,  is  held  back  (to  some  extent  myopically)  by  risk  aversion  among 
potential beneficiaries. Despite the high cost of guarantees (not always made 
apparent to investors) and the decrease in promised returns (given low rates), 
consumers  are  unwilling  to  take  on  market  risk.  Non-guaranteed  products 
therefore  lack  traction  among  investors  in  key  markets.  Figure  12  presents 
consumer  perceptions  in  major  European  economies,  showing  that  risk 
aversion is on the rise, probably due still to the loss of confidence in financial 
intermediation and the ongoing uncertainty surrounding global imbalances. In 
2012, about 43% of European investors were likely to favour a guaranteed over 
a non-guaranteed product. However, the ratio varied greatly across countries, 
reflecting  different  traditions  and  risk  perceptions  –  nearly  20%  in  the  UK 
versus 60% in France.  
Figure 12. Evolution of risk aversion in Europe, 2010-12 
 
Note: See also Figure 7 for more information on risk aversion in Europe. 
Source: Boston Consulting Group.  
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From the perspective of long-term investing, the management of savings pools 
that do not incorporate guarantees has a higher potential, given the additional 
flexibility in terms of asset allocation and the inherently long-term investment 
horizons linked to the accumulation of pension savings. Asset allocation may 
indeed deviate from fixed-income with more freedom than would otherwise be 
permissible if guarantees were present. Higher allocation to equity is hence 
possible, and may be desirable, given potentially higher returns for investors. 
However, the potential for long-term investing in equities41 would not be fully 
exploited unless the liquidity profile of product units (in terms of redemptions) 
is in line with the long-term horizon inherent in investing for retirement. If this 
condition is fulfilled, a higher allocation to less-liquid asset classes, with equity 
-like characteristics would also be possible. Section 1.1 considers the definition 
of long-term investing with reference to asset classes and investment practices, 
and  the  liquidity  profile  of  retail  investment  products.  Chapter  3  considers 
how to align solution design and market structure, in the provision of personal 
DC pension plans, with long-term investing. 
The potential for higher allocations to equity in the absence of guarantees is 
shown  in  Figure  13.  In  effect,  the  average  allocation  to  equity  in  defined 
contribution  schemes  is  twice  as  big  if  they  do  not  incorporate  guarantees. 
Similarly, in most countries with both DB and DC schemes, equity allocation 
tends to be higher in the latter – notably in the US, DC 401ks plans allocate 60% 
to equities, in contrast to 40% in corporate pension funds (Severinson & Yermo, 
2012,  p.  27).  However,  in  Europe,  the  largest  DC  schemes  allocate  22%  to 
equities while the largest DB schemes allocate 35%, a phenomenon that can be 
attributed to risk aversion among investors (McKinsey, 2011, p. 31).42  
                                                        
41  Long-term  investing  in  equity  instruments  is  defined  in  this  report  as  strategic,  low 
turnover and engaged holdings (see section 1.1, chapter 1). 
42 In contrast with defined benefit plans, in most defined contribution plans, investors are 
given  a  choice  in  terms  of  asset  allocation,  which  explains  the  relevance  of  investor 
preferences and risk aversion. SAVING FOR RETIREMENT AND INVESTING FOR GROWTH | 41 
Figure 13. Asset allocation in defined contribution schemes in OECD countries, 2011 
 
Source: OECD Statistics. 
Awaiting regulatory change... 
Life insurers and defined benefit pension funds are awaiting the introduction 
of a comprehensive prudential and supervisory framework in Europe, based 
on  a  total  (or  holistic)  balance-sheet  approach  –  which  considers  the  risks 
presented by both assets and liabilities – and prospective market consistent 
valuations.  These  changes  are  expected  to  be  introduced  by  two  separate 
pieces of legislation, for insurers (Solvency II) and occupational pension funds 
(IORP II, under study) – given the important differences in product features, 
business models, operations and risks between these two sorts of entities (see 
above). 
Solvency II was adopted in November 2009, but its provisions have not been 
implemented  yet.  Shortly  following  its  adoption,  a  review  process  was 
initiated  to  adapt  it  to  the  changes  introduced  by  the  Lisbon  Treaty  for 
implementing legislation and the creation of EIOPA (European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority). What was initially envisaged as a narrow 
and  technical  revision,  however,  was  extended  in  scope  to  include material 
changes to the framework. 
Further analysis of the impact of Solvency II raised several issues of concern, 
which prompted a reassessment of the scope of the changes needed before the 
regime could be implemented in practice. These concerns included, notably, 
the extent to which, by not properly recognising the effects of asset-liability 
management (ALM) practices, Solvency II could undermine the provision of 
guarantees  by  life  insurers  and  introduce  artificial  volatility  in  technical 
provisions, available capital and regulatory capital requirements. 
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At the same time, the European Commission has announced the revision of the 
2003 Directive on IORPs (institutions for occupational retirement provision), 
which is expected to follow broadly similar principles to the regulation of life 
insurance. The legislative proposal has not yet been issued, notably due to the 
diversity of business models among pension funds and institutional settings at 
national level, which makes it difficult to devise homogenous rules. Qualitative 
aspects (governance and disclosure) will be reviewed first, while the merits 
behind introducing harmonised quantitative requirements (regulatory capital) 
will receive further analysis (European Commission, 2013c; EIOPA, 2013b). 
Both  reforms,  however,  affect  the  provision  of  guarantees  for  long-term 
savings and share the objective of strengthening the resilience of insurance and 
pension-fund  undertakings,  thereby  protecting  beneficiaries  and  financial 
stability.  But  they  are  also  aimed  at  overcoming  regulatory  fragmentation 
among member states, furthering European market integration and benefits for 
consumers.  In  some  member  states,  Solvency  II  and  IORP  II  will  entail  a 
complete overhaul of existing regulations and supervisory practices, while in 
others, risk-based supervision is already in place. 
The following sections consider the main features of the Solvency II framework 
and the key points of contention, which have delayed its introduction. Section 
2.2  considers  the  review  of  the  IORP  Directive,  from  a  single  market 
perspective. 
What is Solvency II? 
Solvency II consists of the recasting of fourteen insurance directives, together 
with  the  introduction  of  risk-based  prudential  requirements  and  an 
accompanying  supervisory  framework  for  insurance  and  reinsurance 
undertakings, both life and non-life (European Commission, 2008).  
The stated objectives of Solvency II are, firstly, the protection of policy-holders, 
and only secondarily, other goals such as financial stability or the promotion of 
fair and stable markets (Preamble 16 and Article 27). Long-term investing is 
not among the objectives pursued by Solvency II and it probably should not be, 
to  the  extent  that  it  is  defined  as  gross  capital  formation  without  direct 
connection with the interest of beneficiaries. Yet, it should strive to promote 
investment practices aligned with the long-term horizons of liabilities in life 
insurance.43 
                                                        
43 Holding long-term investments is a straightforward way to comply with the requirement 
to cover the insurance liabilities in a manner appropriate to the nature and duration of those 
liabilities (Article 132.2 paragraph 3, Solvency II). For a discussion on the concept of long-
term investing and the position of beneficiaries, see section 1.1 of chapter 1 in this report.  SAVING FOR RETIREMENT AND INVESTING FOR GROWTH | 43 
The framework is best understood by referring to three pillars: i) quantitative 
requirements – minimum and solvency capital calculations and thresholds; ii) 
qualitative requirements – governance, risk management and supervision; and 
iii) reporting and disclosure – publicly and privately to supervisors. But it also 
addresses solvency and supervision at group level and recasts legislation on 
the reorganisation or winding-up (liquidation) of failing insurers, among other 
important aspects.  
◦ Quantitative requirements are based on a total balance sheet approach, aimed 
at factoring all risks both on the asset and liability side of the balance sheet, 
and their interrelations. It applies therefore capital charges that depend both 
on market (investments falling in value) and underwriting risks (liabilities 
being higher than expected or contributions lower). The insurer is required 
to hold sufficient own funds to cover a ‘solvency capital requirement’ (SCR) 
in proportion to the present value of its business (technical provisions). The 
Directive  defines  the  methodology  to  calculate  the  present  value  of 
business, which is modelled and then discounted at the risk-free rate (term 
structure).  Valuations  are  forward-looking  and  market-consistent  – 
Solvency II does not regulate accounting but is meant to be in line with 
internationally accepted standards (IFRS and IAS). A standard formula is 
used to calculate the SCR, unless the insurer applies to its supervisor for the 
recognition  of  an  internal  model.  Internal  models  are  expected  to  be 
approved only if they provide a better reflection of the specific risks linked 
to  the  product  mix  and  business  model  of  the  insurer.  However, capital 
charges for each asset class are in principle assigned by the regulator, who 
will calibrate charges periodically, based on historical data. When capital 
falls below the SCR, remedial action needs to be taken, based upon a more 
in-depth  assessment,  in  coordination  with  the  supervisor.  The  SCR  is 
devised to act as an early warning mechanism; ultimate supervisory action, 
such as transfer or liquidation, would be undertaken only if an insurer falls 
below a ‘minimum capital requirement’ (MCR). 
◦ Qualitative requirements provide the counterbalance to the mechanical use of 
historical data to calculate risk weights and capital charges. Insurers have to 
put in place qualitative risk management processes and, most importantly, 
conduct a so-called ‘own risk and solvency assessment’ (ORSA) regularly. 
ORSAs are expected to become an integral part of the business strategy and 
inform all strategic decisions by the insurer. They will notably provide the 
framework for stress tests and analysis of deviations between the real risk 
profile of the insurer and the assumptions underlying the standard formula 
for  the  SCR.  ORSAs  are  also  a  supervisory  tool.  Solvency  II  creates  a 
‘supervisory review process’ (SRP) aimed at a closer monitoring and deeper 
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dynamics.  The  process  should  result  in  early  intervention  at  different 
intensity  levels  (‘supervisory  ladder’)  well  before  insolvency  would 
materialise. 
◦ Reporting and disclosure obligations are aimed both at fostering transparency, 
comparability and market discipline, and at equipping supervisors with the 
information they need to perform effective supervision. Insurers are notably 
required to publicly disclose abundant information, periodically and in case 
of significant developments, such as non-compliance with the MCR or SCR. 
Experts and industry participants broadly recognise the merits of Solvency II 
but questions remain as to whether it accurately reflects the characteristics and 
risks linked to the provision of (life) insurance.44 Many insurers in Europe are 
already operating internal models and governance structures that are similar to 
those put forward by Solvency II (Morgan Stanley, 2013). And it is generally 
acknowledged to be leading the process towards greater sophistication in risk 
management and investment practices – even before entering into force.  
The industry has been particularly keen to implement the principles informing 
Solvency  II,  given  the  shortcomings  in  the  previous  framework:  Solvency  I 
does  not  account  for  risks  on  the asset  side of  the  balance  sheet  (and  only 
partially on the liability side), while unduly restricting eligible investments and 
failing to address governance and risk management. Furthermore, it does not 
supply supervisors with sufficient information to perform their functions and 
it does not provide the level of harmonisation needed within a single market.  
Delays in Solvency II are keeping life insurers and supervisors badly equipped 
to deal with the challenges derived from low interest rates and volatile market 
conditions (EIOPA, 2013a; S&P, 2013).45 This has prompted EU supervisors to 
agree to the early introduction of its principles, even before the legislation is 
formally  implemented.  In  particular,  national  supervisors  are  working  with 
undertakings  to  ensure  that  effective  risk-management  processes  are  put  in 
place,  including  a  forward-looking  assessment  of  own  risks,  similar  to  the 
ORSAs (EIOPA, 2012c and 2013b) 
Despite wide acknowledgement of the need to implement Solvency II, industry 
and  stakeholders  have  expressed  concerns  about  parts  of  the  framework, 
which has prompted its review before it is fully applied in practice. The next 
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section  considers  the  key  points  of  contention,  discussed  by  Task  Force 
members at the meetings. Before considering those points, Table 4 presents a 
summary of the three pillars of Solvency II and their main provisions.  
Table 4. Overview of the Solvency II framework 
PILLAR I 
Quantitative Requirements 
PILLAR II 
Qualitative Requirements 
PILLAR III 
Reporting and Disclosure 
◦ Economic risk-based capital 
charges 
◦ Solvency (ongoing) and 
minimum capital thresholds 
◦ Classification of own funds 
according to loss absorption 
◦ Valuation of assets, liabilities 
and technical provisions 
◦ Appraisal of risk-mitigation 
and diversification effects 
◦ Symmetric adjustment to 
capital charges for equities 
◦ Adjustment to the discount 
rate for matched liabilities 
◦ General governance 
requirements 
◦ Risk management and 
compliance functions 
◦ Internal audit and actuarial 
functions 
◦ Own-risk and solvency 
assessments 
◦ Separate management of life 
and non-life business 
◦ Supervisory review process 
and intervention ladder 
◦ Recovery plans and finance 
schemes 
◦ Annual report on solvency 
and financial condition 
◦ Ongoing public disclosure 
obligations 
◦ Additional reporting to 
supervisors 
OTHER ASPECTS 
◦ Group solvency / supervision 
◦ Winding-up / re-organisation 
◦ Limits on investment 
restrictions / capital add-ons 
◦ Provisions for specific 
insurance contracts 
Source: Author, based on Directive. 
Points of contention in Solvency II 
Solvency II will bring a sea change to regulation and supervision of insurance 
in Europe. It has naturally raised concerns and opposition from various angles 
and stakeholders.  This  report  focuses  on  the  prospective  impact  of  selected 
aspects  of  Solvency  II  on  asset  allocation  and  the  ability  of  life  insurers  to 
invest in line with the long-term investment horizons of beneficiaries, in the 
context of long-term (retirement) savings products.46  
◦ The use of short-term horizons for the calibration of capital charges 
The solvency capital requirement (SCR) is determined as the capital needed 
to limit the probability that an insurer will fail to 1 in 200 chances during a 
year.  It  is  calculated using  a  value-at-risk  measure  calibrated  at  a  99.5% 
confidence level over a 12-month horizon (Article 101). The calibration of 
                                                        
46  By extension, some of the aspects discussed here may be relevant for defined benefit 
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capital  charges  for  the  different  asset  classes  is  therefore  based  on  this 
yearly horizon. 
However, when an investor faces a long-term liability profile and has hence 
the ability to hold assets over several years, the use of a 12-month horizon to 
calibrate capital charges may fail to capture the risks effectively run by the 
insurer, while possibly over-representing the impact of short-term volatility 
on asset prices. 
It is suggested that the horizon for the calibration of capital charges should 
instead be in line with their life cycle. This is of particular relevance for less-
liquid asset classes, where the absence of liquid secondary markets means 
that the investor is effectively tied to holding the assets until they mature. 
◦ The steepness of capital charges with regard to duration and rating 
Capital charges under Solvency II increase with longer durations and lower 
ratings, given higher credit risk (the risk that the issuer would default). The 
steepness of this increase is a matter of concern to the extent that: i) long-
term liabilities are typically better served by investing in instruments with 
longer, rather than shorter, maturities; and ii) top-rated assets have become 
more scarce, following the financial and sovereign debt crisis. Box 2 (below) 
considers more broadly the influence of the standard capital charges under 
Solvency II on asset allocation. 
◦ The likely unintended effects of zero risk-weights for sovereign debt47 
The award of zero risk-weights to sovereign debt is unwarranted by actual 
developments,  including  recent  debt  restructuring  in  Europe.  At  a 
macroeconomic level, it results in the crowding-out of resources that could 
otherwise  be  available  to  the  private  sector,  and  may  result  in  lower 
potential  growth,  in  particular for  countries with high debt  levels –  also 
lowering the incentives for fiscal consolidation. At a micro level, it distorts 
the  asset  allocation  process,  pursued  by  insurers  in  the  interest  of 
beneficiaries, to the detriment of any other asset class with a similar risk 
profile but higher capital charges – despite possibly a higher return, which 
is more beneficial to investors. 
Zero capital charges for sovereigns are notably expected to deter investment 
in debt issued by corporations. However, preferences would also be shaped 
by  other  factors,  including  the  supply  of  sufficiently  long  maturities, 
relative returns and correlations with other asset classes. Unintended effects 
may  include  higher  access  to  riskier  assets,  which  are  worse  suited  to 
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meeting  guaranteed  returns,  but  may  offset  the meagre  returns  typically 
offered by government bonds (Morgan Stanley, 2013). 
Applying capital charges to sovereign debt is not straightforward, both due 
to the potential impact in funding costs for sovereigns and the difficulty in 
finding the right weighting. However, the potential unintended effects just 
cited  invite  the  phased  introduction  of  risk  weights,  as  proposed  by  the 
Group of Thirty (2013). 
◦ Sometimes inaccurate reflection of business models and risks 
The  provision  of  guarantees,  within  long-term  (retirement)  savings 
products by life insurers, is understood to necessitate the implementation of 
specific investment practices, broadly known as asset-liability management 
(ALM).  These  practices  try  to  match  asset  allocation  with  the  profile  of 
liabilities  in  order  to  minimise  interest-rate  and  re-investment  risks,  by 
investing  in  assets  with  a  similar  pattern  of  returns  and  life-cycle  to  the 
liabilities they back.48 
By not fully recognising the risk-mitigation effects of these strategies, it is 
feared that Solvency II may distort asset allocation and risk management, or 
otherwise unduly increase the cost of providing guarantees in this context. 
Central to this discussion is the extent to which the standard formula under 
Solvency II recognises interest-risk immunisation and distinguishes spread 
from default risk, as considered below in more detail. 
◦ Artificial volatility in balance sheets and reported solvency positions 
Solvency II is based on prospective and market-consistent valuation of both 
assets and liabilities. However, where the valuation does not recognise the 
effects  of  spread-risk  immunisation,  it  may  lead  to  artificial  volatility  in 
balance sheets and reported solvency positions.49 The problem resides not 
in volatility itself, but on the extent to which the reported solvency position 
may not accurately reflect economic fundamentals and the distortions that 
this may entail for the proper management of the insurance activity. In the 
presence of inaccurate reporting, markets may pressure insurers to expand 
their business or distribute profits, when reported solvency positions are 
artificially high, or alternatively, demand counter-productive restructuring, 
when the reported indicators are artificially low. 
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above. 
49 As for interest-rate risk, in the standard formula, a smaller duration gap between assets 
and liabilities entails a smaller capital requirement for interest-rate risk (movements in the 
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The contentious points just highlighted refer to the 2009 Framework Directive, 
which was undergoing a review at the point of drafting this report. The next 
sections consider in more detail the two aspects that are the core of this review, 
namely i) the distinction between spread (interest rate) risk and default (credit) 
risk and ii) the calibration of capital charges for long-term investing. Before 
considering these respects, Box 2 discusses the impact of capital charges on 
asset allocation, from a more general perspective. 
 
Box 2. The influence of capital charges in Solvency II on asset allocation 
Solvency II is not expected to bring insurers to seek re-capitalisation. The results of the 
fifth quantitative impact study (QIS 5) conducted by EIOPA (2011) indicate that less than 
15% of insurers surveyed (2,520) would not meet the solvency capital requirement (SCR) 
while almost 50% had more than twice the required SCR. It follows that changes in asset 
allocation to meet the SCR are not generally needed (as far as these results will hold in the 
future, as the financial position of insurers is a moving target). However, the introduction 
of risk-sensitive capital charges creates an incentive to adjust asset allocation in favour of 
assets with lower charges, potentially irrespective of their broader suitability at the time 
and under those circumstances. The question for most insurers therefore is one of relative 
rather than absolute incentives. Figure 14 represents equivalent asset allocations under 
the standard formula; it illustrates the incentives embedded in the spread risk and equity 
risk sub-modules. Three observations should be noted: i) charges are higher for equity 
instruments,  longer  durations  and lower-ratings;  ii) covered  bonds  face lower  charges 
than unsecured debt and iii) a zero risk weight applies to sovereign debt issued in the 
European Economic Area (EEA).  
Figure 14. A stylised illustration of trade-offs between different asset classes 
(Equivalent investment allocations under the Solvency II standard formula) 
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Note: This illustration is based on the capital requirements under QIS 5.  
It only considers capital charges from spread risk and equity risk. 
Source: Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS) (2011).  
The  incentives  reflected  above,  which  favour  fixed  income  over  equities,  government 
bonds over corporate bonds, and short over long durations, are not as pronounced as they 
appear in the first instance, in view of: 
◦ The relief provided for diversification, captured in a set of correlation matrices, which 
could reduce the effective risk charge applicable to equities by half (CGFS, 2011);  
◦ The effect of public ratings, which should moderate the incentive to invest in sovereign 
bonds derived from zero risk-weights; 
◦ The relief provided for longer durations by the matching adjustment (section 1.4) and 
the interest rate risk sub-module of the standard formula (EC, 2012a); and 
◦ The benefits awarded for risk mitigation, hedging, reinsurance and securitisation. 
Moreover, Solvency II allows insurers to develop and employ their own internal models (as 
an alternative to the standard formula, subject to supervisory approval) to calculate the 
SCR. The application of internal models could reduce capital requirements significantly – in 
QIS 5, the use of group internal models resulted in a reduction of the SCR by 20% on 
13%
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average. The extent to which insurers will develop internal models remains uncertain, 
however, due notably to the cost and complexity involved. 
In sum, headline capital charges are not fully representative of the net effects of Solvency 
II on asset allocation. Moreover, solvency charges are but one of the factors influencing 
asset  allocation,  as presented in  Table  5. In  any  event,  the  appropriate calibration  of 
capital charges remains important. 
Table 5. Selected factors influencing asset allocation 
Regulatory-related  Market-related 
◦ Solvency (capital) charges 
◦ Available capital and discount rate for 
liabilities 
◦ Supervisory ladder (e.g. recovery 
periods) 
◦ Look-through to underlying 
investments 
◦ Internal models approved by 
supervisors 
◦ Risk transfers (reinsurance, 
securitisation and derivatives) 
◦ Benefits for diversification 
◦ Relative returns offered by each asset 
class 
◦ Volatility of each asset class 
◦ Ongoing business and legacy liabilities of 
each insurer 
◦ Current business model and product mix 
of each insurer 
◦ Size of the balance sheet of each insurer 
◦ Expertise in less-liquid and alternative 
asset classes 
◦ Public ratings (by rating agencies) 
Source: Author. 
Two studies on public ratings indicate that the effect of Solvency II capital charges may be 
more limited than sometimes portrayed: Höring (2012) finds, for an average European 
insurer, that gross market exposure would be lower under the rating model of S&P than 
under the Solvency II standard formula (nearly 25% lower). Yet, once diversification and 
adjustments are factored in, the SCR under S&P is nearly 68% higher than under Solvency 
II. Morgan Stanley (2013) however finds rating models to be less stringent for life insurers. 
However, looking at the SCR in this fashion fails to capture dynamic elements and makes 
results largely dependent on the model or average institution considered.  
It is also widely acknowledged that the effective entry into force of Solvency II should not 
lead to shocks in capital markets, as it has been in the pipeline for over ten years and 
allows for transitional arrangements. No major relocations of assets are likely to occur. 
Some  argue  that  such  relocations  have  largely  already  taken  place,  in  particular  for 
equities,  as  a  direct result  of  the introduction  of  mark-to-market  accounting  and risk-
based supervision. Yet, the phenomenon is more accurately attributed to the convergence 
of  several  effects,  including  also  market  bubbles,  the  persistence  of  low  returns  and 
volatility, ageing populations in developed economies and higher awareness of the risks in 
the  provision  of  guaranteed  returns,  leading  to  the  general  use  of  asset-liability 
management practices, relying on fixed-income investments (see McKinsey, 2011; CGFS, 
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Spread risk versus default risk...  
Life insurers, given the certain and long-term profile of their liabilities, are able 
to hold assets to maturity or otherwise throughout their entire life cycle. When 
assets are held to maturity, as opposed to being available for trading, it is the 
default risk rather than the spread risk that matters. Prudential rules should 
appropriately  distinguish  between  these different exposures.50  The next few 
paragraphs address this question. 
Credit risk or the risk of loss arising from fluctuations in the credit standing of 
an issuer or debtor, is usually understood to have two components: spread and 
default risk. The former is the risk of loss derived from a fluctuation in the 
level or volatility of the market price of a fixed-income instrument. It is defined 
in relative terms as the difference (or spread) between the quoted rate of return 
of the bond held (its market price) and the risk-free rate.  
Within the balance sheet of an insurer or another institutional investor, spread 
risk is relevant for securities that may be subject to a forced sale, so as to meet 
an unforeseen liability cash-flow, or that are otherwise available for trading. By 
way of contrast, when a security is held to maturity, what matters is default 
risk, meaning the risk that an issuer will fail to honour its obligations to timely 
pay any agreed coupons or reimbursements of the principal.51 It is hence the 
financial strength of the issuer or counterparty that determines default risk, 
rather than the volatility of asset prices in the marketplace. 
When a fixed-income security is held to maturity, the investor bears primarily 
the risk of default and is largely unaffected by short-term volatility in the asset 
price,  as  s/he would  not  dispose  of  it  before  it  matures. Holding  assets  to 
maturity (in particular fixed-income securities with long durations, matched to 
similarly  long-term  liabilities)  is  central  to  life  insurance  when  it  provides 
guarantees for long-term/retirement savings.52 To ensure that those guarantees 
are honoured, an insurer would typically match liabilities against assets with a 
similar profile, in terms of duration and/or cash-flows. In so doing, it would 
mitigate the risk of forced sales and therefore the potential impact of spread 
risk in its portfolio. 
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Asset-liability management (ALM) practices are therefore consequential in two 
respects: i) by cash-flow and duration matching, they increase the likelihood of 
meeting liabilities and ii) by holding assets to maturity, they expose investment 
portfolios to default risk rather than spread risk. Arguably the 2009 framework 
directive for Solvency II, however, did not take into account these two effects, 
which prompted its review under the Omnibus II Directive (still in the process 
of adoption at the time of drafting): 
◦ On the asset side of the balance sheet, capital charges reflect a number of risks, 
including: i) interest rate risk or the sensitivity to changes in the yield curve 
or term structure of interest rates, ii) spread risk or the sensitivity to changes 
in credit spreads over the risk-free rates and iii) counterparty risk or the 
possible loss due to unexpected default of counterparties or debtors (Article 
105). For assets held to maturity, it is argued that capital charges should not 
reflect interest-rate and spread risk but only default risk. The risks reflected 
in the charges applied to non-listed asset classes are called into question on 
similar grounds. 
◦ On the liability side of the balance sheet, the term structure of the discount rates 
employed to calculate the present value of future liabilities is constructed on 
the basis of risk-free interest rates (the yield curve), since liabilities are hard 
promises. Utilising a higher rate or discount, that is, assuming a higher rate 
of return on assets and a lower present value of liabilities, would go against 
the principle of prudent valuations, since it is uncertain that a higher rate of 
return can be earned. However, where liabilities are matched to assets with 
a similar duration and cash-flow profile and assets are held to maturity, it is 
argued that the discount rate should reflect the effects of this matching.  
In order to capture the actual risks to which life insurers and beneficiaries are 
effectively  exposed,  it  is  important  to  reflect  the  economic  fundamentals 
derived from asset-liability matching. It matters both to support best practices 
in  the  operation  of  life  insurance  and  to  ensure  market  participants  get  an 
accurate picture of the solvency position of an insurer by looking at reported 
figures. As a corollary, it should also reduce volatility in the reported solvency 
position  of  insurers,  since  fluctuations  in  spreads  would  only  be  fed  into 
balance sheets to the extent they are indicative of changes in default risk. 
Volatility in own funds and reported solvency ratios is not a problem in itself 
but only when it does not accurately reflect actual solvency. It may then lead to 
unintended  effects  such  as  heightened  pressures  to  distribute  profits  or 
compete  aggressively,  when  reported  solvency  would  be  high  (under  low 
spreads). Or pressure to pursue detrimental restructuring if reported solvency 
falls below supervisory thresholds (under high spreads). While such extreme 
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To limit artificial volatility and better capture the risk mitigation effect of asset-
liability management, a matching adjustment (MA) was proposed during the 
Omnibus  II  review  of  the  2009  Solvency  II  Directive.53  The  proposed  MA 
would be applied to the discount rate for eligible liabilities and be equal to the 
spread over the risk-free rate on admissible backing assets, less an estimate of 
the  costs  of  default  (EIOPA,  2013d).  In  this  manner,  it  would  adjust  the 
discounted  value  of  eligible  liabilities  to  the  risks  effectively  borne  in  the 
investment portfolio: eligible liabilities are discounted at the rate of return of 
eligible  backing  assets,  by  projecting  their  future  contractual  cash-flows 
(principal  and  coupon) minus  an  estimation  of  the  reduction in contractual 
cash-flows arising from expected defaults or downgrades. Figure 15 presents 
this process graphically. 
Figure 15. Stylised representation of the matching adjustment process 
 
Source: KPMG (2012). 
 
                                                        
53 The matching adjustment (MA) is part of a broader set of measures aimed at limiting the 
impact of artificial volatility on the provision of certain insurance products, in particular 
long-term guarantees (European Commission, 2012e; EIOPA, 2013c). Under this ‘Long-Term 
Guarantee  Assessment’  (LTGA)  and  following  the  terms  of  reference  agreed  on  14 
December  2012  by  the  European  Council,  Parliament  and  Commission  (in  legislative 
trialogue), EIOPA evaluated five versions of the matching adjustment, the application of a 
counter-cyclical premium to the relevant risk-free interest rate term structure, the extension 
of the recovery period, extrapolation and transitional measures. The findings of EIOPA were 
presented on 14 June 2013 (EIOPA, 2013g). 54 | SETTING THE SCENE: LONG-TERM INVESTING AND RETIREMENT SAVINGS IN EUROPE 
The  application  of  a  matching  adjustment,  while  desirable  to  increase  the 
accuracy of reported solvency and avoid hindering the provision of long-term 
guarantees unduly, raises however a number of practical concerns: 
◦ Identifying default risk, separating it from spread risk 
There is evidence that movements in bond spreads are not driven by default 
risk alone but also by relative liquidity and other non-credit related factors. 
For  any  spread,  however, separating  the share  explained  by  default  risk 
from other components is not a straightforward task.54 Under the proposed 
MA, this ‘fundamental spread’ would be calculated independently by the 
insurer for each portfolio, which springs naturally from the purpose of the 
MA but nevertheless poses a supervisory challenge. 
◦ Determining eligible liabilities and admissible assets 
Assets may only be matched against liabilities that are certain as regards the 
volume and timing of payments. In theory, liabilities can be fully defined in 
both respects. In practice, however, typically due to the possibility of early 
redemptions or the coverage of longevity risk, liability profiles do not tend 
to be fully certain. The insurance business works by aggregating multiple 
liabilities (policies) and modelling them by estimating contingencies such as 
early redemptions, unpaid premiums and life expectancy for beneficiaries. 
The question, for the MA, is the degree of certainty in the liability profile 
that would warrant its application.  
A narrow application of the MA would only operate if policy-holders had 
no other options (no ability to stop contributions or redeem early) and no 
guarantee was offered upon death. Some accumulation policies offering a 
guaranteed return at a given date and some annuities that do not cover 
longevity  risk  are  good  examples.  While  a  broader  MA  would  apply  to 
other products but only to the share of the liabilities deemed to be certain 
(total liabilities less estimated contingencies). The matter is ultimately one of 
supervisory comfort with internal modelling of liabilities by insurers for the 
purposes of regulatory compliance. 
As for admissible assets, while strictly speaking only fixed-income securities 
can be matched, two questions remain: the minimum credit quality required 
(if any) and the extent to which other instruments may be admitted. The 
MA should not provide an incentive to invest in poor-quality assets but 
should probably not confine itself to the highest-graded assets either, which 
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could  limit  useful  investments  in  the  real  economy.55  At  the  same  time, 
extending the application of the MA to other asset classes could facilitate 
some  forms  of  long-term  investing.  In  this  respect,  the  MA  could  be 
extended to include alternative assets with bond-like cash-flows, such as 
infrastructure debt – it should be noted that a replication portfolio based on 
illiquid assets would typically be less expensive than one based on perfectly 
liquid  ones  (Gründl,  2013).  Furthermore,  the  principles  behind  the  MA 
could in theory also be applied to, for instance, dividends from equities or 
rents  from  real  estate,  by  applying  a  prudential factor  to  expected cash-
flows.  
◦ Controlling for reinvestment and counterparty risks. 
Partial matching results in reinvestment risk, which can be defined broadly 
as the risk that future market rates would be below the return guaranteed to 
policy-holders. Perfect matching against assets with identical durations and 
cash-flows is rarely feasible in practice, particularly for very long maturities. 
The question is how to combine the application of the MA with a suitable 
reflection of reinvestment risk, in case of imperfect matching, where assets 
may be held to maturity but would mature before the last cash-flows of the 
liabilities they back. Developing a methodology for this purpose is unlikely 
to be a straightforward exercise (Towers Watson, 2013). 
The MA framework would also need to control for the potential increase in 
counterparty risk indirectly derived from its application. If perfect matching 
is required and the use of derivatives and hedging practices is (inevitably) 
allowed to achieve identical durations and cash-flows, the counterparty risk 
borne by insurers would increase. While this additional (and to some extent 
regulatory-induced) counterparty risk would be taken into account by the 
capital charges for the instruments concerned, it still raises wider prudential 
concerns for insurers and the stability of the financial system (CGFS, 2011). 
◦ Aligning it to best practices in asset-liability management 
Good asset-liability management requires frequent rebalancing of matched 
portfolios, as the term structure of interest rate tends not to move in parallel 
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investments  in  lower-rated  assets.  This  development  could  prompt  the  introduction  of 
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but to become flatter or steeper, leading to maturity mismatches.56 Rating 
downgrades for assets backing liabilities would also invite rebalancing. In 
both these instances the applicability of the MA would be altered. However, 
given a large portfolio, it will typically be more efficient to reallocate some 
assets to back other liabilities or even to sell some assets to purchase others. 
To the extent that such rebalancing is economically efficient, it should be 
recognised in the application of the MA. The instances in which rebalancing 
is possible may however need to be limited in order to prevent insurers 
from behaving strategically i.e. to optimise reported solvency rather than to 
better manage risks and portfolios. 
◦ Deciding the best reporting for its effects 
The risk mitigation effects of asset-liability matching, measured by the MA, 
can be reported in a number of formats, including as a separate entry on the 
balance sheet or integrated in another balance sheet value. In the interest of 
transparency, the impact of the MA should be disaggregated and publicly 
disclosed. The MA should therefore appear as additional information for all 
stakeholders to best assess the solvency position and business of an insurer. 
To conclude, it is important to note that recognising the effect of ALM practices 
(cash-flow and duration matching) is important, not only to better reflect the 
risks effectively run in life insurance, but also to support long-term investing. 
In effect, matching long-term liabilities with long-term assets, held to maturity, 
provides a source of long-term and stable funding for issuers. While the ability 
of insurers to concentrate on default risk rather than spread risk should lead to 
a deeper focus on value fundamentals rather than short-term price movements. 
In the context of long-term investing, the European Commission (2012a) asked 
EIOPA to calibrate capital charges for some assets, as discussed below. 
Calibration of capital charges... 
The European Commission (2012a) asked EIOPA to calibrate capital charges in 
the Solvency II standard formula for infrastructure financing, SME financing, 
socially responsible investments and social business financing – through debt, 
equity and structured finance, including securitisation and project bonds.  
As an exercise to closely assess the risks linked to alternative investments, such 
as venture capital or infrastructure, it should increase understanding among 
regulators and supervisors. But the relative scarcity of performance and risk 
data make it difficult to build a distinct capital charge for each asset class – and 
if no such charge is found, the one for equities applies. Assessing the risks for 
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each asset class separately should lead to a more accurate reflection of risks 
(from an historical perspective). But it may or may not bring about charges that 
are lower than the ones applicable to equities, as the specific risk for the given 
asset class may be found to be higher. In a preliminary assessment, EIOPA 
(2013d) did not find enough supporting evidence to arrive at distinct charges. 
The  discussion  remains  however  open,  in  the  search  for  alternative 
methodologies  better  suited  to  assess  risks  in  less-liquid  asset  classes.  This 
calibration  is  not  a  one-off  exercise  but  could  be  reviewed  periodically 
(according to the Omnibus II proposal57). 
As a cautionary note, it is worth recalling that ‘long-term investing’ (defined as 
investment conducive to gross capital formation) is not among the objectives 
pursued by Solvency II, as it bears no weight on the interest of policy-holders 
and beneficiaries. The promotion of gross capital formation may however have 
overall positive effects in an economy and therefore also on beneficiaries and 
insurance undertakings, albeit through this indirect channel. 
In sum... 
This section has discussed institutional long-term investing today, focusing on 
the provision of guaranteed returns, the interest of beneficiaries and the impact 
of  changes  in  macroeconomic  conditions  and  business  models.  It  also 
considered  the  role of  regulation  and  the  ongoing  reform  of  the  prudential 
framework for insurers and pension funds in Europe. 
The ability of life insurers and pension schemes to invest long-term is given, in 
the first instance, by the long-term horizons inherent in saving for retirement. 
But it also depends on the characteristics of the product or scheme operated. 
And  it  is  affected  by  prudential  and  other  considerations  embedded  in  the 
regulatory framework.  
Products and schemes incorporating guarantees play a useful social function as 
they increase pension safety and help mitigate income inequality at retirement. 
The provision of guarantees requires specific investment practices, known as 
asset-liability management (ALM) based on the matching of liabilities against 
fixed-income instruments with similar duration and cash-flows. Under long-
term  investment horizons,  these  practices  are  inherently  conducive  to  long-
term investing as assets with long life-cycles are held over long periods of time 
or to maturity, providing long-term and stable funding to issuers. 
Retirement solutions that incorporate no (or limited) guarantees are also able 
to  invest  long-term,  as  long  as  redemption  policies  are  sufficiently  illiquid. 
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They may also allocate a higher share of their assets to equity and equity-like 
instruments, and less-liquid asset classes if the size of the scheme allows. Long-
term  investment  horizons  under  restricted  liquidity  towards  investors  and 
large-sized funds should lead to more patient, engaged and productive capital 
being deployed in the economy. 
Persistently low-interest rates reduce the ability to deliver guaranteed returns 
above inflation and call for hybrid solutions that combine pension safety with 
potentially higher adequacy. They also put pressure on the solvency position 
of providers having to service high legacy liabilities and demand more careful 
supervision, within an appropriate regulatory framework.  
Solvency II is central to improving the regulation and supervision of insurance 
and is leading the process towards greater sophistication in risk management 
and investment  practices. It  should, however,  duly  calibrate capital charges 
and  recognise  the  risk  mitigation  effects  derived  from  ALM  practices,  as 
envisaged under the matching adjustment (MA), whose role and trade-offs this 
section considered in detail. The conclusion from this exercise could then be 
used  to  help  inform  the  debate  surrounding  the  extension  of  risk-based 
supervision to the provision of guarantees by pension funds (section 2.2).  59 
2.  THE SINGLE MARKET FOR LONG-TERM 
SAVINGS 
he single market potential remains largely unexplored where it comes to 
long-term investing and retirement saving solutions, broadly accessible 
to households in Europe. This chapter considers less-liquid investment 
funds, occupational pensions and direct retail investments, from an EU single 
market perspective, in view of their importance to channel retail savings with a 
long-term  horizon  towards  adequate  investment  opportunities.  It  also 
considers  the  current  EU  framework  for  investor  protection,  and  ways  in 
which it could be optimised to foster retail access to long-term investing and 
retirement solutions – while improving protection. 
2.1  A single market for less-liquid funds  
The  EU  regulatory  framework  for  retail  investment  funds  favours  liquidity 
towards investors (in terms of redemptions) to the detriment of investments in 
less-liquid  assets.  As  EU-regulated  retail  funds,  UCITS  (undertakings  for 
collective investment in transferable securities) are required to repurchase or 
redeem their units at the request of any unit holder.58 Hence, UCITS are not 
allowed to invest directly in less-liquid asset classes. Yet, in several member 
states,  there  are  regulatory  frameworks  that  allow  retail  investors  to  access 
less-liquid assets in a fund format with limited redemptions (EC, 2013d). 
The adoption of the AIFMD (alternative investment fund managers Directive) 
in 2011 facilitated the introduction of sector-specific and narrow product rules 
for investment funds, in addition to UCITS.59 Indeed, European venture capital 
funds (EuVECAs) and social entrepreneurship funds (EuSEFs) were adopted 
shortly after the introduction of the Directive.60 The AIFMD embodies the basic 
regulatory framework for fund management in Europe – management rules for 
                                                        
58 Article 84, Directive 2009/65/EC. 
59 Directive 2011/61/EU. 
60 Regulation 345/2013 and Regulation 346/2013. The regulatory frameworks for EuVECAs 
and EuSEFs build upon the AIFMD, although they apply when assets under management 
do not exceed the de minimis threshold in Article 3.2.b of the AIFMD. 
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UCITS remain formally separate, despite converging in substance (de Manuel 
& Lannoo, 2012).61 
As a matter of fostering investor choice and facilitating long-term investing, a 
pan-European framework for less-liquid investment funds has been advocated 
by industry, regulators and experts.62 In building such a framework however, a 
number of hurdles are present, including: i) aligning redemption profiles with 
underlying liquidity, ii) addressing valuation difficulties and related problems 
arising from the illiquidity of the underlying and iii) responding to insufficient 
awareness among some investors, as well as mitigating the risk of mismanaged 
expectations. 
The difficulties experienced by some funds invested in less-liquid asset classes 
to meet redemptions before and during the 2008 financial crisis illustrated the 
importance of aligning redemption policies with the liquidity of underlying 
assets. The example of retail OEREFs (open-end real estate funds), popular in 
Germany but regulated in at least other nine member states, prompted national 
authorities to introduce lock-in periods and advance notice requirements.63 The 
substantial liquidity transformation performed by OEREFs resulted in liquidity 
crisis in some funds, which stranded investors and lea to sizeable economic 
and confidence losses (Bannier et al., 2007). 
                                                        
61 The UCITS Directive comprises both management rules (as the AIFMD) and product rules 
(in contrast with the AIFMD). With respect to management rules, the proposal to amend 
Directive 2009/65/EC [COM (2012) 350] will further align the UCITS Directive with the 
AIFMD, regarding in particular the depositary function. In addition, a 2012 consultation on 
UCITS, product rules, liquidity management, depositary, money market funds and long-
term investments is also expected to lead to further alignment of the UCITS framework with 
some of the provisions in the AIFMD (EC, 2012g). 
62 Examples of support to less-liquid fund are: “54% of respondents felt that a common EU 
framework dedicated to long-term investments for retail investors is needed » Industry survey on 
long-term savings (EFAMA, 2012) « Key action 6: Boost long-term investment in the real economy 
by facilitating access to long-term investment funds” Single Market Act II (EC, 2012h). “A new 
long-term vehicle for retail investors should be introduced in Europe: Retail investors would benefit 
from having access to relatively illiquid asset classes to channel part of their long-term savings, 
including part of their retirement savings. A harmonised regulatory framework for long-term retail 
funds (LTRFs) should therefore be considered.” Rethinking Asset Management (de Manuel & 
Lannoo, 2012). 
63 For instance, the Investor Protection and Functionality Improvement Act of 11 February 
2011, imposes a 12-month notice period for redemptions, applicable to existing and new 
investors,  and  a  24-month  holding  period  for  new  investors  in  OEREFs  regulated  in 
Germany. This same Act also prescribes stricter leverage limits and valuation requirements. 
Additional  restrictions  are  envisaged  by  the  German  Government  as  part  of  the 
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Article 16 of the AIFMD requires managers to ensure, for every fund, that the 
liquidity profile of the underlying investments and redemption policy of fund 
units are consistent. Managers need to have liquidity management procedures 
in place and regularly conduct stress tests. Funds also need to devise a specific 
redemption policy for exceptional market circumstances and communicate it to 
investors, in principle professional clients, ex-ante (Article 23).  
The provisions in the AIFMD strive to incorporate the lessons learned during 
the financial crisis regarding the inhibiting effects of unaccounted maturity and 
liquidity transformation for investors individually and the financial system as 
a whole (Turner, 2009; De Larosière et al., 2009). It follows that any framework 
for investment funds biased towards less-liquid underlying assets would need 
to incorporate clear limits on redemptions and avoid giving a false impression 
of liquidity to inexperienced investors.64 
While illiquidity deters some investors from accessing investment funds, there 
are several examples (at national level) of fund frameworks that impose severe 
restrictions on redemptions and, yet, have found relative success among retail 
investors. The European Commission (2013c) reports that 70% of assets under 
management by closed-end funds in Germany originate from retail investors 
directly. In the same vein, 30% of the money raised by private equity funds in 
France  originated  from  retail  investors,  between  2008  and  the  first  half  of 
2012.65  While  the market  for  less-liquid  investment funds  may  be  relatively 
modest in size, when compared to UCITS, investor demand exists and could 
grow in the future. 
In other member states, retail access to less-liquid investment funds is difficult 
and is coupled with insufficient awareness among retail investors about long-
term investing. As a first step, to enable retail access, a harmonised framework 
would be needed; including product structuring and investor protection rules. 
In a survey of industry participants conducted by EFAMA (2012), a majority of 
respondents agreed that a common EU framework for long-term investments 
for retail investors is needed. Such a framework would facilitate awareness but 
additional awareness-raising initiatives would be needed. In this same survey, 
a majority of respondents also saw merit in a common information initiative on 
long-term savings. 
In devising a pan-European framework for retail funds invested in less-liquid 
asset classes, the question revolves around the definition of eligible assets and 
diversification thresholds. Once the importance of aligning redemption policies 
                                                        
64 Liquidity, however, is a continuum that allows for intermediate solutions (for instance, 
from daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly liquidity and above). See section 1.2. 
65 Tax incentives are thought to support these figures. 62 | THE SINGLE MARKET FOR LONG-TERM SAVINGS 
with the liquidity of the underlying is acknowledged, it becomes apparent that 
two alternative designs are possible: i) funds fully invested in less-liquid assets, 
redeemable only upon maturity, or ii) funds partially invested in liquid assets, 
where intermediary redemptions would be possible at given intervals under 
certain conditions, notably advance notice. The latter funds would therefore 
need to incorporate a liquidity management function. 
Each category of funds, however, may serve a different purpose: i) an illiquid 
or closed-end fund for investors able and willing to commit their capital over a 
given period of time, in contrast with ii) a balanced fund, for those investors 
interested  rather  in  gaining  a  diversified  exposure  both  to  liquid  and  less-
liquid asset classes – and willing to accept some restrictions on redemptions. 
The first model would maximise the exposure to the illiquidity premium but, 
precisely  due  to  its  illiquidity,  may  be  more  difficult  for  some  investors  to 
access  –  while  the  second  model  would  give  only  partial  exposure  to  the 
illiquidity premium but may be more broadly accessible. One model does not 
however exclude the other and, in fact, both are complementary and needed to 
complete the choice afforded to retail investors in Europe, beyond the high 
liquidity in transferable securities offered by UCITS.66 However, beyond less-
liquid asset classes, long-term investing also takes the form of low turnover 
and  strategic  equity  stakes  and  investments  in  fixed-income  securities  with 
long maturities. Such practices would also necessitate redemption restrictions 
and may more easily find their place within a framework for balanced funds. 
 
 
 
                                                        
66 It has also been proposed that the so-called ‘trash ratio’ in UCITS (10% of assets under 
management – Article 50.2.a Directive 2009/65/EC) could be allowed to incorporate less-
liquid asset classes. However, holdings of such assets would alter the liquidity profile of 
UCITS and sit uncomfortably with daily redemptions, heightening the risk derived from 
maturity and liquidity transformation (defined for an investment fund by the misalignment 
between the liquidity of its underlying and that of its units or shares). Certain less-liquid 
asset  classes  are  accessible  by  UCITS  using  derivative  financial  instruments,  subject  to 
conditions (for a summary, see ESMA 2012/832). In a derivative transaction, the liquidity of 
the underlying is, in a way, substituted by the liquidity of the counterparty and, hence, 
counterparty exposure limits and collateral management requirements are put in place. The 
use  of  derivatives  to  access  less-liquid  asset  classes  in  UCITS  is  linked  to  regulatory 
restrictions (or permissiveness, depending on the perspective). Yet, more widely, the use of 
derivatives to access less-liquid assets is also explained by typically lower transaction costs, 
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Box 3. The proposal on European long-term investment funds 
In June 2013, the European Commission tabled a legislative initiative (2013/0214 COD) 
containing product rules on closed-end funds, invested in less-liquid asset classes and 
open to retail investors, under the denomination ELTIFs (European long-term investment 
funds). The proposal, in the form of a regulation, directly applicable in all member states, 
builds on the AIFMD framework for managers, and follows a period of extensive analysis, 
review of regimes at national level and consultation with stakeholders (EC, 2013c). 
ELTIFs would invest at least 70% of their capital in less-liquid assets and comply with strict 
diversification requirements – not to invest more than 10% of their capital in any single 
individual real asset or eligible undertaking (below). The remainder 30% of capital may be 
invested in liquid financial instruments (UCITS eligible assets) but no more than 5% in any 
single issuer (Article 12). 
ELTIFs would acquire assets directly from qualifying portfolio undertakings (non-financial 
and non-traded) or take direct participation in projects. Investments may take the form 
of equity participations, debt instruments, loans, or the direct holding of individual assets 
requiring an up-front capital expenditure of at least €10 million. They may also invest in 
other ELTIFs, and regulated venture capital funds (EuVECAs) and social entrepreneurship 
funds (EuSEFs) (Articles 9 and 10).  
ELTIFs would be prohibited from short-selling assets, gaining exposure to commodities, 
entering  into  any  arrangement  that  may  encumber  its  assets  and  using  derivatives, 
except for certain hedging purposes (Article 8). Leverage is hence restricted, as is the 
borrowing of cash (Article 14). 
ELTIFs would be closed-end funds, meaning redemptions are not possible before the end 
of the life of the fund, which must be a specific date, decided by the manager ex-ante and 
disclosed to investors before they enter the fund. The life of the ELTIF should be long 
enough to cover the life-cycle of each individual asset (Article 16). Units may be traded 
however on a secondary market (Article 17) – although such trading should not lead to a 
false impression of liquidity, as a significant discount tends to be involved and liquidity is 
volatile in these markets. 
The product structuring rules above are accompanied by requirements on disclosure and 
transparency, regarding both costs and the illiquid nature of the fund (Articles 21 and 22). 
If marketed to retail investors, additional requirements would apply, including a right of 
withdrawal for 14 days after the subscription of units from the fund (Article 24). 
The European Commission anticipates two demand cohorts for ELTIFs: i) retail investors 
and ii) small institutional investors, with assets from €100 million to €1.5 billion – for 
which pooled vehicles are the most economically efficient way to access less-liquid asset 
classes,  and  a  regulated fund  format  is expected  to ease  due  diligence  and  facilitate 
investments.  ELTIFs  can  also  play  a  pivotal  role  in  structuring  defined-contribution 
personal pension solutions (chapter 3). 
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Box 4. Is there space for retail balanced funds with a long-term orientation in Europe? 
Retail balanced funds in Europe could help broaden access to less-liquid asset classes and 
facilitate long-term investment practices, such as low-turnover equity strategies, strategic 
equity stakes and investments in fixed-income instruments with long maturities. ‘Buy and 
hold’ strategies can be implemented within the UCITS framework but are limited by the 
high liquidity offered towards investors. While the stability of assets under management 
(in terms of volume) facilitates long-term practices in some UCITS, the lack of restrictions 
on redemptions ultimately imposes a heightened duty on managers to ensure liquidity. In 
addition, daily valuations, short-term risk metrics and the use of relative benchmarks to 
evaluate performance and remuneration do not facilitate long-term investing either. 
A framework for balanced funds could be aligned with long-term investing by presenting: 
i) limited redemption windows and advance notice requirements, in line with the lower 
liquidity embedded in long-term investing practices and certain asset classes; ii) absolute 
return targets, based on fundamental macroeconomic or sector-specific variables rather 
than  peer  short-term  performance;  and  iii)  clear  messages  to  investors  about  the 
medium- to long-term nature of the investment vehicle, helping to align incentives with 
managers. At the same time, by still providing some opportunity for redemptions, the 
proposed model of balanced funds may gather success within a broad investor base. 
The proposed retail balanced funds would invest in both UCITS-eligible and ELTIF-eligible 
assets. ELTIF assets (equity participations, debt instruments or loans in non-financial non-
traded undertakings and direct holdings of individual assets) would account for at least 
10% and a maximum of 30% of assets under management – this range could be narrowed 
down further to the benefit of standardisation. The funds would be able to access less-
liquid assets directly or via participations in ELTIFs, EuVECAs or EuSEFs. 
Long-term balanced funds would be driven by absolute return targets in line with their 
investment horizons. And they would publish their own policy regarding the application 
of long-term and responsible investing criteria to their investment practices. The use of 
derivative  instruments  would  be  limited  to  an  exhaustive  list  of  hedging  purposes. 
Leverage would also be clearly limited, as a share of assets under management, following 
a commitment approach. 
Redemption policies would need to be aligned with the share of ELTIF assets targeted by 
the fund in its instruments of incorporation, and its policy on long-term investing in liquid 
assets. Investors would need to be duly informed of the long-term nature of these funds 
and  their  redemption  policies,  both  in  normal  and  adverse  market  circumstances.  If 
adverse market conditions severely impact the ability of the fund to meet redemptions, 
investors should be made aware ex-ante that the fund may become partially illiquid, for 
the share of ELTIF assets, until the end of their life-cycle is attained. Equal treatment to all 
investors should be ensured in such instances, including by segregating ELTIF assets and 
providing participations by way of redemptions. 
Balanced funds are thought to be an adequate default solution for defined-contribution 
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funds (with a long-term orientation, as described in this box) could provide an efficient 
mechanism for the delivery of adequate retirement income – as far as it is coupled with 
an appropriate market structure. Chapter 3 considers these aspects in detail, including 
the merits and drawbacks of balanced funds as default solutions. 
 
Box 5. An accompanying market structure for balanced funds 
Higher standardisation in the market for investments funds could attract investors who 
would otherwise not consider this market by: i) mitigating the complexity and burden of 
choice, ii) raising visibility versus the use of traditional bank deposits for saving purposes 
and iii) helping to focus competition among providers on solution quality and costs over 
product proliferation and marketing. A simple and standardised marketplace for balanced 
funds could therefore benefit both investors – as far as cost efficiencies would be realised 
and passed on to them, thanks to a competitive market setting – and industry – as far as 
it would reach investors previously deterred by the complexity of the market setting and 
multiplicity  of  choice.  It  would  also  benefit  the  economy,  as  it  would  help  channel 
available long-term financing towards long-term investing needs, in a transparent setting 
limiting maturity transformation and hence related risks to financial stability. 
Box 4 (above) advances general principles that could guide the design of a pan-European 
framework for balanced funds. Such funds could be a potential alternative to traditional 
bank deposits (for deposits held with a long-term purpose and for individuals willing to 
accept explicit market risk) or very liquid investment funds. An accompanying market 
structure  policy  would  be  instrumental  for  maximising  efficiencies  in  the  industrial 
setting,  accessibility  and  ultimately  value  for  investors.  It  is  proposed  that  a  narrow 
playing field for competition would be laid out, limiting the offer of balanced funds to one 
product per originator – asset manager, insurer or other qualifying undertaking (each 
fund would be named ‘Balanced Fund’ followed by the name of the provider). It is also 
proposed that a pan-European processing architecture would be established, including a 
single clearing house, to ensure that a genuine single market develops, fostering optimal 
fund size and cost structures. In addition a single online information tool could be devised 
to provide general information about balanced funds and help investors compare among 
the different providers of this standardised investment solution. These aspects are more 
closely considered in chapter 3, from the perspective of a pan-European framework for 
personal pensions. 
2.2  A single market for occupational pensions 
Pensions  linked  to  employment  relationships  carry  different  weights  in 
national pension systems. In the majority of member states where occupational 
schemes play a prominent role, guaranteed benefits are still dominant (EIOPA, 
2012c).  Yet,  the  transition  towards  limited  and  conditional  guarantees  and 
towards  hybrid  and  defined  contribution  arrangements  is  in  progress  and 66 | THE SINGLE MARKET FOR LONG-TERM SAVINGS 
expected to intensify – section 1.4 considers the reasons behind this transition. 
Given their funded status, occupational schemes have both the purpose and 
liability profile/return targets that enable long-term investing.67 
In  2003,  a  Directive  on  institutions  for  occupational  retirement  provision 
(IORP)  was  introduced  as  a  first  step  to  build  a  single  market  for  funded 
occupational  pension  funds  operating  mainly  defined  benefit  and  hybrid 
arrangements.68  Defined  contribution  schemes  are  only  partially  in  scope, 
while some defined benefit and hybrid solutions are entirely excluded from the 
directive – notably book reserve schemes, where liabilities are accounted for in 
the balance sheet of the employer. Figure 16 presents the share of assets in the 
occupational pension sector that is subject to the IORP Directive. 
Figure 16. Assets of IORPs as % of assets of occupational pension sector  
 
Source: Pensions Europe. Data for 2010. 
 
The 2003 IORP Directive, based on minimum harmonisation, had an ‘enabling’ 
purpose for the cross-border provision of occupational pensions – that is, when 
the sponsor and the IORP are located in a different member state – and (more 
indirectly) the pooling of schemes by companies operating in more than one 
member state. The Directive distinguishes between prudential supervision of 
the home member state – the state where the IORP is located – and social and 
labour law (SLL) of the host member state – where beneficiaries are or have been 
employed.69 
                                                        
67 Defined contribution pension solutions lack formal liabilities (no returns are guaranteed) 
but may  be  designed and managed  to achieve  absolute long-term  return  targets,  under 
limited liquidity to investors (in terms of redemptions). 
68 Directive 2003/41/EC. 
69 Articles 6.i, 6.j and 20, Directive 2003/41/EC. 
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In addition, the Directive pursues higher sophistication in the management of 
occupational pension funds across the European Union, within a single market 
that would spur convergence towards best practices from advanced member 
states.  It  also  seeks  better  supervision  in  the  interest  of  current  and  future 
beneficiaries, market efficiency and financial stability. The Union is otherwise 
limited in its ambition to promote occupational pensions by the allocation of 
competences in this area in favour of member states.70 
Regarding the objective of enabling cross-border arrangements, the Directive 
has  achieved  little  success  so  far.  In  2012,  there  were  only  84  cross-border 
IORPs  out  of  roughly  120,000  such  schemes  in  Europe  (EIOPA,  2012d; 
European  Commission,  2012e).  The heightened compliance  burden  affecting 
cross-border operations and the lack of clarity in the division of competences 
between home and host member states is thought to deter sponsors from such 
operations (European Commission, 2011a). Removing these barriers would be 
instrumental to enabling the single market and its associated efficiencies, cost 
savings and diversification benefits. There is scope for further clarification of 
what constitutes cross-border activity and which criteria belong to social and 
labour  law  versus  prudential  law/supervision  (EIOPA,  2010  and  2012d; 
European Commission, 2010a and 2011a). 
As regards prudential supervision, the 2003 IORP Directive relied foremost on 
mutual recognition. It only set general principles affecting technical provisions 
and their funding, own funds, investments, and management and custody.71 It 
requires the calculation of technical provisions to be certified by an actuary and 
gives member states discretion regarding discount rates for liabilities. Funding 
should  be  sufficient  at  all  times  or  otherwise  a  recovery  plan  would  be 
adopted. And the ‘prudent person’ principle should guide investments, with 
limits to the ability of member states to restrict eligible assets.  
Member states have interpreted and implemented the general principles above 
in diverse ways, which makes mutual recognition difficult in practice72 and can 
induce harmful competition among jurisdictions.73 At the same time, IORPs are 
                                                        
70  Articles  4.2.b  and  21.3  (requiring  unanimity  at  Council  level  for  adopting  measures 
concerning  social  security  or  social  protection)  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the 
European Union. 
71 Articles 15 and 16, 17, 18, and 19, respectively, Directive 2003/41/EC. 
72 “Belgium: Cross-border Barriers – What lessons can be learned from the failure of French 
UMR to establish an IORP domiciled in Belgium”, Investments and Pension Europe, March 
2013 (www.ipe.com/magazine/belgium-cross-border-barriers_50273.php). 
73  The  lack  of  harmonised  prudential  standards  is  an  incentive  for  regulatory  and 
supervisory competition among potential fund domiciles, which may come at the expense of 
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significant operators in financial markets. Their size exceeds €2,900 billion in 
terms of assets under management, that is, around 25% of GDP for the EU 
altogether – but in some member states assets in occupational pensions exceed 
GDP by a multiple. Hence, going forward, minimum harmonisation becomes 
difficult to justify, in light of the potential externalities and the lessons learned 
during the financial crisis (Turner, 2009; De Larosière et al., 2009).74  
The European Commission communicated in May 2013 that it would present a 
legislative  proposal  revising  the  IORP  Directive  in  autumn  2013.75  The 
proposal  will  be  limited  to  governance  and  supervision  (pillar  2)  and 
transparency  and  disclosure  (pillar  3).  The  Commission  envisages  tabling  a 
revision of solvency requirements (pillar 1) at a later stage, once the necessary 
quantitative  impact  assessments  would  be  concluded  (EIOPA,  2013b).  The 
diversity  of  occupational  pension  systems  across  member  states  makes  the 
harmonisation of quantitative requirements difficult in practice (section 1.4). 
In the interest of beneficiaries and long-term investing, it is however important 
to strengthen the quality and accessibility of occupational pensions in Europe. 
The single market can indeed deliver efficiencies and innovation, cost savings 
(higher  net  returns)  and diversification  benefits  – including  eased  access  to 
less-liquid  asset  classes.  But  in  reforming  the  IORP  Directive,  a  distinction 
should be made between: i) dealing with legacy issues versus prospectively 
devising a framework for occupational pensions in Europe and ii) a common 
supervisory framework versus the values of parameters in the framework. The 
revision of IORP would benefit from a holistic approach, to foster employer 
participation in pension arrangements and long-term investing practices across 
the spectrum of defined benefit, hybrid and defined contribution schemes. 
◦ Dealing with legacy final salary schemes and instances of severe underfunding. As 
traditional defined benefit schemes close to new members and occupational 
pensions move towards hybrid and pure defined contribution, authorities 
should separate legacy problems from the design of a framework catering 
for the future of funded pensions in Europe. In dealing with cases of severe 
underfunding, coordination at EU level would be necessary in any instances 
at risk of generating negative externalities for other member states, in view 
of their size or significance. Yet, member states should keep some discretion 
                                                        
74 The European Union is also constrained to ensure appropriate regulation and supervision 
of pension funds in all member states, given its Treaty mandate and following the G20 
consensus on subjecting all areas of financial intermediation to appropriate regulation and 
supervision (London, April 2009). 
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to decide the specific timing and fashion of intervention, particularly where 
their fiscal capacity is at stake. 
◦ Providing a platform for hybrid arrangements and innovation in solution design. A 
prospective EU framework for occupational pensions should not be limited 
to addressing prudential concerns in traditional defined benefit schemes. It 
should instead provide “a continuum of regulation that allows pension schemes 
to be created – and properly regulated – at any point on the risk-sharing spectrum” 
(NAPF, 2012). Quantitative requirements, where applicable, should hence 
be  fully  reflective  of  the  characteristics  of  the  pension  contract  and  the 
distribution of risks among sponsor, participants and any other stakeholder 
(section  1.4).  Qualitative  requirements  –  in  particular,  governance  and 
communications – should be afforded greater attention, as schemes move 
away  from  defined  benefit,  to  ensure  adequate  alignment  of  defined 
contribution  solutions  with  retirement  goals  and  long-term  investing 
(chapter 3). 
◦ Facilitating solutions able to follow individuals. During their career, individuals 
move across an increasing number of positions and employers. They would 
therefore benefit from pension solutions that follow them from one job to 
another, while permitting the participation of employers in their funding. 
This  result  is  achieved  via  facilitating  the  transferability  of  accumulated 
savings or via meta-schemes, covering a whole industry sector or the entire 
working population.76 Such solutions allow for: i) costs savings, given scale 
economies, ii) diversification benefits, including eased access to less-liquid 
assets and iii) more conscious asset allocation, as assets are not scattered 
across multiple pots (chapter 3).77  
◦ Promoting scale to minimise costs and maximise the long-term investing potential. 
The dispersion of operating costs for funded pensions across member states 
indicates that the single market can have positive effects by fostering higher 
scale and integration. Countries with large numbers of small funds tend to 
have higher operating costs on average than countries with a small number 
of  relatively  large  funds  (OECD,  2011c,  Figure  17).  In  addition,  scale  is 
directly related to the ability to access less-liquid asset classes, given the 
                                                        
76 Examples are industry schemes in the Netherlands (covering workers in a given industry 
sector, in accordance with collective bargaining agreements), ATP in Denmark or NEST in 
the UK. 
77 Chapter 3 explores personal pensions (which could also allow for the participation of 
employers in their funding) and the alignment of incentives in defined contribution and 
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expertise needed and the sizeable minimum investments typically required 
(section 1.1 and chapter 3). 
Figure 17. Operating costs for private pensions in selected countries 
 
Source: OECD (2011c). Data for 2010. Share of total assets. 
Includes investment expenses and administrative costs. 
2.3  A single market for investor protection  
Confidence and trust in investment products and services are central to driving 
investment flows, operating as a pre-condition to the accumulation of savings. 
In the context of long-term and retirement savings, retail investor protection is 
of particular relevance, given notably: i) the cumulative impact of costs and 
fees on net returns, which is more severe the longer the investment horizon,78 
ii) the growing significance of long-term investment decisions for the future 
income security of individuals, as governments and employers reduce benefits 
and  shift  risks  and  iii)  the  cognitive  limitations  and  behavioural  biases 
affecting individuals when they deal with long-term and retirement savings – 
including  procrastination,  difficulties  to  understand  compounding  and 
irrational reactions to short-term volatility and perceived loss79 (Charter et al., 
                                                        
78 Section 3.1 illustrates with examples the impact on net returns of what may appear to a 
retail investor as a very small yearly fee, and how this impact increases with the investment 
horizon. 
79 In an experiment conducted in the UK by NEST (national employment savings trust) to 
better understand reactions to volatility and loss, participating individuals were explained 
the functioning of defined contribution schemes and were later confronted with short-term 
volatility in accumulated values. Individuals expressed emotions such as feeling cheated, 
robbed or misled and looked for someone to blame or punish (Horack et al., 2010a). These 
emotions led to irrational forms of behaviour, such as stopping contributions.  
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2010; Horack et al., 2010; De Meza et al., 2008). The European framework for 
investor protection needs to take due account of these issues, in building a 
single market that fosters accessibility to long-term investing and retirement 
solutions. 
A simple taxonomy of policy tools for investor protection would distinguish: i) 
know your product rules – product structuring rules and suitability requirements 
at the structuring stage, ii) disclosure requirements – pre-contractual and ongoing 
disclosure standards, iii) know your customer rules – selling practices, investment 
advice,  suitability  and  professional  aptitudes  (de Manuel  & Valiante,  2013). 
These elements are addressed with varying depth by the current EU regulatory 
and supervisory framework, as considered in the remainder of this section. 
Product rules exist for UCITS funds and have been proposed for closed-end 
funds invested in less-liquid asset classes and open to retail clients, under the 
denomination ELTIF (European long-term investment funds – Box 3, above). 
The revision of MiFID (markets in financial instruments Directive), proposed 
by the European Commission, introduces a duty of suitability at product design, 
that  would  need  to  be  developed  in  secondary  legislation.80  However,  no 
product structuring rules exist for (defined contribution) pension solutions, nor 
any principles serving as guidelines for the application of a suitability duty at 
the  structuring  stage  –  section  3.4  proposes  a  blueprint  to  address  these 
failures. In addition, MiFID provisions are not universally applied to all PRIPs 
(packaged retail investment products).81 
As regards pre-contractual disclosure, the European Commission proposed in 
2013 the introduction a standardised key information document (KID), initially 
                                                                                                                                             
The emotional consequences of investing in the absence of guarantees can indeed induce 
great worry and tension on individuals, increasing the probability of sub-optimal decisions. 
The importance of emotional resilience is more pronounced when investing in the long-term 
(Professor Fenton-O’Creevy, presenting at a Task Force meeting). 
80 Suitability at product design refers to the set of principles, policies, processes and controls 
that should guide the design of financial products, in view of the client group to which each 
product is targeted (de Manuel and Valiante, 2013, IOSCO, 2012 and 2013). Article 9.6.d of 
the proposal to recast Directive 2004/39/EC [COM (2011) 656 final] places responsibility on 
senior management to define, approve and oversee the policy governing the services and 
products offered by the firm, in accordance with the characteristics and needs of the clients 
to whom the products will be offered or provided. 
81 PRIPs may be defined as retail investment solutions that entail: i) investment risk for the 
buyer, meaning the payout of the product depends on the market value of given assets, and 
ii) packaging, meaning that the assets are not held directly by the investor but rather are the 
underlying or reference assets to the end product. See European Commission (2009b), de 
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only for packaged retail investment products.82 The KID will provide summary 
information in plain language under headings such as What is this investment? 
What are the risks? What might I get back? What are the costs? The objectives are to 
facilitate conscious purchases by retail investors and enable comparison within 
product categories (for instance, UCTIS A vs. UCITS B) and across product 
categories (ELTIF X vs. ‘DC pension solution’ Y) (de Manuel, 2012). 
As regards long-term investing, pre-contractual disclosure documents should 
contain information, in subsequent layers, about: i) investment horizons and 
recommended holding periods, ii) the duration, redemption policy or liquidity 
profile  of  solution  units,  iii)  in  relation  to  the  investment  policy  applied, 
whether  it  includes  elements  such  as  instruments  with  long  maturities, 
strategic equity stakes or less-liquid assets; iv) whether a relative a short-term 
benchmark or a long-term absolute return objective is pursued; and v) whether 
the  solution  has  an  specific  retirement  objective  or  other  specific  long-term 
investing purpose. Pre-contractual disclosure should support communication 
for  solutions with  a distinct long-term  investing  purpose, such  as ELTIFs  – 
explaining potential benefits and drawbacks. The KID should contain referrals 
to other documents and sources, where needed to avoid information overload. 
Pre-contractual disclosure needs to be complemented by ongoing disclosure, in 
particular for long-term saving/investing and retirement solutions. The longer 
the investment horizon, the higher the importance of periodic disclosure – both 
to keep investors informed and ensure that the incentives for providers remain 
aligned with the best interests of clients across the full length of the investment 
horizon. For defined contribution (and hybrid) retirement solutions, periodic 
statements should revolve around: i) retirement goals, phrased for instance as 
the monthly income targeted at retirement and ii) any action that members 
may undertake to increase the likelihood of achieving those goals. Conversely, 
it  should  avoid  focusing  on  short-term  volatility  in  accumulated  values  – 
during most of the accumulation phase, before it enters the final stage where 
pronounced  drops  in  market  prices would  have  a  detrimental  effect  on  the 
actual retirement income achieved (in the case of conversion into annuities). 
Otherwise,  investors  have  been  shown  to  react  irrationally  to  short-term 
volatility  and  perceived  losses  in  DC  schemes,  including  by  stopping  any 
retirement savings altogether (Horack et al., 2010b). Similarly, where ongoing 
disclosure  emphasises market  values,  managers have  an  incentive  to centre 
their  efforts  on  mitigating  volatility  rather  than  delivering  returns  over  the 
investment horizon in line with the purpose of the retirement vehicle. Both 
retirement  goals  and  market  values  are  however  important  –  the  challenge 
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therefore lies in finding a format of disclosure that achieves a good balance. 
Moreover, disclosure on an ongoing basis should also cover all costs. 
Despite its importance, notably for long-term savings and retirement solutions, 
the EU framework for retail investor protection contains few provisions and no 
standards for ongoing disclosure. The absence of ongoing disclosure disables 
the  ongoing  assessment  of  suitability  (where  applicable)  and  reduces  the 
control  of  ongoing  costs  incurred  by  providers  (Box  7).  In  the  field  of 
retirement solutions, different standards are applied at national level, some of 
which pay insufficient regard to retirement goals and effective communication 
(Antolín & Harrison, 2012). In an effort to raise the quality of communications 
via soft coordination, EIOPA (2013f) put forward general guidance on good 
practices for information disclosure in defined contribution schemes, aimed at 
national  supervisors  and  solution  providers.  The  guidance  emphasises  the 
need  to  assist  beneficiaries  and  to  take  full  account  of  cognitive  and 
behavioural limitations, and proposes to structure information in subsequent 
layers (Table 6).  
Table 6. Checklist for drafting information requirements 
     
Preparation  1  Have a behavioural purpose 
  2  Provide a first layer of information that answers key questions  
  3  Ensure information is retrievable  
  4  Ensure the information provided is comprehensible 
Drafting  5  Optimise attention 
  6  Reduce complexity 
  7  Provide figures that enable personal assessment and understanding 
  8  Show potential implications of risks and ways to deal with them 
  9  Support readers as much as possible towards financial decisions 
Testing  10  Ensure thorough testing among members 
     
Source: EIOPA (2013f). 
Turning to sales practices, MiFID distinguishes advised sales – where the seller 
delivers a personal recommendation and needs to assess the suitability of the 
product for each buyer – and non-advised sales – where only an assessment of 
whether the buyer has the experience and knowledge to understand the risks 
involved  in  the  transaction  (appropriateness)  is  made.  Some  products  are 74 | THE SINGLE MARKET FOR LONG-TERM SAVINGS 
classified  by  MiFID  as  non-complex  and  hence  can  be  purchased  on  an 
execution-only  basis,  exempted  from  any  test  in  the  sales  process.83  This 
framework presents both obstacles and opportunities to foster the access of 
retail investors to long-term investing and retirement solutions: 
◦ The MiFID framework fully ignores costs and fails to acknowledge that the 
quality of any personal recommendation or suitability assessment depends 
on the range of solutions and originators considered by the seller, its level of 
expertise and the alignment of incentives among seller and buyer.84 In long-
term and retirement savings, however, costs merit full consideration in view 
of  their  cumulative  impact  on  net  performance,  and  they  should  hence 
become  an  integral  part  of  the  suitability  test  (FSA,  2009).85  Moreover, 
where the seller surveys solutions from only a narrow number of providers, 
any advice delivered is unlikely to incorporate any meaningful comparison 
of relevant features, including costs. In such instances, investors should at 
least  be  warned  of  the  limitations  of  the  ‘advice’  service  received  (de 
Manuel & Valiante, 2013). 
◦ The execution-only exemption opens a window of opportunity to widen the 
accessibility of long-term investing and retirement solutions for less well-off 
individuals. In effect, the cost of distribution and quality advice are sizeable 
and can significantly erode net returns. Yet, the availability of a solution for 
purchase by retail investors on an execution-only basis should be granted 
                                                        
83 Articles 35 and 36, Directive 2006/73/EC, and Article 19.6, Directive 2004/39/EC. See de 
Manuel & Valiante (2013) for further reference. 
84 Regulation also needs to limit conflicts of interest in distribution and, in particular, for 
investment advice. MiFID I prohibits inducements but grants an exemption based on three 
conditions: i) it is designed to improve the quality of the service, ii) it does not impair the 
ability to act in the best interest of investors and iii) is appropriately disclosed (Article 26, 
Directive  2006/73/EC).  Compliance  with  these conditions is  so  difficult  to monitor and 
supervise that they almost strip the general prohibition from its meaning (de Manuel & 
Valiante,  2013).  MiFID  II  is  expected  to  introduce  a  reserved  label  for  ‘independent 
investment  advice’  that  does  not  accept  inducements.  Challenges  remain,  including:  i) 
facilitating the access to high quality advice among less wealthy individuals, by reducing 
the cost of this service, and ii) addressing the professional aptitudes of advisers. 
85 The UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) developed in 2009 a template for advisors to 
assess the suitability of pension-switching advice, which gives due consideration to costs:  
Key unsuitable outcome 1: The customer has been switched to a pension that is 
more expensive than their existing one or a stakeholder pension (because of exit 
penalties and/or initial costs and ongoing costs of the receiving scheme versus 
the old scheme or a stakeholder pension) without good reason. […] You should 
consider the total costs of the receiving scheme (including initial and ongoing 
fees) to be able to judge how these compare with the receiving scheme. – FSA 
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only on the basis of targeted product structuring rules. These rules should 
ensure that such solutions are adequate for retail investors to access without 
an individual assessment of suitability. Product rules would need to ensure 
the simplicity and quality of solutions, together with high standardisation,86 
to facilitate understanding and comparability. Box 5 (above) builds on these 
elements with reference to balanced funds and section 3.4 with respect to 
defined contribution personal pensions. 
The harmonisation of investor protection rules is rather loose in Europe, with 
the exception of pre-contractual disclosure requirements.87 Such fragmentation 
is thought to raise distribution costs for some investors and represents a barrier 
for investment solutions to gather efficient scale. European investors should be 
the prime beneficiaries of member states converging to a single but ambitious 
approach  to  the  distribution  of  investment  solutions,  including  long-term 
investment (de Manuel & Valiante, 2013).  
2.4  A single market for direct investments  
Pooled investments allow retail investors to benefit from diversification, expert 
asset allocation and risk management. The costs of intermediation should be 
compensated by these benefits, in a competitive and efficient market setting. 
Investors may however also access underlying securities directly, not pooling 
their savings together. Direct access allows end investors to save on the costs 
derived from solution structuring and some layers of intermediation, which 
may lead to higher net returns. However, direct access entails additional risks 
in comparison to pooled solutions, as far as non-professional investors tend to: 
i) have less knowledge and expertise than professionals, ii) suffer from more 
acute behavioural biases and iii) be unable to diversify, given the limited size 
of their portfolios, taken in isolation. In addition, direct access may result in 
opportunity costs, as a result of sub-optimal asset allocation, diversification or 
investment practices.  
                                                        
86 Higher standardisation reduces the need for investment advice and may allow for the sale 
of such solutions on an execution-only basis and upon publicly-provisioned information. 
Conversely,  product  proliferation  and  differentiation  make  the  choice  more  difficult  by 
raising  the  need  for  professional  advice.  Both  sorts  of  solutions  (standardised  and 
customised), however, add value to investor choice and may co-exist in the marketplace. 
The distinction between execution-only and advised sales may be utilised to distinguish 
both sorts of solutions, as a tool to better structure the market setting. 
87 EU rules on investor protection are also scattered across multiple legislative instruments, 
which does not help consistency either (notably, selling practices are regulated separately in 
MiFID and the IMD – the insurance mediation Directive). 76 | THE SINGLE MARKET FOR LONG-TERM SAVINGS 
In spite of the caveats above, direct access to certain securities, notably simple 
bonds and equities, may deal positive results for retail investors with sufficient 
expertise. Direct access may deal more attractive returns than pooled solutions, 
although strict comparison is not possible, as returns should be weighted on a 
risk-adjusted basis.88 Capital markets and the ‘real’ economy may also benefit 
from facilitating direct access by small retail investors to bonds and equities. 
Such investors are thought to provide in particular a source of stable and long-
term finance, by for instance holding bonds to maturity. Expert investors may 
also sidestep agency conflicts in the asset management value chain by directly 
investing their capital. 
In Europe access to equities is relatively easy for small retail clients, in spite of 
which concerns remain regarding retail investor protection and best execution 
policies, among others (Valiante & Lannoo, 2011). By way of contrast, bond 
markets are predominantly institutional and access for retail investors is fairly 
limited in Europe. Notable exceptions are found in a few member states, where 
certain corporate and sovereign bonds are accessible to retail clients – typically 
limited to bonds issued by entities domiciled in that member state. The lack of 
a single market restricts the free flow of capital and unduly restricts choice for 
retail investors, as well as the potential financing available to companies. From 
a practical point of view, widening retail access to bond markets would require 
a rethink of market structure, including the levels of transparency prevalent in 
the marketplace. However important, these questions exceed the remit of this 
report.89  
                                                        
88 While it has been argued that the (high) fees charged by solution providers sometimes 
exceed the benefits of pooling and expertise (Eurofinuse, 2013), this argument elicits rather 
the importance of a competitive setting and market structure. The objective of policy-makers 
should be to enable access to cost-efficient pooled solutions, given the objective benefits of, 
professionally managed, pooled investments over undiversified direct access by non-expert 
investors.  
89 For a discussion on the level of transparency in bond markets and other issues regarding 
market structure refer to Valiante & Lannoo (2011). The authors also review the risks in 
bond investments (Box 5).  77 
3.  LONG-TERM INVESTING AND 
PERSONAL PENSIONS 
ersonal pension plans are defined by the OECD (2005) as private plans 
where  “access  does  not  have  to  be  linked  to  an  employment 
relationship”.90 These plans are established and administered directly by 
a  qualifying  private  undertaking,  without  intervention  from  the  employer 
(sponsor), as opposed to occupational plans.91 In effect, personal pension plans 
or  solutions  are  typically  selected  and  purchased  by  individuals  separately 
from  their  employment  relationship.  Employers  “may  nonetheless  make 
contributions to personal pension plans” (OECD, 2005).  
The dividing line between personal and occupational pensions is often blurred, 
as highlighted in the request from the European Commission (2012i) to EIOPA 
to deliver technical advice on developing a single market for personal pension 
schemes in the EU.92 The request follows initiative thirteen in the White Paper 
on pensions (European Commission, 2012c) to raise the quality of third-pillar 
retirement products, possibly by introducing an EU certification scheme.  
                                                        
90 Private plans are defined by the OECD (2005) as follows: “A pension plan administered 
by an institution other than general government. Private pension plans may be administered 
directly by a private sector employer acting as the plan sponsor, a private pension fund or a 
private  sector provider.  Private  pension  plans may  complement or  substitute for  public 
pension plans. In some countries, these may include plans for public sector workers.” 
91 Occupational plans are defined by the OECD (2005) as follows: “Access to such plans is 
linked to an employment or professional relationship between the plan member and the 
entity that establishes the plan (the plan sponsor). Occupational plans may be established by 
employers  or  groups  thereof  (e.g.  industry  associations)  and  labour  or  professional 
associations,  jointly  or  separately.  The  plan  may  be  administered  directly  by  the  plan 
sponsor or by an independent entity.” 
92  “I  think  it  is  very  important  that  personal  pension  schemes  are  considered  in  close 
connection with occupational pension schemes because the borderline between personal 
and occupational pensions is often blurred. [...] I invite EIOPA to engage in a second phase 
with  a  view  to  providing  technical  advice  on  the  prudential  regulation  and  consumer 
protection  measures  required  to  develop  an  EU-wide  framework  for  the  activities  and 
supervision  of  personal  pension  funds.  EIOPA's  advice  should  consider  at  least  two 
approaches: i) develop common rules to enable cross-border activity of personal pension 
schemes (similar to the IORP Directive); and ii) develop a 28th regime, whereby EU rules do 
not replace national rules but are an optional alternative to them.” European Commission 
(2012i). 
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In this chapter, ‘personal pensions’ refers to defined contribution solutions and 
potentially other (hybrid) arrangements offered by financial intermediaries. It 
therefore excludes traditional defined benefit occupational schemes. Yet, it is 
meant to encompass plans to which employers may make contributions, while 
being easily portable for the plan holder when changing employer. 
This chapter argues that raising the quality of solution design within personal 
pensions entails fostering long-term investing practices and embedding a clear 
vision about retirement goals. The chapter is structured as follows: section 3.1 
presents some key observations on the situation of private pensions in Europe 
today, referring to their increasingly important but diverse role, insufficient 
coverage and low contributions, and sometimes high costs and low returns. 
Section 3.2 considers the market structure and proposes an enabling industrial 
policy. Section 3.3 exposes potential shortcomings in solution design and key 
trade-offs.  And  section  3.4  concludes  by  proposing  a  blueprint  for  a  pan-
European framework for personal pensions.  
3.1  Private pensions in Europe today 
An increasingly important but diverse role... 
The role and coverage of personal pension plans vary widely across the EU, as 
a result of the diversity of pension policies and multi-pillar mixes developed in 
member  states  over  time.  Nevertheless,  defined  contribution  (DC)  and 
personal schemes play an increasingly important role in pension systems – as 
employers  phase  out  the  provision  of  defined  benefits  (DB),  unwilling  or 
unable to bear market and longevity risks, and ageing reduces the funding 
available  for  traditional  public  pensions,  based  on  taxation  or  social 
contributions and redistribution (Holzmann, 2012).93 Moreover, some member 
                                                        
93 The high replacement rates traditionally afforded by public provision are unlikely to be 
delivered in the future, given demographic changes, including longer life expectancy and 
lower fertility rates, leading to an ageing population. To reduce (or at least contain the 
growth of) unaccounted pension liabilities and ensure the sustainability of social security 
systems, EU member states have been progressively reforming pension systems over the last 
decade, under the political steering and technical guidance of the European Commission, 
the European Council and international organisations such as the OECD.  
The 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent contagion to sovereign debt markets in the euro 
area have accelerated the need both for reform (given the deterioration of public finances) 
and closer macroeconomic coordination among member states, particularly within the euro 
currency union. The reform of PAYG (pay as you go)systems is therefore still ongoing and is 
likely to deepen, notably with the inclusion of automatic adjustment mechanisms for paid 
benefits in line with life expectancy and funding (so-called ‘sustainability factors’) – and this 
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states  have  introduced  defined  contribution  schemes  within  the  system  of 
public  provision  (so-called  ‘pillar  one-bis  schemes’,  which  sometimes 
incorporate minimum return guarantees).  
With the exception of DB meta-schemes, DC and hybrid plans tend to be better 
adapted to job mobility than traditional (final salary) DB schemes, which the 
employee typically cannot carry with him or her when changing employer. 
Portability  is  not  just  a  challenging  and  costly  administrative  issue  but  has 
further  consequences  in  terms  of  sub-optimal  asset  allocation  (scattered 
through multiple and uncoordinated pension pots) and opportunity costs.  
Given the absence of guarantees, DC and hybrid solutions have the potential of 
delivering better risk-adjusted returns and more efficient asset allocation than 
traditional DB and life-insurance solutions (section 1.4). However, the design 
and  the  provision  of  personal  DC  pensions  are  affected  by  a  number  of 
frictions, which tend to result in poor results for beneficiaries, as considered in 
this chapter. While the growing importance of DC and hybrid solutions is a 
common theme in Europe, there remains great diversity. Despite this diversity 
however, a number of common challenges are identified and discussed in the 
next sections. These challenges are i) insufficient coverage and contributions, ii) 
high costs and iii) low returns. After describing these challenges, the rest of the 
chapter  is  devoted  to  their  underlying  causes  from  the  points  of  view  of 
solution  design  and  market  structure.  The  chapter  ends  by  proposing  a 
blueprint for a pan-European framework for personal pensions. 
Insufficient coverage and low contributions… 
While  the  data  are  difficult  to  access,  the  move  from  DB  to  DC  in  the 
occupational space seems to be accompanied by a decrease in contributions, in 
a manner that may fail to ensure adequate replacement rates for households 
relying  on  occupational  schemes  as  their  primary  source  of  income  in 
retirement.  In  the  United  Kingdom  for  instance,  the  size  of  average 
contributions  in  occupational  DC  schemes  is  roughly  half  the  size  in  DB 
schemes.94 
Similarly in non-occupational space, low contributions are coupled with low 
participation.  Table  7  presents  the  rates  of  participation  and  median 
                                                                                                                                             
despite  the  non-inclusion  so  far  of  unaccounted  pension  liabilities  in  the  Stability  and 
Growth Pact. On the transparency of public pension liabilities, see Cocquemas (2013). 
94 For private sector occupational DB schemes, the average contribution rate was 4.9% for 
members (employees) and 14.2% for employers in 2011, while the rates for DC schemes 
were  2.8%  and  6.6%,  respectively.  In  the  UK  the  move  from  DB  to  DC  has  also  been 
accompanied by a decrease in coverage – there were 8.2 million active members in 2011, 
compared to 11.1 million in 1983 (Office for National Statistics, 2012).  80 | LONG-TERM INVESTING AND PERSONAL PENSIONS 
accumulated values in voluntary private pension plans and life insurance in 
Europe. Participation and median accumulated values will be typically lower 
in countries with higher coverage and benefits from occupational schemes and 
public pensions. Yet, at aggregate level, looking at income and net wealth, the 
data reveal the existence of three investor categories: 
◦ Households in the lowest deciles exhibit the lowest participation and values – 
below 20% and €5,000 respectively. Most of these households cannot afford 
to save and are better helped by public anti-poverty safety nets than by 
complementary pensions. 
◦ Households in the highest deciles exhibit the highest participation and values 
– below 60% and €30,000 respectively. These households are better served 
by customised investment solutions, other than mass-market solutions. 
◦ Households in the middle deciles exhibit middle participation and values – 
between 20% and 40% and €5,000 to €15,000. These households can afford to 
save and would benefit the most from building a personal pension – as they 
typically cannot access complementary public benefits or afford investment 
solutions, other than mass-market ones. 
Crucially,  Table  7  shows  that  coverage  and  contributions  are  low  even  for 
households in the middle deciles, despite the fact that these households are in a 
better  financial  position  to  save.  Approximately  80%  to  60%  of  these 
households do not hold a complementary pension solution and, among those 
that do, the median accumulated value is €20,600 at retirement (ECB, 2013).95 
Table 7. Participation in voluntary private pensions and life insurance 
  Percentile of  
EA income 
Percentile of  
EA net wealth 
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Participation 
(in percent) 
13.2  20.4  31.1  41.9  58.3  15.9  32.7  31.5  35.8  49.1  19.0  36.4  46.8  28.9  47.8  30.1 
Median value 
(€ thousands) 
4.4  5.1  8.6  11.8  23.0  1.6  6.4  11.8  14.2  29.1  9.2  10.1  17.5  16.1  15.0  6.6 
Notes: Data for Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, 
the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and Finland. EA refers to euro area. 
Source: Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey (ECB, 2013).  
                                                        
95 Median accumulated value for households where the main person is aged 63 to 67 years 
old [Variables PF0920 and RA0300 in the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption 
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The optimal level of contributions in DC schemes depends on net returns96 and 
the replacement rate (or recurring income during retirement) sought by the 
individual. Where it comes to complementary pensions, the optimal level of 
contributions  depends  therefore  on  the  replacement  rate  expected  from  the 
principal  sources  of  retirement  income  –  occupational  schemes  and  public 
pensions. Additional disclosure and research are needed to measure the actual 
underfunding of expected replacement rates and to inform individuals. Yet, 
the  limited  evidence  available  provides  a  strong  indication  that  current 
participation and contributions are unlikely to meet the expectations of and 
future  needs  of  beneficiaries.  Figure  18  illustrates  that  over  50%  of  the 
population  in  the  UK,  France  and Germany  save 5%  or  less  of  their  yearly 
income for retirement, while still expecting to retire at around age 65. 
Figure 18. Retirement expectations vs. contribution levels 
Expected retirement age… 
 
…share of income saved 
 
Source: Boston Consulting Group.  
Tax incentives are frequently used by governments to encourage contributions 
to private pension plans and discourage redemptions before retirement. Such 
incentives have however a cost for public finances and benefit investor cohorts 
unequally. Most forms of tax incentives tend to benefit the wealthier cohorts of 
individuals. Conversely, low income cohorts benefit less, even though they are 
the most in need. Compulsory savings are thought to be a more efficient tool to 
increase saving rates. They also free up public resources that can be better used 
to top-up savings by low incomes and reduce financial exclusion in the market 
for long-term and retirement savings (Chetty et al., 2012). 
                                                        
96  The  higher  the  net  returns  (market  returns  minus  fees  and  costs),  the  more  the 
accumulated savings will grow over time without additional contributions. 
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High costs and low returns... 
When advising people to save more, public authorities should bear in mind that pension 
saving products are in many cases destroying real value of citizens’ savings. This is why 
providers and public authorities should seek to protect the long-term purchasing power 
of savings, before advising citizens to increase those. 
Eurofinuse (2013). 
Private pensions are generally, despite their different forms, at the forefront of 
popular criticism of the financial industry, regarding its failure to deliver value 
to clients. And the limited evidence available points indeed at dismal and even 
negative returns (net of costs) for investors, on average in the last decade. Low 
market returns are mostly to blame but administration and investment costs 
are also believed to be prime drivers.97 
Aggregate statistics on returns and costs are rare. By way of illustration, Figure 
19  presents  the  average  investment  return  of  collective  pension  funds  in 
selected OECD economies, net of inflation and observed costs. In Europe, net 
returns were on average slightly positive from 2001 and 2010, below 2% for the 
countries listed. Returns were positive in all countries, except in Spain, the UK 
and the US. Following the financial crisis and the economic recession, returns 
turned negative, except in Denmark and Germany (OECD, 2012). The data, 
however,  refer  to  a  relatively  short  time-frame  for  pension  accumulation, 
which should typically last for over 30 years.  
Figure 19. Average annual real net investment return of pension funds 
 
Source: OECD (2012). Average returns net of inflation and observed costs for 
collective pension funds, excluding individual private pension products. 
                                                        
97 The term ‘cost’ refers in this section all fees, charges and costs leading to a reduction in net 
returns, in comparison to underlying market returns. 
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International comparisons of performance are difficult given the diversity of 
pension  solutions,  fee  structures  and  disclosure  standards  (OECD,  2011d; 
Hernandez  &  Stewart,  2008;  Tapia  &  Yermo,  2008).  However,  evidence  at 
national level is indicative of average fee levels and their dispersion. By way of 
illustration, annual management fees, applied yearly to the value accumulated 
assets, near 0.13% in the Netherlands on average while they exceed 0.70% in 
the United Kingdom (AFM, 2011; DWP, 2012). 
Depending chiefly on the volume of assets of the pension solution, annual fees 
can vary widely. In the Netherlands, the average management fee for small 
funds nears 1.20% – 12 times the average fee for the largest funds (AFM, 2011). 
Similarly, in the UK, average fees for the smallest funds exceed 1%, while they 
fall below 0.50% for the biggest funds (DWP, 2012). 
In addition to annual management fees disclosed up-front, investment costs 
also add up to total ongoing expenses for pension solutions. Disclosure of the 
latter is however more cumbersome, as it is necessarily ex-post and sometimes 
difficult to observe and compile – in particular for underlying funds, complex 
derivatives and structured instruments (Box 7). Actual investment costs may 
therefore be multiples of the figures reported.98  
A moderate difference in costs can however lead to a substantial difference in 
benefits. This is particularly true for ongoing costs, applied on a yearly basis on 
the accumulated value of the investment, both principal and returns. Figure 20 
compares the impact of different yearly cost rates on total net returns and total 
costs at the end of a thirty-year investment horizon. Under high cost rates, total 
costs may exceed net returns by a multiple. Contributions, cost rates and return 
rates are assumed to be yearly and constant (Table A.2 in the annex).  
Most retail investors have problems understanding the effects of compounding 
and the final impact of what they may perceive as small differences in ongoing 
charges (Charter et al., 2010; Lusardi et al., 2006). Cost transparency, however, 
does not only affect investor choice but also incentives for intermediaries, and 
competition dynamics (Box 7). 
                                                        
98  The  Dutch  supervisor  estimates  that  the  average  investment  cost  reported  (0.19%)  is 
actually two to three times larger (0.38% - 0.57%). The problem is more acute among smaller 
pension  funds,  as  they  have  less  bargaining  power  to  enforce  transparency  from  asset 
managers and originators and tend to lack the expertise and infrastructure for effective cost 
accounting with full look-through to the costs embedded in underlying investment funds, 
derivative instruments and structured products (AFM, 2011). 84 | LONG-TERM INVESTING AND PERSONAL PENSIONS 
Figure 20. Impact of different cost rates on net returns at year thirty 
 
Source: Author. Balance of total costs and net returns after having invested €10,000 
per year over 30 years, assuming a yearly rate of return of 3% on accumated assets. 
See Table A.2 in the annex for a full reference on this simplified investment case. 
The compounding of ongoing costs also means that their impact increases over 
time. The longer the investment horizon, the higher the impact of yearly costs 
on  total  costs,  both  in  relative  and  absolute  terms.  By  way  of  illustration, 
building on the simple scenario above, Figure 21 presents the relative effect of 
a 0.75% yearly cost rate after 10, 20 and 30 years. The share of total costs at the 
end of each investment horizon, in comparison with total returns in the zero-
cost case (benchmark) increases by eight percentage points over 20 years, from 
4% to 12% due to compounding. 
Figure 21. Impact of costs depending on the investment horizon 
Source: Author. See Table A.2 in the annex for a full reference. 
Against the background of low returns in the marketplace, the crucial question 
is whether efficiency and innovation can help deliver better value to investors. 
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The following two sections will consider: i) how an enabling industrial policy, 
which  addresses  market  structure,  may  help  drive  both  cost  savings  and 
innovation,  and  ii)  how  solution  design  and  asset  allocation  may  be  better 
aligned with retirement goals and long-term horizons, to deliver potentially 
higher returns and better serve the needs of investors. The last section presents 
a blueprint for pan-European personal pensions.  
 
Box 6. Interim conclusions from the UK Office of Fair Trading 
In 2013, the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) launched a study on the market for defined 
contribution workplace pensions, in view of the expected increase in participation after 
the  introduction  of  auto-enrolment  in  2012.  The  purpose  of  the  study  is  to  examine 
whether  the  market  is  serving  consumers  well,  and  whether  supply  and  competition 
dynamics are working in the best interest of investors, by delivering low-cost, high-quality 
schemes. On 11 July 2013, the OFT issued the following conclusions in a progress update:  
◦ The  current  level  of  governance  over  the  performance of some  schemes  may  not  be 
sufficient  to  ensure  that  scheme  members  are  getting  the  best  possible  investment 
outcomes. 
◦ A number of schemes have been set up with two-tier charging structures, where those 
members  who  have  stopped  making  contributions  pay  a  higher  annual  management 
charge percentage.  
◦ There are a number of schemes open for auto-enrolment that appear to have built-in 
adviser commissions and which may not represent the best value for money for those that 
could be enrolled into them. 
◦ There may be a number of schemes that do not have a realistic prospect of reaching 
sufficient scale to generate value for their members. 
◦ The way that different providers currently present their charges may mean that they are 
not easily comparable. 
◦ There may be some schemes – primarily but not exclusively those sold prior to 2001 – that 
have charges that may not represent the best value for money, or that may not reflect 
current standards of scheme design. 
 
Box 7. Cost transparency, incentives and competition 
Cost transparency is seen as an essential element of investor protection, helping investors 
make informed decisions and promoting competition in the marketplace (see section 2.3). 
However, cost transparency not only affects investor choice but also contributes to shape 
incentives for providers and intermediaries.  
A broad distinction can be made between headline administrative charges, known ex-ante 
and incorporating the commercial margin of the intermediary originating the product, and 
investment costs, which depend on the actual implementation of the investment mandate 86 | LONG-TERM INVESTING AND PERSONAL PENSIONS 
by the originator and can only be observed ex-post. In addition, distribution and advisory 
charges also apply. 
Investment costs are frequently difficult to observe and compile. Transparency is more 
cumbersome for providers to enforce when investing in pooled vehicles
a – particularly if 
restricted to institutional investors, where retail disclosure standards do not apply – and 
complex derivative transactions and structured instruments – whose pricing process is, by 
the very nature of these instruments, opaque. These are frequently known as ‘second-
floor fees’. 
Any  investment  decision  should  be made  on  the basis  of  costs,  and  not  only  by  risk-
adjusted returns. Yet, the ability of solution-providers to enforce full cost transparency on 
intermediaries depends on their bargaining power and relative size (AFM, 2011). And even 
where costs are known, compilation and processing require resources that many providers 
lack, in particular smaller ones (AFM, 2011).  
In some market segments, most investment costs are not explicitly reported but directly 
deducted  from  net  returns  and  net  asset  values  (AFM,  2011).  Partial  disclosure  casts 
doubts as to whether these costs are effectively taken into account and monitored by 
providers.  Deficient  cost  accounting  and  disclosure  ultimately  distort  incentives  for 
providers  (Figure  22).  And  may  also  foster  related  party  transactions,  among  entities 
belonging to a same group, in less competitive markets. 
Figure 22. Full versus partial cost transparency and related incentives 
 
Source: Author. 
Next to cost accounting and disclosure, the unbundling of costs categories can also act as 
an important driver for efficiencies. It has been estimated that approximately only 45% to 
50% of management fees are retained by the originators of retail investment funds in 
Europe,  with  the  remainder  being  paid  back  to  distributors  and  advisors  (EFAMA  and 
Strategic Insight, 2011). Making the costs of distribution services transparent to investors 
could help achieve further cost reductions over time.
b 
Regulation and supervision play important roles in fostering effective cost accounting and 
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◦ For end investors, a simple and uniform structure/presentation of fees for all solutions in 
the marketplace has been shown to improve transparency and stimulate competition 
(IFF Research et al., 2009). At the point of sale, pre-contractual disclosure should capture 
all costs known ex-ante and an estimation of those costs that can only be known ex-
post.
c Periodic disclosure of actual costs should follow suit on an ongoing basis (Figure 
23). 
◦ For providers, additional action is needed to facilitate effective cost accounting and the 
factoring of costs into investment decisions. The right of originators to demand full cost 
transparency from intermediaries should be reinforced, including by creating effective 
enforcement mechanisms. And cost accounting should be explicitly recognised as a duty 
for providers, auditors and supervisors to control, as considered in this report.  
Yet, price transparency is no silver bullet as its positive impact on competition is limited by 
the inability of many investors (or pension plan holders) to understand fees in isolation, let 
alone  apprehend  their  cumulative  impact  over  time  (Charter  et  al.,  2010).  Additional 
market structure measures are arguably needed to drive cost efficiencies forward (section 
3.2). 
Figure 23. Reported versus non-reported costs and main policy tools 
 
Source: Author. 
---------------------------------------------- 
a Without prejudice to the high level of disclosure provided by some forms of pooled vehicles, including notably 
pre-contractual disclosure for UCITS funds under the regulated KIID standard. 
b Making the costs of distribution transparent is important, whether these costs are embedded in overall fees for 
the investment solution or the charges for distribution and/or investment advice are unbundled (as in the United 
Kingdom following the Retail Distribution Review and planned in other member states). Originators should have 
the responsibility for disclosing the costs related to the product or solution itself while distributors should have 
the responsibility of disclosing the costs related to distribution, aggregating all costs and communicating them to 
investors. Investors should be able to access a total cost figure, summing up both product and distribution costs, 
comparable across products/solutions and sale channels/services.  
c This is the principle followed in the standardised disclosure of ongoing charges for UCITS funds, which is based 
on actual costs from the preceding year (art.78.3.d Directive 2009/65/EC, Commission Regulation 583/2010 and 
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3.2  Addressing market structure: An enabling industry policy 
If the market structure is such as to give the right incentive, then appropriate 
behaviour should follow, and regulatory oversight of such behaviour can be 
reduced:  if  market  structure  and  incentives  are  not  right,  then  regulation 
which imposes behaviour which conflicts with the commercial interests of 
participants is likely to enjoy limited success. 
Kay (2012). 
Demand and diversity of cohorts... 
The characteristics of demand for private pensions depend on the institutional 
setting  for  the  provision  of  retirement  income  in  each  jurisdiction.  Where 
demand is compulsory or semi-compulsory, a quasi-market is found, meaning 
demand is captive, as it cannot choose to abstain from consumption (Impavido 
et al., 2010). A typical example is the use of private pensions as part of pillar 
one provision in some of the member states of the European Union.99 
Captive consumers are at a higher risk of exploitation by the supply side of the 
market.  A  captive  demand  facilitates  the  explicit  or  tacit  coordination  of 
suppliers to keep prices high and stifle innovation, unless barriers to entry are 
low enough to enable disruption by new entrants. In the market for private 
pensions however, barriers to entry tend to be high (next subsection).  
Even in the absence of formal compulsion, a market setting similar to a quasi-
market may be found. In the presence of low replacement rates in pillar one, 
complementary  pensions  cease  to  be  an  option  but  a  practical  necessity  to 
achieve income adequacy in retirement. Over the next decades, as the funding 
for pay-as-you-go pensions becomes scarcer, the market for personal pensions 
will increasingly resemble a perfect quasi-market.100 
Beyond formal compulsion or practical necessity, the captivity of demand is 
also explained by its low elasticity (response function) to both solution quality 
and  price.  The  complexity  and  asymmetries  of  information  present  in  the 
market place are exacerbated by the limited ability of demand to understand 
solution  features  and  their  implications.  As  a  result  of  behavioural  and 
                                                        
99 Pillar one-bis schemes exist in the following EU member states: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Denmark,  Latvia,  Hungary,  Lithuania,  Poland,  Romania,  Slovak  Republic  and  Sweden 
(Eichhorst et al., 2011; Oxera, 2007). Participation and contribution to pillar one-bis schemes 
is compulsory. Schemes are administered by privately managed undertakings, frequently in 
a competitive environment, and supplement or substitute traditional pillar one pensions 
(pay-as-you-go) (EIOPA, 2013h). 
100 In particular in those markets where occupational pensions do not exist, have insufficient 
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cognitive and limitations, individuals are unlikely to shop around or change 
providers (Charter et al., 2010). 
It does not, however, help to simplify demand as if it were a homogenous 
group. Quite the opposite, demand is diverse – even though probably not as 
diverse as the level of product proliferation in some market segments would 
indicate (Celerier & Vallee, 2012). Demand can usefully be grouped in three 
cohorts, in accordance to their wealth, salience and behaviour; each of which 
requires differentiated policy action (Table 8).  
Table 8. Stylised characterisation of investor cohorts 
#  Financial means  Behaviour  Salience  Applicable policy solutions 
1  CAN’T afford to 
save 
WON’T save since 
they have peremptory 
needs 
SHOULDN’T be 
confronted with 
investment markets 
◦Rely on public provision and anti-
poverty mechanisms 
2  CAN afford to 
save 
PROBABLY WILL save  COULD become 
informed 
consumers 
◦Need an efficient market structure 
◦May need incentives 
◦Benefit from financial education 
3  CAN afford to 
invest 
WILL invest to build / 
maximise wealth 
ARE informed 
investors 
◦Need choice and customisation 
◦Do not need incentives 
Source: Author based on Task Force discussions and Clark et al. (2012). 
Policy-makers and industry should be mindful of the features and size of each 
cohort. Individuals with low income or wealth, at risk of falling into poverty 
and unable to save, will rely primarily on anti-poverty safety nets financed by 
taxation or social contributions. While at the opposite end of the scale, high net 
worth individuals can readily access high-quality advice and custom solutions. 
The largest cohort of individuals, however, can afford to save only marginally 
and needs an efficient market structure, capable of delivering high-quality and 
cost-efficient solutions. 
Supply and competition dynamics... 
Supply and competition dynamics for private pensions are shaped by barriers 
to entry and scale economies, as well as switching costs. For personal pensions, 
the combined effect of these market failures pushes supply and competition 
dynamics towards product proliferation (over pooling of solutions and quality 
in  solution  design)  and  cost  inefficiencies  (derived  from  fragmentation  and 
marketing expenditure). 
By making disruption by new entrants unlikely, entry barriers lead to higher 
mark-ups and are a disincentive to further efficiencies and innovation. A major 
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efficient scale in the administration of private pensions. A high efficient scale 
makes  disruption  by  new  entrants  unlikely  unless  supported  by  sufficient 
balance-sheet capacity or grandfathered by regulators. Entry for small players 
is easier in functions with lower scale economies, such as asset management,101 
but may not deliver competitive pricing unless administration is pooled. 
Switching costs focus competition on attracting customers (through marketing 
expenditure) since once an investor enters a solution, s/he is unlikely to move 
out. Switching costs include: i) transaction costs – such as search, information 
and  learning  costs,  derived  from  information  asymmetries,  cognitive 
limitations and the complexity of solutions and market settings, ii) exit costs – 
such  as  exit  fees,  penalties  or  conditional  rebates  on  bundled  products;  iii) 
uncertainty costs – due to the experience and credence attributes of investment 
and  insurance  solutions;102  and  iv)  behavioural  biases  –  including 
procrastination. 
The switching costs above are exogenous to long-term investing and can hence 
be addressed, even partially, by measures such as: standardising information, 
facilitating access to advice, prohibiting penalties and bundling or introducing 
minimum qualitative requirements for any solution sold. 
At  a  structural  level,  however,  long-term  investing  requires  a  level  of 
illiquidity towards investors (regarding redemptions and transfers) that can be 
seen both as an opportunity and switching cost. Investors need to forego the 
opportunity  for  immediate  redemptions  in  order  to  access  the  potential  for 
higher  risk-adjusted  returns  at  retirement  (opportunity  cost).  And  easy 
switching  is not  possible without  renouncing  the premiums  linked  to  long-
term investing strategies and illiquid underlyings (switching cost). 
As a result of those entry barriers and switching costs, supply and competition 
dynamics may focus on product proliferation (trial and error, segmentation) 
and marketing (branding, spurious differentiation) over solution quality, cost 
efficiencies (scale) and eased investor access (simplicity in solution design and 
                                                        
101 In comparison with the administration and processing functions, which have high scale 
economies and may benefit from centralisation for a given market, the asset management 
function has relatively lower scale economies, except in relation to back-office functions and 
the access to specialised or illiquid asset classes, in view of the needs for qualified expertise 
and diversification. 
102 In an experience good, quality can only be observed after consumption. In a credence 
good, quality cannot be observed even after consumption (de Manuel & Valiante, 2013). 
Experience  and  credence  attributes  introduce  an  upward  pressure  in  prices,  since  the 
inability to observe performance brings investors to infer higher quality from higher prices, 
and facilitate product proliferation based on branding and other spurious factors. They also 
explain the weight carried by ‘trust’ in determining investment decisions. SAVING FOR RETIREMENT AND INVESTING FOR GROWTH | 91 
choice environment). They also may forego long-term investing practices and 
holdings of less-liquid assets in favour of high liquidity for clients (in terms of 
redemptions) – as the bespoke benefits from long-term investing can only be 
observed in the long run. It has been argued that these failures are generalised 
in  the  wider  (retail)  asset  management  industry  and  cannot  be  effectively 
addressed but though structural measures (Kay, 2012). 
As the demand for complementary pensions becomes less of a choice and more 
of a necessity for individuals, a quasi-market will be found, bearing a practical 
obligation for welfare states to reduce distortions in supply and competition 
dynamics, by both addressing market structure and solution design (Impavido 
et al., 2010).  
 
Box 8. Marketing and switching: The example of Poland 
The experience from quasi-markets is that marketing expenses can significantly raise costs 
without delivering substantial benefits to investors (Tapia & Yermo, 2008; Impavido et al., 
2010). Figure 24 presents the yearly transfers among the 14 open pension funds (OPFs) 
available in the Polish pillar one-bis system. OPFs are reported to have used aggressive 
marketing practices, involving the use of over 400,000 sales agents to encourage members 
to change plans (ILO, 2002). Under these practices, nearly 4% of participants switched 
providers  at  the  peak,  in  2010.  Additional  restrictions  on  sales  practices  were  then 
introduced, in an effort to reduce marketing expenditure, and transfers collapsed in 2012. 
Marketing and acquisition expenses (sales agents, new contracts and transfers) accounted 
for about 40% of total costs incurred by Open Pension Funds in the period 2007-11. In 
2012, following the introduction of marketing restrictions, the weight of related expenses 
decreased to just 18% (Table 9). Despite the very considerable marketing expense and 
number of sale agents, a switching rate of 4% remains relatively low in comparison to 
other industries. For instance, estimations suggest that 10% of current-account holders in 
Europe changed providers in 2011 (GFK, 2011).  
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Figure 24. Transfers among pillar one-bis pension funds in Poland 
 
Source: Polish Financial Supervisory Authority. Based on quarterly data. 
Table 9. Acquisition and marketing costs of OPFs in Poland 
  2012  2011  2010  2009  2008  2007    2000 
Costs of acquisition  121.80  384.90  473.90  446.40  368.10  321.50    811.40 
Marketing costs  9.90  8.50  23.10  37.00  42.20  39.60    68.00 
Total management costs  728.20  1025.00  1242.30  1210.10  1050.00  968.20    1646.00 
Share over total costs  18%  38%  40%  40%  39%  37%    53% 
Source: Polish Central Statistical Office (GUS) and ILO (2002). 
The role of processing architecture... 
Individual countries have found different solutions to high costs and welfare-
reducing marketing expenditure, including notably: i) putting grandfathered 
or not-for-profit institutions in direct competition with for-profit ones, and ii) 
opening competition for the market or sections of it, by way of procurement 
processes. An example of all these practices is the National Employee Savings 
Trust (NEST) introduced in the UK in 2012. NEST is a not-for-profit institution 
in competition with other market players, and has a public service obligation to 
serve any employers who wish to choose NEST as default option, to fulfil their 
obligations under the Pensions Act of 2008. In the Netherlands, not-for-profit 
entities, jointly managed by employers and employees (paritarian), also play a 
central role in pension provision.  
Some other countries have employed more crude tools, such as imposing price 
caps and limits to switching across providers. However, these measures alone, 
fail to address the root causes of high costs, namely inefficiencies in supply and 
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competition dynamics, and may have important unintended effects (Tapia & 
Yermo, 2008, Impavido et al., 2010): Price caps can be easily circumvented by 
the misreporting of investment costs and related party transactions (via second 
floor fees – see Box 7, above). Limits to aggressive marketing practices may be 
effective in reducing marketing expenditure but artificial limits to switching 
make consumers more captive and thereby introduce an upward pressure on 
fees. Limits to switching should be derived naturally – from the alignment of 
redemption policies with the liquidity profile of underlying assets and long-
term investment practices, both for financial stability and investor protection 
reasons. 
An appropriately designed processing architecture emerges as an efficient tool 
to reduce the focus of competition on marketing over solution quality and cost, 
while delivering a highly competitive market setting (Haupt & Kluth, 2013; 
Impavido et al., 2010; Guardiancich, 2010; Tapia & Yermo, 2008; Weaver, 2005). 
The example of the Swedish Premium Pension System is paramount in this 
respect. The use of a central clearing house means that administration costs are 
minimised,  while  facilitating  comparability  and  switching  across  providers. 
Only the total invested sum is known by providers, rather than the identities of 
beneficiaries, reducing the incentive for aggressive marketing practices. As end 
investors are not communicated to providers, their only client is the Swedish 
Pension Agency, who has a greater bargaining power and is able to negotiate 
rebates in management fees, as asset under management grow, redistributing 
the benefits of scale economies. 
Efficient scale and optimal bundling... 
In addition to the benefits above, a single processing architecture would have 
greater potential if undertaken at pan-European level, as it could further drive 
scale through market integration. In most member states, current market size is 
insufficient to achieve efficient scale, in particular for long-term investing. 
Pan-European scale should lead to: i) lower costs – as high fixed costs would 
be distributed among a greater number of participants; ii) more expertise in 
management and administration, business sophistication and innovation – as 
under  efficient scale,  the cost  of  these can  be more  easily  afforded;  and  iii) 
direct access to certain asset classes, including less-liquid ones, which due to 
their complexity or the minimum size of the initial investment, require specific 
expertise and processing capabilities, and scale (assets under management) for 
diversification purposes. Figures 25 and 26 present the apparent effects of scale 
on administration expenses for defined contribution schemes in the UK and 
Germany.  
Efficient scale, however, is reached at different points for each of the functions 
in the production chain for private pensions. The collection of contributions, 94 | LONG-TERM INVESTING AND PERSONAL PENSIONS 
administration and processing of subscriptions and redemptions benefits from 
the highest economies of scale, and may therefore be carried out by one central 
entity. Communications with end beneficiaries also benefit from economies of 
scale, in particular regarding the design of standard formats and their testing 
with consumers. By way of contrast, asset management benefits relatively less 
from  economies  of  scale,  in  comparison  to  administration  and  processing, 
except for back-office functions. Yet, direct access to illiquid assets and private 
placements requires very large fund sizes, in terms of volume of assets under 
management, to achieve efficient diversification. 
The bundling of services and functions with different efficient scale leads to 
inefficient outcomes – either higher total costs (where bundling takes place at a 
lower scale) or reduced choice (where bundling takes place at a higher scale). It 
is therefore essential that any industrial policy for private pensions strives to 
achieve optimal bundling. “If policy makers fail to establish institutions for the 
centralised  provision  and  procurement  of  services  with  high  economies  of 
scale, barriers to entry will be artificially extended” (Impavido et al., 2010, p. 
161). 
Figure 25. Scale effects in DC schemes in the UK 
 
Source: BCG (based on own analysis and SynThesys). Data comprise all UK players with over 
GBP 1 bn assets, 100% pension share and over 95% DC share within pension. 
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Figure 26. Scale effects in DC schemes in Germany 
 
Source: BCG (based on own analysis and BaFin). Data comprise all German pension funds 
(‘pensionsfonds’) that report administration expenses with a DC share over 50%. 
The single market potential... 
The EU single market holds the potential to maximise scale economies while 
increasing the level of competition in the marketplace, delivering high-quality 
and low-cost pension solutions to beneficiaries. In addition, from a long-term 
investing perspective, high scale is needed to access less-liquid asset classes. A 
pan-European processing architecture would be central for both purposes. The 
experience with UCITS indicates that without a single processing architecture, 
the potential derived from market integration – in terms of cost efficiencies and 
choice for retail investors – cannot be exploited in full. 
In  practical  terms,  achieving  a  pan-European  processing  architecture  would 
require some form of tax harmonisation, which could only affect the structure 
of taxation, while keeping tax rates as a matter for member states. The benefits 
would be numerous, both in terms of increased convergence at macroeconomic 
level, increased pension adequacy and investor protection, and eased cross-
border  mobility  of  workers,  while  promoting  long-term  investing  though 
appropriate principles regarding solution design. 
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3.3  Addressing solution design: Long-term investing and 
retirement savings 
Issues identified... 
The market for private pensions may be characterised, in some of its segments, 
by the poor design of the solutions offered. A detailed assessment of solution 
design  is  not  possible,  given  the  lack  of  readily  accessible  and  comparable 
information and the widely different institutional and market settings in which 
private pensions are delivered in Europe. Yet, discussions during the meetings 
of  the  Task  Force  and  available  literature  point  towards  shortcomings  in  a 
number of areas, closely related to long-term investing: 
◦ Purpose and governance. Many DC solutions lack a clear retirement objective, 
beyond  their  branding  or  denomination,  for  instance  in  terms  of 
replacement rates, and bear too much resemblance to other (shorter-term) 
investment solutions readily available on the market. The lack of specific 
retirement purpose is closely linked to governance frictions and the absence 
of institutional mechanisms to align incentives for originators with long-
term  investing.  Notably,  the  use  of  long-term  investment  targets  to 
benchmark  performance  is  rare.  The  use  of  relative  benchmarks  is 
commonplace, even though absolute return objectives are more in line with 
retirement  savings.  The  reform  of  governance  appears  more  difficult  for 
small providers, given a relative lack of skills and resources. 
◦ Liquidity profile. DC solutions tend to emphasise relatively high liquidity for 
investors, regarding the frequency and length of redemption windows and 
the immediacy of execution of redemption orders.103 High liquidity in this 
sense is, however, incoherent with long-term investment for retirement. It 
does  not  allow  long-term  assets  to  be  held  to  maturity,  to  build  and 
maintain strategic equity stakes or investment in less-liquid asset classes. 
Redemptions  policies  need  to  be  well  aligned  with  the  liquidity  of  the 
underlying, both in the interest of investor protection and financial stability 
(de Manuel & Lannoo, 2012).104  
◦ Asset  allocation.  A  lack  of  clear  retirement  purpose  and  an  inadequate 
liquidity profile towards investors leads to asset allocation mixes skewed 
towards short-term instruments, with high liquidity and short maturities. 
                                                        
103 Taxation may, however, deter redemptions before retirement, making the actual liquidity 
profile of DC solutions in some markets far less-liquid. 
104 Pension solutions need to be fairly illiquid until retirement to maximise the potential risk-
adjusted return over the long term. The optimal level of liquidity is, however, a matter of 
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Solutions therefore tend to hold a disproportionate amount of liquid assets, 
including cash (Impavido et al., 2010). In addition, some solutions pursue 
inefficient  diversification  or  suffer  from  home  bias  –  sometimes  as  a 
consequence of inefficient government intervention (Oxera, 2007).  
◦ Investment practices. Similarly, investment practices are conditioned by the 
pursuit of short-term relative performance rather than long-term absolute 
return objectives. The available evidence indicates that most DC solutions 
do not consider asset liability management (ALM) practices. They do not 
distinguish  either,  within  each  solution,  between  return-seeking  and 
liability-hedging portfolios (Amenc et al., 2012).105 For life-cycle funds there 
is also evidence of the use of simplistic approaches, such as deterministic 
glide paths, without explicit consideration of related risks (Amenc et al., 
2012).106  In  connection  with  investment  practices,  it  is  apparent  that 
originators do not adequately account for investment costs or factor them 
into  investment  decisions.  Yet,  investment  costs  can  have  a considerable 
impact  on  net  returns,  given  compounding  and  long-term  investment 
horizons (AFM, 2011). 
◦ Risk management. Many solutions do not take into account key risks in close 
relation to their purpose. In particular, many DC solutions ignore risks in 
connection to the de-accumulation phase, such as annuity conversion risk or 
longevity risk (Antolín, 2008; Impavido et al., 2010).107 At portfolio level, the 
available evidence is that few solutions operate on a basis of risk budgeting 
or consider the potential benefits and drawbacks of risk hedging and risk 
insurance (Amenc et al., 2012).108 
                                                        
105 While there are no formal liabilities in defined contribution solutions (this being the main 
difference with defined benefit solutions), future consumption targets or replacement rates 
can be seen as absolute return objectives and invite the implementation of flexible asset-
liability management frameworks. 
106 A more in-depth discussion of life-cycling is provided in section 3.4. 
107 Annuity conversion risk is given by the short-term volatility of conversion rates utilised 
to transform a stock of money into an income stream, lasting typically until death. Annuity 
conversion rates are based on the projected long-term curve of interest rates at the time of 
conversion. Annuity conversion risk also refers to the risk of an accumulated sum in a 
defined contribution scheme would experience a fall in value, due to short-term volatility, at 
the time where redemption and conversion into an annuity is mandated by legislation or the 
pension contract. 
108 Risk hedging and risk insurance present trade-offs since any risk protection afforded (for 
instance, protection against changes in currency values, interest rates or inflation) typically 
needs to be weighed against any counterparty exposure generated and the expense incurred 
in risk hedging and risk insurance transactions. 98 | LONG-TERM INVESTING AND PERSONAL PENSIONS 
◦ Communications. Communications to holders of DC pension plans tend to be 
focused on the current market value of the accumulated investments and 
pay  insufficient  attention  to  retirement  goals  and  the  action  required  by 
beneficiaries to reasonably achieve those (Antolín and Harrison, 2012). The 
use of current market values in periodic statements to beneficiaries is useful 
information but can be heavily affected by short-term volatility in markets, 
which beneficiaries are typically not in a position to understand. Reactions 
to perceived loss can result in damaging behaviour by the investor, running 
against his/her own interest, such as stopping retirement savings (Horack 
et al., 2010). In many market segments, annual statements do not provide 
information about the progress achieved by the investor in achieving their 
retirement objectives (a given consumption level or replacement rate) this 
fails to convey the long-term nature of the solution and heightens the focus 
on current market values over other crucial aspects such as contribution 
levels. 
◦ Investor capabilities. In designing pension solutions, the characteristics and 
capabilities of the targeted investors are sometimes ignored and frequently 
misunderstood.  Many  solutions  grant  investors  a  wide  margin  of  choice 
regarding asset allocation, even when targeting cohorts with low levels of 
financial expertise and education (Clark et al., 2012). Choice is typically not 
only  given  at  the  time  of  subscription  but  also  during  the  life  of  the 
investment,  even  without  the  requirement  to  request  expert  advice  first. 
Most  individuals  are  ill-equipped  to make  asset  allocation  decisions  and 
benefit  from  simpler  solutions  where  allocations  are  managed 
independently by the solution originator in accordance with some criteria 
set  ad  initium  –  in  relation  to  the  level  of  risk  the  individual  is  able  or 
willing  to  bear,  including  as  retirement  approaches.  Non-assisted  choice 
during the life of the investment can result in knee-jerk reactions to short-
term price differences. There is evidence that, by being more hands-on with 
investment  options  in  a  retirement  solution,  investors  increase  the 
likelihood of underperforming, as they lack expertise and experience and 
are affected by biases, such as buying low and selling high (Weber, 2013). 
Despite the shortcomings identified above, good examples of solution design 
are present in the market place. In improving solution design, these solutions 
are useful benchmarks for industry, policy-makers and investors. In a perfectly 
efficient market place, supply and demand would gradually converge towards 
the  best  solutions.  Yet,  market  frictions  make  this  convergence  difficult  in 
practice, without regulatory and supervisory intervention. In addition to the 
supply and competition dynamics considered in section 3.2, important frictions 
are also present in the distribution of solutions, such as: i) closed networks – 
where only solutions originated by the distributor are sold, ii) inducements SAVING FOR RETIREMENT AND INVESTING FOR GROWTH | 99 
paid  by  originators  to  distributors  –  which  distort  the  incentives  for 
distributors to look primarily at the quality of solution design; iii) charging 
structures  in  advisory  services  –  where  they  favour  complex  over  simple 
solutions.109  
Trade-offs in solution design… 
In improving solution design, best practices in the market place and advances 
in scientific research should guide industry and policy-makers. The subsection 
above reviewed typical shortcomings in solution design. While there is ample 
room for improving the design of defined contribution pensions, a perfect and 
flawless design does not exist, as a number of trade-offs need to be balanced: 
◦ Customisation versus cost. Individuals have different levels of risk aversion, 
determined both by subjective preferences and objective factors – including 
their  income  and  wealth,  their  human capital  potential,  their  health  and 
their ability to pool resources within family structures (Clark et al., 2012). In 
a world without transaction costs, the optimal pension solution is specific to 
each  individual,  in  attention  to  their  level  of  risk  aversion.  The 
customisation  of  solutions  to  the  characteristics  of  each  beneficiary  is 
frequently  referred  to  as  life-styling.110  The  advantages  of  life-styling  and 
customisation,  in  terms  of  better  outcomes  for  individuals,  need  to  be 
weighed against their costs however. Higher standardisation leads to lower 
costs,  thanks  to  economies  of  scale  and  scope.  More  limited  choice  will 
inevitably leave some individuals with a retirement solution that is not fully 
in line with their risk budget and preferences. Yet, thanks to cost savings, 
such solutions may ultimately yield superior net returns. Uncertainty and 
information asymmetries make full customisation illusory in practice. But it 
is both feasible and economical to group individuals in a few cohorts with 
similar characteristics. It is argued that most individuals would benefit from 
high standardisation (section 3.1).111  
                                                        
109  Distribution  is  in  close  connection  with  solution  design  as,  frequently,  underlying 
products  and  instruments  are  accessed  by  investors  indirectly  through  an  account  or 
wrapper, tied to an advisory or sale service. From a practical point of view, the dividing line 
between distribution and origination can be very thin. 
110 For instance, an individual with an abundant and secure public pension or with a reliable 
income stream from real estate could afford to run more risk through a complementary 
funded pension solution, in exchange for potential higher return. 
111 Individuals with higher-risk budgets can typically access quality investment advice and 
non-standardised  investment  solutions  with  ease.  Standardised  solutions  should  focus 
instead on individuals with lower-risk budgets and more limited access to advice. 100 | LONG-TERM INVESTING AND PERSONAL PENSIONS 
◦ Sophistication versus cost. More sophistication in solution design, investment 
practices and risk management has the potential to deliver higher and more 
secure returns. Expertise and sophistication do, however, come at a cost that 
reduces net returns. Size, in terms of assets under management and number 
of participants, allows the spreading of fixed costs, making a higher degree 
of sophistication affordable. A good example is target-date funds; many of 
which apply deterministic glide-paths (equity allocation decreasing linearly 
with time) while more sophisticated stochastic modelling is found to reduce 
risk and increase risk-adjusted performance (Amenc et al., 2012). While the 
first  alternative  is  simpler  and  less  expensive,  the  second  is  more 
sophisticated and requires a higher degree of expertise and management. 
◦ Access to less-liquid asset classes versus size and cost. Many pension solutions, 
in particular defined contribution, do not invest in less-liquid asset classes, 
as these tend to: i) be incompatible with redemption policies, as advertised 
to investors, ii) carry high search and entry costs, and iii) require sizeable 
minimum investments (entry tickets). Scale eases access to less-liquid asset 
classes, by spreading related costs among a larger number of participants 
and facilitating diversification within a larger pool of managed assets. Less-
liquid assets have longer-term life-cycles and offer higher potential returns 
(illiquidity premium). Yet, direct investments in these are unlikely to lead to 
net positive returns, unless undertaken by schemes with sufficient scale. 
◦ Transferability versus long-term investing. Higher liquidity towards investors 
(in terms of redemptions) facilitates investor entry, transfers of savings and 
competition (section 1.2). However, the high liquidity of solution units is 
inconsistent with long-term investing and the first objective of any pension 
solution, namely, delivering a given level of income at retirement. In sum, 
while some liquidity is beneficial to enable healthy competition and efficient 
transfers (the consolidation of dispersed pension pots), it needs to be kept at 
a level compatible with long-term investing. 
As these trade-offs illustrate, no optimal pension solution exists and numerous 
factors need to be balanced to ensure private pensions fulfil their purpose and 
do so efficiently. Building a pan-European framework for personal pensions 
represents a unique opportunity to balance these trade-offs and improve the 
quality and accessibility of personal pensions in Europe, while creating a single 
market capable of achieving higher scale economies and net returns. The next 
section proposes a blueprint for pan-European personal pensions. 
3.4  A blueprint for pan-European personal pensions 
In 2012, the European Commission requested EIOPA to initiate reflections with 
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EU-wide  framework  for  the  activities  and  supervision  of  personal  pension 
funds.112 EIOPA formed a task force in 2013, composed of national supervisors, 
with the objective of delivering final advice to the Commission in 2015. A pan-
European framework for personal pension solutions is a unique opportunity 
to: i) increase the quality of solution design and their accessibility, ii) create a 
single  market  capable  of  delivering  better  value  to  investors,  and  iii)  to 
mobilise latent long-term funding towards long-term investing opportunities. 
In  sum,  a  well-devised  framework  has  the  potential  to  foster  both  income 
adequacy at retirement and economic growth (Group of Thirty, 2013; OECD, 
2013a).  
The design of a pan-European framework for personal pensions should seek to 
address both dismal net returns and low coverage, by targeting the underlying 
failures in market structure and shortcomings in solution design. The potential 
for realising efficiencies and scale economies in a single market is estimated to 
be  very  high  (European  Commission,  2010a).  But  the  challenge  also  lies  in 
ensuring that the benefits from these would be passed on to investors. A pan-
European  framework  should  therefore  give  full  consideration  to  market 
structure, in view of both the characteristics and behaviours of demand, and 
supply  and  competition  dynamics.  It  would  hence  need  to  ensure 
transparency,  facilitate  efficient  scale  and  the  optimal  bundling  of  services, 
within a supportive processing infrastructure (section 3.2). 
Regarding solution design, the deficiencies observed in terms of governance, 
liquidity profile, asset allocation, investment practices, risk management and 
communications indicate that the scope for improved outcomes for investors is 
also sizeable (section 3.3). Yet, no perfect solution design exists and several 
trade-offs need to be balanced, referring to i) the levels of customisation or life-
styling, sophistication in life-cycling and access to illiquid assets, versus ii) the 
costs linked to each of these features and the potential relief afforded by scale 
within a genuine single market (section 3.3).  
Regulation has a role to play both in addressing market structure and guiding 
solution design. By providing a narrow playing field for competition in default 
solutions and a pan-European processing infrastructure, regulation can ensure 
that schemes reach sufficient scale to be cost efficient and capable of accessing 
less-liquid asset classes. By providing a set of best-practice principles regarding 
solution design, in order to qualify for certification, regulation and supervision 
can pave the way for solutions of higher quality for all investors. Policy-makers 
                                                        
112  See  European  Commission  (2012).  The  work-stream  initiated  by  EIOPA  excludes 
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do not face this task in a vacuum but can rely on best practices already present 
in the market place and forerunning academic research (Amenc et al., 2012). 
In view of the former, the next subsections propose a possible blueprint for the 
regulatory and supervisory structure needed to build an EU single market for 
personal pensions. The framework proposed is composed of: i) principle-based 
rules concerning solution design for qualifying schemes and the alignment of 
incentives with long-term  investing,  ii)  flexible  product  rules  governing  the 
construction of the default option or options, iii) an accompanying industrial 
policy and processing architecture and ii) measures addressing communication 
and distribution. Table 10, at the end of this section, summarises the contents 
of the proposal in six building blocks. 
Principle-based rules to align solution design and incentives... 
It is proposed that qualifying solutions – which would be granted a passport 
for cross-border marketing and distribution to retail investors – should comply 
with  a  set  of  principle-based  rules  aimed  at  ensuring  the  high  quality  of 
solution design and a clear retirement purpose. Among others, these principles 
should include: 
◦ Having a long-term absolute return target, ideally framed as a replacement rate, 
or recurring income at retirement – where the benefits afforded by other sources 
of retirement income are known. 
◦ Offering a liquidity profile towards investors (redemption policy) coherent with 
the purpose of saving for retirement and compatible with long-term investing. 
◦ Giving explicit consideration to investment horizons, asset-liability management 
practices (where appropriate), strategic equity stakes and less-liquid asset classes. 
◦ Balancing life-styling and life-cycling features, while considering the impact of 
customisation and sophistication on costs and net returns. 
◦ Conducting  appropriate  risk  management  practices,  while  weighing  up  the 
benefits and drawbacks of risk hedging and risk insurance. 
◦ Giving full consideration to the de-accumulation phase, assisting individuals in 
making the best choice for de-accumulation and minimising related risks in case 
of planned annuity conversion.  
◦ Catering consciously to the level of expertise and behavioural patterns of the 
investor cohort targeted, so as to avoid requiring ill-equipped individuals to take 
periodic investment decisions. 
◦ Limiting, to the extent possible, the need for advisory services, for those investor 
cohorts for whom the fees for such services may significantly erode net returns. 
Principles regarding solution design should be appended by similar conduct of 
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◦ Aligning remuneration practices in line with the retirement objectives of clients 
and long-term investing. 
◦ Conducting full cost accounting and giving careful consideration to investment 
costs and their impact, given compounding. 
◦ Privileging scale, pooling and pan-European solutions over the fast proliferation 
of products, so as to achieve better value for investors. 
In the proposed framework, the principle-based rules for qualifying schemes 
presented above would be accompanied by flexible product rules governing 
solution design, asset allocation and investment practices for default solutions. 
Product rules for the default options... 
Default options are useful to overcome investor inaction and facilitate choice 
by investors, while serving as a benchmark against which alternative solutions 
can be compared. Hence, defaults also play a broader role, as cornerstones of 
market structure and competition dynamics. Designed to be adequate for most 
individuals, it is proposed that default options would be sold on an execution-
only basis; that is, without the need for investment advice,113 whose cost can 
significantly erode net returns over time. It is in this sense (options available on 
an execution-only basis) that the term default option is utilised in this section.  
Regarding the design of default solutions, best industry practice and academic 
research converge towards two main alternatives (Viceira, 2010): 
◦ Life-style solutions, customised to the risk budget of each cohort of investors 
(risk-based investing). Balanced funds, where they exploit the advantages of 
long-term horizons in retirement planning – via strategic equity allocations, 
investments in fixed income instruments with long maturities and holdings 
of less-liquid asset classes – are probably the most representative example 
of  life-style  retirement  solutions.  Balanced  funds  are  based  on 
diversification across asset classes but do not incorporate life-cycling.  
◦ Life-cycle solutions, which adjust asset allocation towards less risky assets as 
the  individual  approaches  retirement  (age-based  investing).  These  are 
target-date funds, embedding a glide-path whereby allocation to equity and 
equity-like instruments decreases with age, as the individual exhausts its 
potential to monetise their human capital. Target-date funds are primarily 
based  on  diversification  across  time  and,  only  secondarily,  across  asset 
classes.  As  the  individual  approaches  retirement,  allocations  to  fixed-
                                                        
113  The  potential  to  set  up  a  regulated  form  of  simplified  advice  restricted  to  default 
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income instruments increase, based on the assumption that bonds are less 
risky than equities. 
Each category of solutions has a number of advantages and drawbacks, which 
need  to  be  considered  in  close  connection  to  the  de-accumulation  phase. 
Target-date funds can help reduce annuity conversion risk, where such is the 
chosen pay-out option. By using fixed-income instruments to keep portfolio 
volatility under control, as retirement approaches they can help to protect the 
value of accumulated savings from ill-timed and severe falls in markets prices. 
Asset-liability management practices can be useful in this respect, even though 
no formal liabilities exist. Solution design and legislation nevertheless need to 
provide some flexibility regarding the timing for conversion into annuities, as a 
short-term drop in conversion rates can be very detrimental to beneficiaries. 
Balanced funds appear as a better alternative where a draw-down plan is the 
chosen pay-out option (Antolín et al., 2010). As life expectancy increases draw-
down plans may be more beneficial to investors, as they can continue to invest 
part of their capital during the many years in retirement. A draw-down plan 
may be combined with the purchase of a deferred annuity to cover longevity 
risk after a certain age has been reached. The market for annuities, as any other 
insurance market, should in any event be protected from adverse selection. 
Target-date funds and balanced funds are available in the market place but are 
not homogenous. Some are more sophisticated and better able to handle risk 
than others. For instance, many target-date funds follow deterministic glide 
paths, with linearly decreasing allocations to equities, which are automatic and 
cannot be revised based on market conditions and the relative expensiveness of 
assets  (Amenc  et  al.,  2012).  Similarly,  not  all  balanced  funds  have  a  clear 
retirement purpose or conduct appropriate  risk management. It is therefore 
important to identify best practices within these solutions categories. 
In identifying best practices, the trade-offs considered in section 3.3 also need 
to  be  considered.  Higher  sophistication  and  customisation  entail  costs  and 
lessen  the  potential  for  scale  economies,  as  they  reduce  the  ability  to  pool 
investments together. As a result, they may lead to similar or lower net returns 
than  simpler  and  more  standardised  solutions.  The  EU  single  market 
represents,  however,  a  significant  opportunity  to  raise  the  level  of 
sophistication and competition, without reducing net returns for investors, as 
efficient scale can be more easily reached within a bigger market. 
In sum, policy-makers can choose to establish a model of either balanced funds 
or target-date funds as default options. Or alternatively, they could allow both 
solution categories to be sold on an execution-only basis and leave the choice 
to  individuals,  with  the  support  of  publicly  provisioned  information.  In 
deciding which solution category should be regarded as default, system-wide 
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the potential to quickly reach efficient scale, cost-efficiency and enough size to 
invest  in  less-liquid  asset  classes  –  as  these  would  deliver  better  value  to 
investors.  These  considerations  support  fewer  choice  and  higher 
standardisation. 
Once the choice of the model for default solutions is made, it is proposed that 
product rules are enacted to ensure the quality of these solutions, in line with 
best practices. Such product rules should be well defined in order to provide 
clarity for investors and a level playing field for intermediaries, but flexible 
enough to allow originators to adapt to changing market circumstances. The 
adequacy of the rules would be periodically monitored by an EU supervisor 
(EIOPA)  with  powers  to  introduce  or  propose  changes  as  needed.  Product 
rules for default options would address areas such as: 
◦ Portfolio construction, eligible assets and permissible investment practices. 
◦ The liquidity profile of product units (redemption policies for investors). 
◦ Risk management function and practices. 
◦ Retirement objectives, connection with the de-accumulation phase and 
information to participants. 
Accompanying industrial policy and infrastructure... 
The characteristics of demand and supply in the market for personal pensions, 
as  considered  in  section  3.2  tend  to  promote  product  proliferation  and 
branding over solution quality and cost-efficiency. While introducing product 
rules for a default solution can indeed help in raising solution quality overall, 
also  in  the  non-default  space,  industrial  policy  measures  are  needed  to 
facilitate  scale  and  minimise  administration  costs,  while  fostering  healthy 
competition based on quality rather than marketing.  
It is argued that an EU single market for personal pensions may not deliver full 
value  to  investors  unless  it  is  accompanied  by  a  pan-European  processing 
infrastructure for qualifying solutions, following the successful model of the 
Swedish  Premium  Pension  System  (section  3.2).  The  existence  of  a  single 
clearing house and blind accounts would minimise administration costs, while 
facilitating comparability and switching across providers from everywhere in 
Europe. It would also allow for the establishment of genuinely pan-European 
products, simultaneously available for retail clients in all member states under 
equal pricing, in contrast to the situation observed in market segments such as 
UCITS, at the forefront of European integration today.  
The use of blind accounts would result in a reduction in marketing costs, and 
help focus competition on quality. End investors would not be communicated 
to providers, who would have as their only client a central agency with greater 
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seek rebates in management fees, as asset under management would grow, 
redistributing the benefits of scale economies towards beneficiaries. 
In addition, in the default solution space, product rules should be accompanied 
by a narrow playing field for competition among providers. It is proposed that 
each provider (whether insurer, asset manager or other intermediary) would 
only be allowed to offer one product per default solution category recognised 
by regulation. For instance, if balanced fund products are the chosen default, 
each provider would only be able to sell one of such funds. 
Targeted communications and tailored distribution... 
Communications with beneficiaries play an important role in the alignment of 
incentives of providers. As considered in section 3.3 (above), communications 
in DC pensions sometimes focus excessively on current market values over 
other important aspects – notably, whether the investor is on track to meet 
his/her goals. Where they solely emphasise current market values, affected by 
short-term volatility, communications fail to convey the long-term nature of 
pension solutions and can lead to knee-jerk reactions by investors. 
A pan-European framework for personal pension solutions would need to be 
complemented with rules governing the content and format of pre-contractual 
and ongoing (periodic) communications with beneficiaries. For pre-contractual 
disclosure, the key information document (KID) standard, proposed under the 
packaged retail investment products (PRIPs) initiative, is undoubtedly a step 
forward in easing understanding and comparison by beneficiaries, before they 
decide on their purchase. It is important that the KID standard is well adapted 
to the characteristics of investing under a long-term horizon with a retirement 
purpose – and should be aligned with the future EU framework for personal 
pension solutions.114 
As regards ongoing disclosure, regulatory intervention is needed to ensure that 
periodic communications with beneficiaries follow best practices and are very 
similar across intermediaries, at least for default solutions. Market best practice 
and academia converge towards de-emphasising market values and providing 
actionable information to investors (NAPF, 2012; Antolín & Harrison, 2012). 
The format and content of communications also need to factor in the cognitive 
and behavioural limitations of individuals (EIOPA, 2013a).115 
Defined contribution pensions have been frequently utilised to minimise the 
volatility of consumption (funding) during accumulation, ignoring the likely 
                                                        
114 See legislative proposal COM (2012) 352 final. 
115 For a more in-depth discussion of disclosure practices and investor protection see section 
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outcomes at retirement or leaving them as an afterthought, poorly explained to 
investors. As a result, contributions to DC pensions are much lower than in DB 
schemes  (section  3.1).  Communication  has  an  important  role  to  play  in 
reversing this perverse trend, empowering individuals to take action. Annual 
statements should therefore present easy-to-understand projections of the level 
of income that can be expected upon retirement and inform beneficiaries as to 
whether they are on track to meet their targets or need to contribute more.116 
In addition to communications, it is proposed that the future EU framework 
for personal pensions would be accompanied by specific distribution rules. In 
effect, distribution is the cornerstone of a successful market structure, capable 
of delivering value to investors. Distribution rules should distinguish between 
default and non-default solutions:  
◦  Default solutions would be sold on an execution-only basis, that is, without 
the  requirement  to  receive  investment  advice  or  other  forms  of  sale 
services. The availability of default solutions on an execution-only basis is 
judged to be an essential element of the proposed framework, as it would 
both foster access and scale – coupled with the other measures proposed, 
notably,  a  single  clearing  house  and  one  product  per  intermediary.  To 
ensure full understanding and eased choice, it is proposed that a single 
pan-European online information point would be established for default 
options.  On  this  site,  individuals  would  find  both  generic  information 
about each solution category and a comparison of all products available on 
the market under each default category (if more than one category).117 The 
potential  to  set  up  a  regulated  form  of  simplified  advice  restricted  to 
default solutions should be explored (FSA, 2011; Thoresen, 2008). 
◦  Non-default solutions would require investment advice to be purchased. Yet, 
it is proposed that special suitability requirements would apply, including 
broad market coverage and explicit consideration of the cumulative impact 
of costs and fees (section 2.3). 
Table 10 summarises this section by presenting the six building blocks of the 
proposed pan-European framework for personal pensions: i) principle-based 
regulation  of  solution  design,  ii)  product  regulation  for  default  options,  iii) 
conduct  of  business  rules for  solution  providers,  iv)  a  single  pan-European 
                                                        
116 Projections should, however, avoid giving any misrepresentation in relation to the lack of 
any formal guarantee. In addition to the content of periodic disclosure formats themselves, 
investor education, generic information and non-commercial advice are also important to 
avoid misrepresentation in this respect. Projections are based on numerous assumptions and 
are more uncertain the longer the time remaining before retirement. 
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processing infrastructure, v) communications with actionable information for 
investors,  and  vi)  a  supportive  distribution framework,  separate  for  default 
and other qualifying solutions. 
Table 10. Building blocks for a pan-European framework on personal pensions 
S O L U T I O N   D E S I G N     D E F A U L T   O P T I O N ( S )  
◦Principle-based regulation of solution 
design for non-default option(s) 
◦Explicit consideration of retirement 
purpose and long-term horizon  
◦Long-term absolute-return objectives 
in terms of replacement rates 
◦Consideration of de-accumulation 
phase (annuities, draw-downs) 
  ◦Product regulation of default option 
(or a limited number of options) 
◦Life-cycling and life-styling features or 
options (limited or no range) 
◦Eligible assets and permissible 
investment practices 
◦Allocation range per asset class, 
including less-liquid asset classes 
S O L U T I O N   P R O V I D E R S     I N F R A S T R U C T U R E  
◦Resources and expertise 
◦Alignment of incentives with long-term 
investment horizon 
◦Conflicts of interest in asset 
management value chain  
◦Industrial organisation and market 
structure policy (size, access to less-
liquid asset classes, cost) 
  ◦Pan-European processing architecture 
◦Pan-European clearing house for 
default options 
◦Administration of contributions 
◦Unbundling of services with lower 
efficient scale 
◦Uniform regulation of holding rights 
and transfers 
C O M M U N I C A T I O N     D I S T R I B U T I O N  
◦Full fee transparency, based on 
harmonised and simple fee structures 
◦Standardised pre-contractual 
disclosure, supported by a single pan-
European online information point 
◦Annual statements focused on 
replacement rates and follow-up 
actions by members 
  ◦Special suitability requirements, with 
broad market coverage and explicit 
consideration of the cumulative impact 
of costs and fees 
◦Professional standards for sales staff 
◦Execution-only access for default 
option(s) supported by publicly-
provisioned information  
Source: Author. 
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By way of practical examples, Boxes 9 and 10 respectively present a concept 
delivery framework and a concept default solution for pan-European personal 
pensions.  These  two  concepts  were  presented  by  the  representatives  from 
EFAMA  and  Nordea  during  the  Task  Force  meetings  and  are  broadly 
reproduced here for illustration purposes. 
 
Box 9. The example of the ´OCERP´ framework for personal pension products 
The Task Force discussions benefited from the presentation of a concept framework to 
organise the delivery of European pension solutions, under the acronym ´OCERP´ (officially 
certified European retirement plan). This box presents the main points of the presentation 
delivered to the Task Force by Bernard Delbecque (European Fund and Asset Management 
Association, EFAMA). The OCERP concept, as presented to the Task Force, would: 
◦ Be based on individual accounts (one account per person) and personal ownership of 
pension assets.  
◦ Comply with a set of unified standards for a personal pension product to qualify as 
an OCERP, for the governance and administrative organization of OCERP providers 
and for the distribution of the OCERP.  
◦ Be offered across Europe once certified by a competent authority in one member 
state, upon notice to the authorities of another member state.  
◦ Be offered by insurers, banks, asset managers and pension funds, as long as they 
comply with the regulatory framework for OCERPs and OCERP providers.  
◦ Restrict the range of investment options from which members can choose according 
to their different risk-return profiles. 
◦ Put in place mechanisms to help individuals make well-informed choices, notably by 
presenting the risk-reward profile of the investment options, standard pre-enrolment 
information and full transparency of costs. 
◦ Offer a default investment option to help individuals who may be unwilling to make a 
choice.  
◦ Offer  a  range  of  solutions  for  the  payout  phase,  including  annuities,  lump-sums, 
phased draw-down plans or combined solutions. 
Full details about the OCERP proposal can be found in EFAMA (2010) and EFAMA (2013), 
referenced in the bibliography of this report. 
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Box 10. The example of ´Simple´ balanced funds 
The Task Force discussions benefited from the presentation of a concept pension solution, 
branded ´Simple´ and an accompanying market structure. This box reproduces the main 
points of the presentation delivered by Ole Stæhr (Nordea Wealth Management) to the 
Task Force. This ´Simple´ concept, as presented to the Task Force, would involve: 
An investment vehicle rather than a wrapper… 
◦ 'Simple' products would be investment vehicles, which retail investors would be able 
to directly access as an alternative to UCITS, AIFs and securities. 
◦ 'Simple' could be part of a wrapper (for instance, the OCERP, an insurance policy or a 
defined-contribution  scheme  providing  insurance  cover  for  disability,  death  and 
longevity and different pay out models). It should also be possible to purchase the 
investment vehicle separately. 
A pan-European investment vehicle… 
◦ Regulated by EU legislation, it could be based on the proposed ELTIF framework for 
faster adoption and easier implementation. 
◦ National  supervisors  would  authorise  and award  the  'Simple'  status  to  qualifying 
products. 
◦ Certified  'Simple'  products  would  receive  a  European  passport  with  immediate 
effects for cross-border selling in all EU member states simultaneously. 
◦ Originators would hold 0.25% of assets under management in capital and at least 
€5m. 
◦ Every  'Simple'  product  would  be  denominated  in  EUR  currency  to  ensure 
comparability. 
Designed for the accumulation phase… 
◦ 'Simple' products would allow retail investors to accumulate and invest their savings. 
◦ The de-accumulation would be best managed by other products (annuities, draw-
down plans...)  
◦ As the objective would be to store wealth, no dividends would be paid out. 
Set as the default investment solution… 
◦ To maximise the economies of scale and the derived cost-effectiveness. 
◦ To facilitate investment decisions and steer asset allocation in line with investment 
horizons, helping investors to overcome myopic risk aversion. 
Limited to one 'Simple' per product originator… 
◦ To limit choice and foster competition, increasing the value for investors, as a result 
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◦ Originators would label the product 'Simple' + brand name (for instance, 'Simple' 
Nordea) 
With full transparency and easy comparability… 
◦ A single homepage (such as www.simple.org) would hold information in all EU-27 
languages about the product concept and all 'Simple' products available in the EU 
market. 
◦ Standardised disclosure and product information.  
◦ Product providers would pay an annual fee for administering the product concept 
and website. 
Asset allocation in line with long-term investment horizon… 
◦ EU guidelines (issued by the EU supervisor) would set asset allocation targets and 
permissible ranges. 
◦ Moderate  allocation  to  alternative  asset  classes,  including  infrastructure,  venture 
capital, non-listed equities, real estate or high-quality securitisation. 
Asset sector  Target 
allocation (%) 
Asset class  Target 
allocation (%) 
Allocation 
range (%) 
Stocks  30  European equities  10  20-40 
Global equities  20  45-70 
Bonds  60  European Investment grade  40  45-70 
Global investment grade  15   
Global High Yield  5  0-10 
Alternatives  10  Private equity / venture capital  2.5  0-5 
Real Estate  5  0-10 
EU infrastructure  2.5  0-5 
◦ Benchmarking would be discouraged; instead the goal would be to maximise returns 
within the guidelines (allocation ranges). 
◦ The use of investment hedging instruments would be out of scope (except currency 
derivatives against euro since the funds would be euro denominated). 
Incorporating sustainability criteria… 
◦ Voting shareholder proxies would be in accordance with environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) criteria. 
◦ Commitment to engagement with management on issues such as ESG disclosure, 
executive compensation, worker safety, climate change and others. 
◦ Initiating  or  supporting  shareholder  resolutions  at  annual  stockholders  meetings 
aimed at persuading companies to adopt higher standards of responsibility.  
◦ Supporting  public  policy  initiatives  that  promote  greater  corporate  sustainability, 
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Easily transferable… 
◦ It is suggested that redemption should be possible quarterly but be claimed at least 
14 days before the end of each quarter.  
◦ Payments would be made electronically only. 
And built upon efficient pan-European administration… 
◦ Within a freely competitive single market, driven by completion on both costs and 
investment performance.  
◦ The platform for 'Simple' should include a central clearing house that would route 
subscriptions and redemptions to the preferred 'Simple' originator. 
◦ 'Simple'  originators  would  have  the  responsibility  of  investing  and  providing 
information to the clearing house. 
◦ Individual taxation would need to be handled locally by the providers of wrappers 
that would incorporate a 'Simple' product as underlying investment similar to UCITS 
funds, securities and others. The wrapper would utilise the existing contribution-
collection infrastructure in the local market. 
 
* * * * 
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ANNEXES 
Annex 1. Additional Tables 
 
Table A.1: Evolution of household financial holdings 2000-2010, extended table* 
 
Currency and 
deposits 
Securities other 
than shares 
Shares and other 
equity 
Insurance 
technical 
reserves 
Other holdings 
2000  2010  2000  2010  2000  2010  2000  2010  2000  2010 
Austria  51%  47%  7%  9%  24%  22%  18%  20%  1%  2% 
Belgium  21%  32%  19%  9%  44%  31%  13%  26%  3%  1% 
Czech Rep.  51%  56%  0%  1%  39%  25%  7%  14%  2%  4% 
Denmark  21%  19%  8%  4%  23%  29%  46%  47%  2%  1% 
Estonia  34%  21%  0%  0%  55%  69%  1%  6%  10%  4% 
Finland  33%  35%  1%  3%  44%  40%  19%  19%  3%  2% 
France  32%  29%  3%  2%  32%  24%  28%  37%  5%  8% 
Germany  35%  40%  6%  5%  28%  19%  29%  35%  1%  1% 
Greece  44%  77%  8%  8%  43%  9%  2%  4%  2%  2% 
Hungary  42%  34%  9%  6%  34%  36%  10%  21%  6%  4% 
Italy  23%  30%  17%  19%  46%  30%  11%  18%  3%  3% 
Netherlands  17%  23%  3%  2%  26%  13%  52%  61%  2%  1% 
Poland  60%  43%  1%  1%  22%  27%  7%  27%  10%  3% 
Portugal  36%  37%  4%  6%  32%  27%  12%  19%  15%  10% 
Slovak Rep.  78%  65%  3%  2%  6%  8%  1%  21%  12%  5% 
Spain  40%  49%  3%  3%  40%  29%  14%  15%  3%  4% 
Sweden  15%  18%  3%  2%  41%  40%  40%  39%  1%  2% 
United King.  21%  28%  1%  1%  23%  15%  52%  52%  3%  3% 
Norway  33%  32%  1%  0%  18%  13%  37%  40%  11%  15% 
Switzerland  23%  30%  9%  7%  27%  20%  41%  42%  0%  0% 
Europe  35%  37%  5%  4%  32%  26%  22%  28%  5%  4% 
Canada  19%  23%  5%  2%  34%  35%  36%  36%  6%  4% 
Japan  54%  54%  4%  3%  11%  11%  27%  28%  4%  4% 
United States  10%  14%  7%  11%  50%  43%  31%  30%  2%  2% 
*Data from national accounts. Europe includes listed countries. See also Figure 6 in Chapter 1. 
Source: OECD (2013b). 
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Table A.2: Stylised illustration of the cumulative impact of costs on net returns* 
   
Assumed yearly rate of return  3%  3%  3%  3%  3%  3%  3% 
   
Yearly charge on accumulated value  0.00%  0.15%  0.25%  0.50%  0.75%  1.00%  2.00% 
   
Difference in yearly charge  -  0.15%  0.10%  0.25%  0.25%  0.25%  1.00% 
                   
Year t  Yearly contributions  Accumulated contributions  Value year t  Value year t  Value year t  Value year t  Value year t  Value year t  Value year t 
                   
10  10,000  100,000  118,077.96  117,065.38  116,395.52  114,738.86  113,107.58  111,501.29  105,318.57 
                   
   
Total costs at end year 10  0.00  1,012.58  1,682.44  3,339.10  4,970.38  6,576.67  12,759.39 
    Total net returns at end year 10  18,077.96  17,065.38  16,395.52  14,738.86  13,107.58  11,501.29  5,318.57 
   
% Costs over zero-cost case  -  0.86%  1.42%  2.83%  4.21%  5.57%  10.81% 
   
% Returns over principal invested  -  17.07%  16.40%  14.74%  13.11%  11.50%  5.32% 
   
Total cost / total net returns  -  5.93%  10.26%  22.66%  37.92%  57.18%  239.90% 
                   
20  10,000  200,000  276,764.86  272,047.44  268,954.43  261,399.50  254,091.34  247,021.50  220,966.53 
                   
   
Total costs at end year 20  0.00  4,717.42  7,810.43  15,365.36  22,673.52  29,743.36  55,798.33 
    Total net returns at end year 20  76,764.86  72,047.44  68,954.43  61,399.50  54,091.34  47,021.50  20,966.53 
   
% Costs over zero-cost case  -  1.70%  2.82%  5.55%  8.19%  10.75%  20.16% 
   
% Returns over principal invested  -  36.02%  34.48%  30.70%  27.05%  23.51%  10.48% 
    Total cost / total net returns  -  6.55%  11.33%  25.03%  41.92%  63.25%  266.13% 
                   
30  10,000  300,000  490,026.78  477,227.13  468,912.46  448,862.96  429,821.58  411,734.65  347,956.95 
                   
   
Total costs at end year 30  0.00  12,799.66  21,114.32  41,163.82  60,205.21  78,292.13  142,069.83 
    Total net returns at end year 30  190,026.78  177,227.13  168,912.46  148,862.96  129,821.58  111,734.65  47,956.95 
   
% Costs over zero-cost case  -  2.61%  4.31%  8.40%  12.29%  15.98%  28.99% 
   
% Returns over principal invested  -  59.08%  56.30%  49.62%  43.27%  37.24%  15.99% 
    Total cost / total net returns  -  7.22%  12.50%  27.65%  46.38%  70.07%  296.24% 
* Charge rate applied on the value of accumulated principal and returns at the end of each year. A constant rate of return of 3% per year is assumed. 
Source: Author.   122  
Annex 2. Task Force Participants 
 
Chairman 
 
Allan Polack 
Chief Executive Officer 
Nordea Asset Management 
 
 
Rapporteurs 
 
Mirzha de Manuel Aramendía 
Research Fellow 
CEPS - Centre for European Policy Studies 
ECMI - European Capital Markets Institute 
 
Karel Lannoo 
Chief Executive Officer 
CEPS - Centre for European Policy Studies 
ECMI - European Capital Markets Institute 
 
 
Task Force Members 
 
Heiko Beck 
Managing Director 
Union Asset Management Holding 
 
Patrice Bergé-Vincent 
Partner Asset Management Regulatory 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
 
Pierre Bollon 
Director General 
AFG - Association Française de la Gestion 
Financière 
 
Ana Breda 
Economic Advisor 
EFAMA - European Fund and Asset Management 
Association 
 
Lachlan Burn 
Partner - Capital Markets 
Linklaters 
 
James Burnham 
Director 
EVCA - European Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Association 
 
Simon Burns 
Public Affairs and Research Executive 
BVCA - British Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Association 
 
Michael Collins 
Public Affairs Director 
EVCA - European Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Association 
 
Joanna Cound 
Managing Director 
Government Affairs and Public Policy 
BlackRock 
 
Jean-Baptiste de Franssu 
Chairman 
Incipit 
 
Nine de Graaf 
Trainee Public Affairs 
PGGM 
 
Michel de Jonge 
Expert Policy Advisor EU Public Affairs 
PGGM 
 
Laurent de Smedt 
Policy Officer 
EVCA - European Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Association 
 
Laure Delahousse 
Director of Asset Management and Public Affairs 
AFG - Association Française de la Gestion 
Financière 
   SAVING FOR RETIREMENT AND INVESTING FOR GROWTH | 123 
 
Bernard Delbecque 
Director of Economics and Research 
EFAMA - European Fund and Asset 
Management Association 
 
Carine Delfrayssi 
Deputy Head of International Affairs 
AFG - Association Française de la Gestion 
Financière 
 
Carey Evans 
Vice President and Associate Director 
Fleishman Hillard 
 
Claire Fargeot 
Head of Standards and Financial Market Integrity 
EMEA 
CFA Institute 
 
Stephen Fisher 
Managing Director 
Government Affairs and Public Policy 
BlackRock 
 
Martin Gilbert 
Chief Executive Officer 
Aberdeen Asset Management 
 
Jane Gimber 
Account Manager Financial Services Practice 
Fleishman-Hillard 
 
Andreas Guth 
Public Affairs Manager 
INREV - European Association for Investors in 
Non-Listed Real Estate Vehicles 
 
Julia Hobart 
Partner  
Oliver Wyman 
 
Simon Horner 
Deputy Director Strategy 
BVCA - British Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Association 
 
Christian Hott 
Senior Economist 
Government and Industry Affairs 
Zurich Insurance Company 
 
Stephane Janin 
Director, Head of International Affairs Division 
AFG - Association Française de la Gestion 
Financière 
 
Fiona Joseph 
European Business Manager - Public Policy 
Aberdeen Asset Management 
 
Patrik Karlsson 
Head of EU Public Affairs, Funds  
Prudential 
 
Anne Keane 
Director 
Afore Consulting 
 
Jesper Kjerside 
Partner and Managing Director 
BCG - Boston Consulting Group 
 
Maroussia Klep 
Associate 
Kreab Gavin Anderson 
 
Kurt Kotzegger 
Chief Investment Officer 
Equities and Asset Allocation 
Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich 
 
Agathe Legris 
Executive Associate 
Kreab Gavin Anderson 
 
Andreas Maskow 
Attorney-at-Law 
Union Asset Management 
 
Francesca Mollica 
Director 
Kreab Gavin Anderson 
 
Anders Nordheim 
Head of Research and Policy 
Eurosif 
 
Burkhard Ober 
Head of European Affairs Office Brussels 
Allianz 
 
Matt Orsagh 
Director of Capital Markets Policy 
CFA Institute (USA) 
   124 | TASK FORCE PARTICIPANTS AND OBSERVERS 
 
Martin Parkes 
Director, Government Affairs and Public Policy 
BlackRock 
 
Paul Pasquali 
Head of EU Liaison Office 
Raiffeisen Zentralbank 
 
Anne Plöger 
Regulatory Policy Advisor, European Affairs 
Office 
Allianz 
 
Pablo Portugal 
Advocacy 
AFME - Finance for Europe 
 
Per Bremer Rasmussen 
Chief Executive Officer 
Danish Insurance Association 
 
Nickolas Reinhardt 
Director 
Afore Consulting 
 
Donald Ricketts 
Head of Financial Services, Senior Vice President 
and Partner, DirectorFinancial Services 
Fleishman-Hillard 
 
Jeff Rupp 
Director Public Affairs 
INREV - European Association for Investors in 
Non-Listed Real Estate Vehicles 
 
Kyoko Sakuma 
Senior Research Fellow  
Solvay Brussels School of Economics and 
Management 
 
Alexandra Schick 
Manager, Legal and Public Affairs 
Union Asset Management 
 
Gordon Scott 
Head of EU Policy Development and Public 
Affairs 
Prudential 
 
Khalid Sheikh 
Senior Strategist 
PGGM 
 
Hannes Sigurdsson 
Deputy Director General 
Confederation of Icelandic Employers 
 
Cliff Speed 
Managing Director 
Blackrock Client Solutions 
 
Ole Leonard Stæhr 
Executive Advisor 
Nordea Wealth Management 
 
Sandrell Sultana 
Associate Director 
Kreab Gavin Anderson 
 
Jaap van Dam 
Director Investment Strategy  
PGGM 
 
Ron van Grinsven 
Legal Counsel 
PGGM 
 
Samantha Walker 
Head Public Affairs 
Aberdeen Asset Management 
 
Rick Watson 
Head of Capital Markets 
AFME - Finance for Europe 
 
Andreas Witzani 
Member of the Board 
Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich 
 
Lara Wolters 
Consultant 
Afore Consulting 
 
Alastair Woodward 
Conducting Officer and Head of Risk 
Luxembourg 
Aberdeen Global Services 
 
 
 
 SAVING FOR RETIREMENT AND INVESTING FOR GROWTH | 125 
Task Force Observers 
 
Sophie Barbier 
Advisor 
Caisse des Dépôts 
 
Christophe Bourdillon 
Advisor European Public Affairs  
Caisse des Dépôts 
 
François Calonne 
Director for European and International Affairs 
Caisse des Dépôts 
 
Gordon Clark 
Director of the Smith School of Enterprise and the 
Environment 
University of Oxford 
 
Marc-Antoine Coursaget 
Representative European Public Affairs Office 
Caisse des Dépôts 
 
Pierre Darbre 
Policy Officer 
DG Internal Market and Services / Insurance and 
Pensions Unit 
European Commission 
 
Olivier Debande 
Managerial Adviser, Institutional Strategy 
EIB - European Investment Bank 
 
Raffaele Della Croce  
Economist, Financial Affairs Division 
OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development 
 
Robin Edme 
Senior Advisor Responsible Finance  
Office of the Commissioner General for 
Sustainable Development 
French Ministry of Ecology and Energy 
 
Andrea Fenech Gonzaga 
Lawyer  
DG Internal Market and Services / Asset 
Management Unit 
European Commission 
 
Mark Fenton-O'Creevy 
Professor of Organisational Behaviour  
Open University 
 
Christelle Fontbonne-Proniewski 
Policy Officer  
DG Internal Market and Services / Accounting 
and Financial Reporting 
Policy Officer 
 
Julie Galbo 
Deputy Director General 
Finanstilsynet  (Danish Financial Services 
Authority) 
 
Helmut Gründl 
Managing Director  
ICIR - International Center for Insurance 
Regulation 
 
Cees Karregat 
Senior Expert - Pensions  
EIOPA - European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority  
 
Marcin Kawinski 
Consumer and Financial Services Expert 
Warsaw School of Economics 
 
Barthold Kuipers 
Policy Officer - Pensions  
EIOPA - European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority 
 
Jung-Duk Lichtenberger 
Policy Officer  
DG Internal Market and Services/Insurance and 
Pensions Unit 
European Commission 
 
Michael Mainelli 
Principal Advisor 
Long Finance 
 
Anne-Françoise Mélot 
Deputy Head of Unit  
DG Internal Market and Services / Accounting 
and Financial Reporting 
European Commission 
   126 | TASK FORCE PARTICIPANTS AND OBSERVERS 
 
Ian Michael 
Manager, Risk and Regulation, Financial 
Services Faculty 
ICAEW - Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales 
 
Alfredo Panarella 
Senior Head of Unit, Institutional Strategy 
EIB - European Investment Bank 
 
Eric Perée 
Associate Director, Institutional Affairs 
EIB - European Investment Bank 
 
Guillaume Prache 
Managing Director 
EuroFinuse 
 
Dawn Robey 
Policy Officer 
DG Internal Market and Services / Accounting 
and Financial Reporting 
European Commission 
 
Almoro Rubin de Cervin 
Deputy Head of Unit 
DG Internal Market and Services / Financial 
Services Policy, Relations with the Council 
European Commission 
 
Timothy Shakesby 
Policy Analyst 
DG  Internal Market and Services / Asset 
Management Unit 
European Commission 
 
Robert Specterman 
Policy Officer 
DG Internal Market and Services / Financial 
Services Policy, Relations with the Council 
European Commission 
 
Diego Valiante 
ECMI Head of Research and CEPS Research 
Fellow 
ECMI - European Capital Markets Institute 
CEPS - Centre for European Policy Studies 
 
 
Lina Vatenaite 
Legal Officer 
DG  Internal Market and Services / Asset 
Management Unit 
European Commission 
 
Juan Manuel Viver 
Policy Officer 
EuroFinuse 
 
Tomas Walter 
Senior Expert Solvency II 
EIOPA - European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority 
 
Esther Wandel 
Administrator 
DG  Internal Market and Services / Asset 
Management Unit 
European Commission 
 
Juan Yermo 
Deputy Head  
Financial Affairs Division 
OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development 
 
 
---------------------------- 
Members are individuals who participated in the Task Force. Members may represent a private 
company, an association, a consumer group, a non-governmental organisation, or any other entity 
pursuing a commercial or non-commercial interest in the topics discussed. Members contributed 
to Task Force meetings and provided input to the discussions through presentations and relevant 
materials for the Final Report. Members contributed to the expenses of the Task Force through a 
general fee paid by their respective organisation. The findings of the Final Report, independently 
drafted by CEPS-ECMI Research Fellow, Mirzha de Manuel, do not necessarily reflect the views 
expressed by Members or their respective organisations (see disclaimer at beginning of Report).  
Observers are academics, policy-makers, regulators and supervisors, representing their own views 
or those of a governmental authority, European institution or other public body. Observers have SAVING FOR RETIREMENT AND INVESTING FOR GROWTH | 127 
regularly followed the work of the Task Force, attended one or more meetings, or contributed to 
the discussion through presentations or other materials.  
Rapporteurs are the CEPS-ECMI experts who independently proposed and developed the research 
programme for the Task Force, conducted all relevant research and drafted the Final Report. 
Chair is an internationally recognised expert appointed by CEPS to steer the dialogue during the 
meetings and ensure that all interests around the table were sufficiently heard. The Chair also 
advised on the general conduct of the Task Force. The Chair, however, was not involved in the 
drafting of the Final Report and cannot be identified in any way with its authorship. 
 